CHADIAN REBELS: WEST CAN FACILITATE DIALOGUE OR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000501 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/C, AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU PARIS FOR KANEDA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV CD SU SUBJECT: CHADIAN REBELS: WEST CAN FACILITATE DIALOGUE OR ACCEPT WAR REF: A. KHARTOUM 00385 ¶B. KHARTOUM 00418 KHARTOUM 00000501 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) One faction 'c2MwCQ$Q outbreak of a renewed offensive to topple him. According to UFDD/F President Abdelwahid Aboud, the three movements in the AN have settled on a joint structure, with Mahamat Nouri as the political chief. He said the recent attack on Ade was the opening salvo of a new campaign against Deby's government and an attempt to demonstrate to the world that the rebels are prepared to pursue a military solution before the onset of the rainy season in the absence of a serious peace process involving Western observers. The next attack will strike "further" into Chad, said Aboud, but the Alliance will negotiate with Deby until the last moment before his Government is overthrown, "even if we receive the call for dialogue when we're at the gates of N'djamena." End summary. -------------- The West's Choice: Dialogue or War -------------- 5crb ^Bnce of Chadian armed groups remains open to dialogue with the Chadian Government, but the West must either facilitate negotiations with President Deby's regime or accept the outbreak of a renewed rebel offensive to topple him, President of the Union des Forces de la Democratie and du Developpment/Fondamentale (UFDD/F) Abdelwahid Aboud told POLOFF during a meeting in Khartoum on April 2. Though they have not made direct overtures to the Chadian Government since the October 2007 Sirte Accord, the National Alliance has expressed its willingness to negotiate power sharing arrangements with Deby through the AU mediation team of Libya and Congo. "The international community must choose," said Aboud. "We don't want a civil war, but we will have no other choice if Deby refuses to negotiate with us." -------------- Ade Attack Just the Beginning -------------- ¶3. (C) Aboud characterized the recent attack on Ade as the opening salvo of a new campaign against Deby's government and an attempt to demonstrate to the world that rebels are prepared to pursue a military solution in the absence of a serious peace process. He said that the next rebel attack will occur "further" inside Chad, mentioning Monga and Am Timan specifically. Maintaining the status quo is unacceptable, underscored Aboud, particularly in light of Deby's actions since the last rebel offensive in February: destruction of entire neighborhoods in N'djamena, persecution and detention of opposition figures, and continued refusal to participate in serious negotiations with the movements. ¶4. (C) The AN sees two potential scenarios in the weeks before the onset of the rainy season: 1) A "roundtable" of Chadian government representatives, the unarmed opposition, and the rebel movements is convened with international observers to forge agreement on sharing power in N'djamena (with Deby remaining as head of state),on the creation of a national army, and on a timeline for elections; or 2) The Chadian opposition overthrows Deby by force, establishes a transitional administration, and holds a "national forum" of political stakeholders to prepare for UN-observed elections within six months. While the AU could convene the "roundtable" to provide a mechanism for negotiations between Deby and the rebels, Aboud demanded that Western observers be present as guarantors of an agreement. -------------- National Alliance Fully United -------------- ¶5. (C) The three factions of the AN--Mahamat Nouri's UFDD, Ahmed Soubiane's Front du Salut de la Republique (FSR),and the UFDD/F are united in their analysis of the current KHARTOUM 00000501 002.2 OF 002 situation and in their support for a peace process, claimed Aboud, adding that both Nouri and Soubiane are now in the field with their forces. The movements have agreed to Nouri as the political head of the AN, to Aboud's top military commander as the chief of the AN's armed wing, and to a Soubiane loyalist as the commander of the "military police." "All of our forces are in full coalition," said Aboud. He acknowledged that Nouri has his own motives and political ambitions. However, he predicted that Nouri would be obliged to participate in negotiations because his movement is not strong enough to overthrow Deby on its own. -------------- Erdimi: A Special Case -------------- ¶6. (C) Timan Erdimi's Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) remains outside the alliance and is a "special case," said Aboud. He noted Erdimi's intense personal antipathy for Deby and the other factions' reticence to replace one Zaghawa-dominated dictatorship with another. Erdimi has lost support within his movement in recent days, however, with the defection of a sub-clan of the Zaghawa Bideyat, the Borogat, to the AN. Aboud reported that Erdimi is now along the Chad-Sudan border. (Note: Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi, who is in frequent contact with Erdimi, told Poloff by phone on April 1 that Erdimi left Khartoum for West Darfur on March 30 or 31. End note.) -------------- Open to Dialogue Until the Last Minute -------------- ¶7. (C) POLOFF said that the U.S. will condemn future attempts to change Deby's government by force and that the West is likely to ostracize any regime that takes power at the behest of Khartoum. Aboud said that the Chadian rebels' goals are not a "mirage" to extend Sudan's influence but a genuine attempt to institute true democracy in Chad, in place of a patronage system administered by "illiterate" officials that benefits only Deby loyalists and has turned the Chadian military into a band of "thugs." He said that the rebels will halt any offensive if given the opportunity for credible negotiations, "even if we receive the call for dialogue when we're at the gates of N'djamena." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) While Aboud's UFDD/F is often viewed as a junior partner in the AN, UN officials and other observers in Sudan estimate its force strength as roughly equivalent to that of the other two movements. Aboud appears to be the most open to negotiations among any of the AN leaders, having made several appeals to the Embassy over the last six weeks--either directly or through interlocutors--for a constructive political track with Western backing (reftels). End comment. ¶9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ