BALANCING ACT - UNAMID PUBLIC AFFAIRS WALKS TIGHTROPE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000518 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF S/E WILLIAMSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU KPKO UNSC SUBJECT: BALANCING ACT - UNAMID PUBLIC AFFAIRS WALKS TIGHTROPE BETWEEN GOS AND INTERNAL BATTLES ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On April 2, Shereen Zorba and Ali Hamati, of UNAMID's Public Information Office in El Fasher, told emboffs that they feel both external pressure from the Government of Sudan (GoS) and a degree of internal marginalization within UNAMID itself. Most notably, Zorba reported that strategic communications were excluded from the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) concluded in February between the GoS and UNAMID, an omission that is causing significant problems for their department. Externally, Zorba and Ali also stated that GoS's censorship, harassment, and bureaucracy slow their public affairs and outreach work. Internally, Zorba and Ali stated that they struggle with limited resource allocated from UNAMID (with only eight staff, technological limitations, and delays in the assignment of a permanent director.) END SUMMARY. FEELING THE GOS'S HEAT - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) Zorba and Hamati stated that UNAMID public affairs is not included in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) signed on February 9, 2008. Zorba explained that at the time of SOFA negotiation, inclusion of public information took a back seat to other, more pressing issues (which at the time included night flights and access). They stated that because of this exclusion, government harassment and state control of the press, they have had to do much of their work below the radar of the government. ¶3. (SBU) They noted that it is particularly difficult to "tell UNAMID's story," as the Government tightly controls the main media in Sudan. Zorba stated that it is even more difficult for Sudanese journalists to gain access to Darfur than international journalists. Hamati said that during his two years in Sudan, he has learned how to "play the government's game" when requesting travel permits for journalists, putting for example, "researcher" on many forms (as opposed to "reporter"),as this simple substitution speeds the process and saves him a significant amount of work and time. Even after gaining access to remote areas of Darfur, Hamati emphasized that the government censors remove "almost every story coming out about UNAMID in the local press." ¶4. (SBU) Despite the GoS censorship and harassment, neither Hamati nor Zorba stated that they feel any sense of competition with the GoS-controlled media or the rebel movements. Zorba stated in fact that "the rebels take pressure off of us and do a lot of work for us." Both admitted that non-signatory rebel movements are media masters, whose information is often not to be trusted. UNAMID INTERNAL BATTLES - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) Zorba stated that UNAMID public affairs currently has two international employees and six Sudanese staff. Hamati is the acting director, having served on and off in the position for the past several months. Hamati stated that while he supports his local staff, several of them confuse their work in public affairs with other areas of the UN mission, including political affairs and military intelligence. Zorba stated that she would like public affairs to embark upon a comprehensive research and feedback program, but she does not have the staff, time, or money to set up focus groups and conduct pre- and post-program surveys. ¶6. (SBU) Zorba stated that most of UNAMID's leadership understands the importance of public affairs, even though that department was initially excluded from a two-day internal UNAMID brainstorming session on Darfur Peace Agreement and Related Issues held on March 31 and April 1 [NOTE: Zorba publicly criticized senior UNAMID leadership for this oversight during one of the final sessions on April 1. END NOTE]. ¶7. (SBU) Zorba stated that much work needs to be done to avoid public affairs "blunders," such as AMIS' handling of the Haskanita attack on September 30, 2007, when rebels attacked the Haskanita base killing approximately ten AMIS soldiers. She stated that AMIS did not have a mobile media unit, which would have allowed her and her team to get directly to the site and report from the field. She said by the time AMIS was able to put together its side of the story, the media had already run with it, framing it as an example of the incompetence of African Union troops. Zorba stated that other resources, such as radio transmitters, radios for distribution, and other equipment are needed to aid the public affairs dimension of her work. POSITIVES - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) Despite both the internal and external challenges facing UNAMID Public Information, both Zorba and Hamati were optimistic about the coming months. Zorba stated that one recent success was a public affairs training for many civilian police (civpol). She KHARTOUM 00000518 002 OF 002 emphasized that public affairs staff "cannot be everywhere" and that civpol have more contact with the local population than any other UNAMID office, often prompting Public Information officers to accompany civpol on patrols. "There are opportunities for UNAMID to tell its story. Despite language and cultural barriers, the troops are doing good things and we need to highlight that," stated Zorba. ¶9. (SBU) On April 15, UNAMID will hold a public event on "UNAMID's First 100 Days," highlighting UNAMID successes during this period. Public Information would like to hold this event in the Peace Secretariat and has expressed interest in taking over the facility SIPDIS from the USG. [NOTE: The Joint Special Representative's Office, the Joint Mediation Support Team and the DDDC have also indicated their desire to assume control of the Peace Secretariat; we expect a formal request from the JSR's office imminently. END NOTE]. Hamati emphasized that UNAMID continues to work on a radio program for UNAMID, while UNMIS's "Radio Miraya" continues its work throughout some locations in Darfur. [NOTE: Although Radio Miraya has a fully functional website with streaming audio, its broadcasts that are advertised on the website did not appear to be functional in El-Fasher on FM101 during March and April 2008. END NOTE]. COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Despite significant challenges, UNAMID Public Information Officer Zorba appeared enthusiastic, informed, and undaunted by the enormity of UNAMID's public affairs work. Like other elements of the mission, the UN's own bureaucratic dysfunction and difficulties integrating the remnants of the AU are two likely reasons for UNAMID's shortage in staffing. Although help may be on the way when Albany Associates (a UK-based contractor for communications and public diplomacy strategies) provides six more international and highly qualified staff to UNAMID, as of April 5, a MoU between Albany Associates and UNAMID still has not been signed. GoS harassment and UNAMID's failure to allot sufficient resources, freedom, and leverage to public affairs are causes for concern. The fact that UNAMID Public Affairs was not explicitly mentioned in the SOFA (although there is a reference to UNAMID radio in the SOFA) should not deter UNAMID's Public Information section from going about their business. Embassy Khartoum's own experience with the Sudanese press is that there is more actual openness and opportunity than UNAMID describes - if the USG in Sudan can successfully communicate its message, why can't UNAMID? FERNANDEZ