ERITREAN OFFICIALS: NCP/SPLM COALITION AND UNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000641 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND AF/E, NEA FOR DAS GGRAY NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/23/2012 TAGS: PREL PGOV SU ER CD LY SUBJECT: ERITREAN OFFICIALS: NCP/SPLM COALITION AND UNITY VERSUS RISKY ELECTIONS REF: A. KHARTOUM 637 ¶B. KHARTOUM 628 KHARTOUM 00000641 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and ( d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Eritrean policy toward Sudan centers on two priorities, senior Eritrean officials told the Charge d'Affaires in a recent meeting: facilitating a partnership between the NCP and the SPLM that maintains the country's unity and defusing the Sudan-Chad conflict. Asmara continues to view a "comprehensive approach" to Sudan's internal tensions as the best method for ensuring stability, attributing the failure to end the marginalization--and conflict--in Darfur and the East to political cross-currents with the Government of National Unity. Predicting that elections in 2009 will "collapse the CPA," Eritrea prefers a postponement in favor of an NCP/SPLM "grand coalition" and a political settlement in Darfur. Believing that the NCP has softened its position toward N'djamena, the officials blamed Libya for obstructing reconciliation between the two governments. End summary. -------------- -------------- Eritrean Priorities: Unity, Ending Chad/Sudan Conflict -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In an April 24 meeting with CDA Fernandez and Poloffs, Eritrean officials Yemane Gharaeb and Abdullah Jabr stated that their country's policy toward Sudan centers on two priorities: 1) Facilitating a common understanding between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) on maintaining Sudan's unity, and 2) Defusing the conflict between Sudan and Chad. Asmara has always supported a "comprehensive approach" to resolving Sudan's internal tensions, said Gharaeb, and while addressing the Darfur conflict is important, "Sudan's problems are indivisible." Gharaeb affirmed that Eritrea continues to view unity as the best outcome of the 2011 referendum on Southern Sudan. -------------- NCP, SPLM Positions -------------- ¶3. (C) While Eritrea continues to press the NCP to maintain its partnership with the SPLM and follow a more accommodating course that ensures unity rather than tactical political steps to gain the upper hand, the NCP "does not countenance" this approach, according to Gharaeb. Meanwhile, the SPLM has yet to refine its strategy, vacillating between support for unity and the pursuit of an independent Southern Sudan. Gharaeb posited that the SPLM remains "potentially strong" in the North but has been unable to capitalize on the groundswell of support among Sudan's marginalized populations. The status of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement (ESPA) exemplifies these trends. Eastern Front leaders complained to Gharaeb and Jabr during an April 24 meeting in Khartoum that neither the NCP nor the SPLM are serious about the ESPA, despite the fact that the Government of National Unity (GNU) signed the agreement, which committed both political parties to its implementation. Yemane noted that SPLM leader Malik Agar had led the GNU talks with the Eastern Front when NCP negotiator Mustafa Othman Ismail wasn't present. -------------- Elections May Collapse CPA -------------- ¶4. (C) Concerned that the risks inherent in the 2009 elections are too great, Gharaeb stated that Eritrea - while not opposed in principle to Sudanese elections - would like to see them postponed "because there are too many unknowns and they may lead to the collapse of the CPA." Instead, Asmara has urged the parties to look into a "grand coalition" that, if coupled with a political settlement for Darfur, will stabilize the country through the transition period until the referendum in 2011. However, neither the NCP nor the SPLM want to be perceived as suggesting a deviation from the KHARTOUM 00000641 002.2 OF 003 timeline in the CPA and are therefore reticent to discuss any adjustment that may prove to be beneficial to the country and the region in the long-term. Gharaeb suggested that the international community discuss such a proposal "openly" with the parties to provide them with political cover. -------------- -------------- NCP, SPLM Should Assume Responsibilities on Darfur -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The cross-currents within the GNU have prolonged the Darfur crisis. Acknowledging that the Darfur rebel movements remain "weak and divided," Gharaeb asserted that this fact does not absolve the NCP of its responsibility to address the crisis. The SPLM has similarly failed to take adequate steps on Darfur, despite its pivotal role in the GNU. "We need to push the SPLM to say, 'we, as members of the national unity government, have a responsibility for Darfur and cannot blame the situation on the National Congress and the movements,'" said Gharaeb. The NCP can also not just sit back and blame the rebels and international community for not solving a problem created by the Sudanese, "Khartoum could do more to solve this." -------------- Bringing the Fur into the Peace Process -------------- ¶6. (C) Gharaeb further suggested that the UN/AU mediation "needed a new approach" and that Eritrea and the U.S. "reach a certain consensus among ourselves about which direction to push." A key element is to bring the Fur into the peace process, he said, characterizing Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) faction leader Ahmed Abdulshafie as "not very representative of the Fur" and rival SLA leader Abdulwahid al Nur as "obstinate." Eritrea is monitoring discrete unification discussions among Fur military commanders in the field, "which have gone a certain distance," according to Gharaeb. (Note: Gharaeb is likely referring to the efforts of Suleiman Marjan, an influential Fur commander, to bridge the SLA factions in North Darfur that have split from Abdulwahid with those in Jebel Marra, West Darfur that remain allied with him. End note.) -------------- -------------- Sudan Softening on Chad but Libya Obstructing Peace -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) During President Bashir's recent visit to Asmara, President Afwerki noted that Sudan-Chad tensions preclude an improvement in the security or humanitarian situation in Darfur, according to Gharaeb. His and Jabr's visit to Khartoum is an attempt to ameliorate the situation after Bashir indicated he "is more amenable to looking at other options" beyond regime change in N'djamena. Even though they came close, overthrowing Deby turned out to be harder than they thought. "We got them (the NCP) to say that if Chad stopped support for the Darfur rebels, they could look at a rapprochement," claimed Gharaeb. He said that Libya, however, is "not being helpful" in forging a compromise and called on the U.S., France, and other Western governments to play a more robust role, which "is critical to help Darfur." Jabr plans to attend the April 28 Contact Group meeting in Tripoli and will attempt to mitigate Libya's "obstruction on this issue." -------------- USG, Eritrea Somewhat Consistent on Sudan -------------- ¶8. (C) CDA Fernandez stated that, based on Gharaeb's remarks, much of Eritrean policy toward Sudan is consistent with USG views. He noted that the U.S. is urging both N'djamena and Khartoum to "scale back their confrontation" and pressing Deby to reach out to the marginalized elements in Chadian society. He concurred with Gharaeb's statement that the NCP bears ultimate responsibility for resolving the Darfur crisis "because they created it." CDA Fernandez also said that while the USG prefers the preservation of Sudan's unity, the U.S. is not "dogmatic" but wants the secession of Southern Sudan to be handled through a "deliberative process." He added that US support for the GOSS and SPLM is evident in the largest US development program in Africa taking place in South Sudan. In answer to a question from the Charge, a KHARTOUM 00000641 003.2 OF 003 mostly silent Abdullah Jabr intimated that Sudan keeps the "Jihad Eritrea" group on ice in Sudan in case they ever need to unleash them again against Asmara. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Though Eritrean influence in Darfur has waned since their attempt to forge a unified movement of several SLA factions collapsed in the fall of 2007, there is no reason to assume that Eritrea will remain on the sidelines for long, making them both useful interlocutors and potential protagonists in Sudan's ongoing conflicts. Though astute veteran observers of Sudan, Gharaeb and Jabr have at times implemented their country's political and financial support for Sudanese rebel movements, fomenting unrest within the borders of their dominating neighbor. However, their frank criticism of the SPLM, a long-time ally, and their prescription for a "grand coalition" rather than elections may signify genuine concern that Sudan's internal dysfunction may spin out of control during the next year, with grave repercussions throughout the region. End comment. ¶10. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ