ROME TALKS - INITIAL NCP PERCEPTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000616 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: ROME TALKS - INITIAL NCP PERCEPTIONS Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) "The Rome talks were useful and even though we didn't get much out of them, we're looking at the bigger picture," NCP negotiator Yahia Bebiker, who was present in Rome, told CDA Fernandez April 21. Bebiker said the NCP viewed the talks as a "good start" as long as the two sides begin to commit themselves to a number of actions. The NCP view is that Williamson and Nafie are serious about the process and both have the capacity to "make things happen." Bebiker said Presidential Advisor Nafie would chair an inter-departmental meeting later that same day to prepare a briefing for President Bashir and to begin preparations for a follow-up meeting in May. ¶2. (C) Bebiker said one of his jobs would be to "begin working ON the things that we want." CDA Fernandez pointed out that this would be very important - to clearly define realistic items that the Sudanese want from these negotiations. Notably, Bebiker did not jump directly to the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism or removal of sanctions. On the contrary, he mentioned two items that could be used as confidence building measures - waivers for spare train locomotive parts that are subject to sanctions, and the release of some containers in Europe (also apparently held up by US sanctions). ¶3. (C) CDA FQnandez noted that Special Envoy Williamson will testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee later this week and that already the Save Darfur coalition and others had criticized the Rome talks. Bebiker said he hoped that the Rome talks would be of assistance to Williamson, as the NCP had offered to assist with several items that will lead to greater humanitarian access and security and the rapid deployment of UNAMID. CDA Fernandez noted the gap between advocacy NGOs, who are criticizing the US Administration's initiative to engage with the GOS, and humanitarian NGOs who are supportive of the US initiative because they know this will lead to improved conditions ON the ground in Darfur. Bebiker observed that it is easy and sells well to criticize the Sudanese government from afar. CDA wryly responded that the NCP has done a "poor job" of winning NGOs working in Sudan to the NCP's point of view because of frequent regime harassment. ¶4. (C) Bebiker urged continued engagement, noting that it is the best hope for implementation of the CPA. He said the GOS is well aware of the "dichotomous nature" of US policy toward Sudan. ON the one hand the US negotiates with the GOS to ensure peace, as with the CPA, while ON the other hand the US seeks to punish the GOS. He cautioned that the SPLM and other forces in Sudan are watching carefully and implied that they will also make decisions ON CPA implementation and engagement with the regime based ON the US stance toward the regime. CDA noted that these talks are the best opportunity for improved relations in quite a while and urged the NCP not to do anything to derail the process. ¶5. (C) Comment: Despite the relatively thin outcome from Rome, the NCP appears to view the talks as a success largely because the NCP's primary goal is to improve relations. In this regard, follow-up meetings and continued discussions of small confidence building measures serves to achieve that goal. The NCP seems to know that the US is not going to remove Sudan from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism or remove all sanctions at this time. However, continued high-level and engagement and negotiations with several modest deliverables (such as waiver for train parts) serves their objectives in the short term - the legitimacy that comes from engagement from the US. Without committing to anything that is politically unfeasible in the US, we can pursue our goals in Darfur and ON the CPA by continuing to engage modestly with the Sudanese. It is important to keep expectations realistically low while recognizing both that this is a regime that can absolutely not be trusted but which can be gingerly moved in the right direction. This means there is a real opportunity to ameliorate human suffering in Darfur and speed up UNAMID deployment but little chance of changing the essential nature of a regime equally brutal and pragmatic in pursuit of its main goal: holding onto power. End comment. KHARTOUM 00000616 002 OF 002 FERNANDEZ