FORMER DARFUR GOVERNOR ON PEACE PROCESS

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000537 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO AU UN SU CD SUBJECT: FORMER DARFUR GOVERNOR ON PEACE PROCESS REF: A. 2007 CAIRO 2560 ¶B. NDJAMENA 00127 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Former defense minister and former governor of North Darfur Ibrahim Suleiman Hassan told poloff that now is the time to push for peace in Darfur. Hassan believes peace is achievable if the U.S. pushes Sudan to reach deals with the Darfur rebels and Chad. He also said the U.S. should not be surprised if the NCP remains in power for another 20 years. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) Meeting with Poloff on April 6, longtime National Congress Party (NCP) member, former Minister of Civil Aviation, and former governor of North Darfur General Ibrahim Suleiman Hassan characterized the security environment in Darfur as a morass. He observed that the government, having gone too far in its military intervention, created a mess that will take fifty years to resolve. (Note: Hassan expressed his opposition to the war in Darfur early on and left the NCP regime in 2003 when he was fired as Governor by Al-Bashir. End note.) Hassan said that there is an opening for diplomatic intervention with greater UNAMID presence in Darfur. He urged the international community to push for negotiations to capitalize on UNAMID's presence. ¶3. (SBU) According to Hassan, the Sudanese Government now understands that military operations in Darfur will only generate international condemnation, and is therefore looking for a political solution to the crisis. He expressed the view that the Darfur rebels are likewise motivated to begin negotiations because a viable peace process will reverse the growing perception that the rebel movements are little more than bandits. He observed that average Darfurians are fed up with both the GoS and the Darfur rebel commanders. Hassan believes these factors will help lead to a peace agreement, but he said it is necessary for the U.S. and other international actors to engage more aggressively. Hassan noted that a lasting peace deal in Darfur also involves a resolution of hostilities between the NCP in Sudan and Deby in Chad. Hassan urged that the U.S. engage with the NCP and Deby on this point as well. ¶4. (SBU) Once active in the NCP, Hassan said he no longer identifies with the party or its leaders. When asked about the current concerns of the NCP, Hassan stated that they are most afraid of the International Criminal Court (ICC),viewing it as a legitimate threat to their hold on power. Hassan said that while the NCP "fears" the southern referendum in 2011, the NCP is preparing to govern for the next twenty years - and Hassan believes they will most likely do so. -------------- Bio Note -------------- ¶5. (SBU) General Hassan served for 36 years in the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF),reaching the post of Minister of Defense. A native of Darfur, Hassan returned to serve as Governor of North Darfur from 2001 to 2003. Although nationally well-respected, Hassan fell from the upper echelon of the NCP after opposing military intervention in Darfur. Notably, Hassan ordered the arrest of Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal in 2002, and was nicknamed "the godfather of the rebels" by goveQment-owned media after accusations of tacitly supporting the armed movements in Darfur. Now in poor health, Hassan is inactive within the NCP, and returned to Khartoum in November 2007 after four months of surgery and recuperation in Cairo. CDA Fernandez met with General Hassan in Cairo in 2007 (ref a). -------------- Comment -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Though no longer an influential voice on Darfur affairs, General Hassan knows a great deal about Darfur, Sudanese politics in general, and the NCP in particular. He was not particularly forthcoming about NCP party dynamics, presumably preferring not to dwell too much on his former NCP affiliation. Hassan is correct that the international community will need to engage more directly to force the government and rebels toward a comprehensive peace agreement in Darfur. Unfortunately with a dysfunctional JMST team in place, there is currently a lack of leadership and vision on how to engage the parties. FERNANDEZ