ROME TALKS - INITIAL NCP PERCEPTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000616

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: ROME TALKS - INITIAL NCP PERCEPTIONS


Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) "The Rome talks were useful and even though we didn't
get much out of them, we're looking at the bigger picture,"
NCP negotiator Yahia Bebiker, who was present in Rome, told
CDA Fernandez April 21. Bebiker said the NCP viewed the
talks as a "good start" as long as the two sides begin to
commit themselves to a number of actions. The NCP view is
that Williamson and Nafie are serious about the process and
both have the capacity to "make things happen." Bebiker said
Presidential Advisor Nafie would chair an inter-departmental
meeting later that same day to prepare a briefing for
President Bashir and to begin preparations for a follow-up
meeting in May.


2. (C) Bebiker said one of his jobs would be to "begin
working on the things that we want." CDA Fernandez pointed
out that this would be very important - to clearly define
realistic items that the Sudanese want from these
negotiations. Notably, Bebiker did not jump directly to the
List of State Sponsors of Terrorism or removal of sanctions.
On the contrary, he mentioned two items that could be used as
confidence building measures - waivers for spare train
locomotive parts that are subject to sanctions, and the
release of some containers in Europe (also apparently held up
by US sanctions).


3. (C) CDA FQnandez noted that Special Envoy Williamson will
testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee later
this week and that already the Save Darfur coalition and
others had criticized the Rome talks. Bebiker said he hoped
that the Rome talks would be of assistance to Williamson, as
the NCP had offered to assist with several items that will
lead to greater humanitarian access and security and the
rapid deployment of UNAMID. CDA Fernandez noted the gap
between advocacy NGOs, who are criticizing the US
Administration's initiative to engage with the GOS, and
humanitarian NGOs who are supportive of the US initiative
because they know this will lead to improved conditions on
the ground in Darfur. Bebiker observed that it is easy and
sells well to criticize the Sudanese government from afar.
CDA wryly responded that the NCP has done a "poor job" of
winning NGOs working in Sudan to the NCP's point of view
because of frequent regime harassment.


4. (C) Bebiker urged continued engagement, noting that it is
the best hope for implementation of the CPA. He said the GOS
is well aware of the "dichotomous nature" of US policy toward
Sudan. On the one hand the US negotiates with the GOS to
ensure peace, as with the CPA, while on the other hand the US
seeks to punish the GOS. He cautioned that the SPLM and
other forces in Sudan are watching carefully and implied that
they will also make decisions on CPA implementation and
engagement with the regime based on the US stance toward the
regime. CDA noted that these talks are the best opportunity
for improved relations in quite a while and urged the NCP not
to do anything to derail the process.


5. (C) Comment: Despite the relatively thin outcome from
Rome, the NCP appears to view the talks as a success largely
because the NCP's primary goal is to improve relations. In
this regard, follow-up meetings and continued discussions of
small confidence building measures serves to achieve that
goal. The NCP seems to know that the US is not going to
remove Sudan from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism or
remove all sanctions at this time. However, continued
high-level and engagement and negotiations with several
modest deliverables (such as waiver for train parts) serves
their objectives in the short term - the legitimacy that
comes from engagement from the US. Without committing to
anything that is politically unfeasible in the US, we can
pursue our goals in Darfur and on the CPA by continuing to
engage modestly with the Sudanese. It is important to keep
expectations realistically low while recognizing both that
this is a regime that can absolutely not be trusted but which
can be gingerly moved in the right direction. This means
there is a real opportunity to ameliorate human suffering in
Darfur and speed up UNAMID deployment but little chance of
changing the essential nature of a regime equally brutal and
pragmatic in pursuit of its main goal: holding onto power.
End comment.





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