MFA OFFICIAL COUNSELS "TANKS MORE LIKELY THAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000582 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EX E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2018 TAGS: SU AMGT ASEC PGOV PREL SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIAL COUNSELS "TANKS MORE LIKELY THAN ARMED LOCAL GUARDS" FOR US EMBASSY REF: A. KHARTOUM 574 ¶B. KHARTOUM 560 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) In the midst of a wide-ranging discussion on violence in Darfur (reftel A) on April 13, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Under-Secretary Mutriff Siddiq, a regime insider and former intelligence officer (and also in charge of the UNAMID deployment file for the GOS),asked CDA Fernandez "why aren't you going to the talks on Sudn in Rom?" CDA noted that other urgent embassy business, such as trying to get progress on NEC construction and security matters, preclude his leaving the country at this time. ¶2. (C) Siddiq responded that "I know you raised the issue of arming local guards" with the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Deng Alor) again last week (reftel B). Siddiq said that the MFA had further looked into the idea and "it is just a bad idea," he noted. He said that such a step could put "your local staff in big trouble" if they were to use their weapons improperly or hurt and kill someone. "We could be more forthcoming if these were Americans you were arming" than Sudanese. A better solution, he continued, was increasing local police and other official protection, "if you need a tank or armored car positioned somewhere, we can even look at doing that." ¶3. (C) CDA Fernandez responded that security threats related to Islamic terrorists seeking to hurt Americans still exist in Sudan ("I am unaware of any current threats," Mutriff retorted). The Embassy would prefer to have local staff able to protect places where most American officials work, such as the Chancery and the USAID complex in Manshia, in addition to local police. This is not because of lack of confidence in the police but because this provides additional protection. Siddiq answered that Embassy security was important to the Sudanese but that there should be other ways to do this. CDA responded that one way to improve our security is to get the NEC finished in a hurry. ¶4. (C) On the NEC, Siddiq said that any good faith effort by the USG to respond to pressures on the Sudanese missions in New York and Washington would probably be reciprocated by the Sudanese in releasing NEC containers. He said that FM Alor had personally taken on trying to solve this matter with President Al-Bashir "but you need to give him some ammunition to get this resolved". CDA noted that AF/SPG had already taken the initiative of meeting with the Sudanese Embassy to meticulously go over their most pressing concerns, and Mutriff responded "yes, but I have seen the report and nothing was resolved yet." ¶5. (C) Comment: Embassy will continue to raise the issue of arming selected LES guards, first formally raised in November 2007 and then again in February 2008 as an additional line of defense, with senior Sudanese officials. While Siddiq's skepticism was disheartening, especially when contrasted with the Minister's vague earlier good will, we will also explore whether asking for even more local police or even armored vehicles makes good security sense. Tanks guarding entrances is generally not a sight seen anywhere in Khartoum including in such sensitive locations as the Presidential Palace, Ministry of Defense, or NISS headquarters. End comment. FERNANDEZ