UNAMID LEADERSHIP DEBATES DARFUR SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000486 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/CRS, AF/C, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018 TAGS: PGOVAU PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD SUBJECT: UNAMID LEADERSHIP DEBATES DARFUR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and ( d) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In one of the most inconclusive sessions of the two-day internal UNAMID brainstorming session on the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and Related Issues, UNAMID leadership on March 31 made myriad excuses for UNAMID,s performance to date without highlighting any relative successes or offering any ways forward. The Force Commander argued that managing expectations is UNAMID's greatest challenge, that DPA non-signatories' continued fragmentation threatens the search for Darfur peace, and that "the world had to be ready to invest in the force" more than it was. Joint Mediation Support Team chief Sam Ibok enraged working-level participants by saying he had never heard of any of the complexities facing UNAMID before this session and berated staff for sending "sanitized" reports to the Security Council that did not accurately reflect the reality on the ground. Civil Affairs officers insisted that Darfur insecurity came from banditry and Arab militias armed by the GoS, while West Darfur reps blamed insecurity on the regional dimensions of the crisis. In short, everyone present got a turn to rant about the nature of the crisis without offering any way of addressing each problem, leaving one DPKO Darfur Team Member with the impression that "the mission is hopeless." However the mission is not hopeless; UNAMID needs to develop a coherent strategy, including an effective ceasefire mechanism for UNAMID to lead - this can be organized by calling for a Joint Commission meeting, involving both the signatories and non-signatories of the DPA. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) Approximately 35 participants attended the two-day "brainstorming session" at the Peace Secretariat in El-Fasher. Attending the conference were senior UNAMID leadership including: Force Commander, G. Martin Luther Agwai; Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada; and Deputy Joint Special Representative Henry Anyidoho. JMST, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and DPKO all sent representatives to the meeting. The U.S. Embassy was the only non-AU/UN contingent at the meeting and special permission was granted for this representation. (COMMENT: It ;is remarkable that UNAMID's most senior leadership in Sudan can afford to spend two entire work days consumed by a "brainstorming session" - especially one that was hampered by a late-start, much pontificating, raised tempers, and mutual accusations. This use of time, perhaps more than the actual content of the meetings, is most telling of UNAMID's current status and leadership. END COMMENT). FORCE COMMANDER: BIGGEST CHALLENGE IS MANAGING EXPECTATIONS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) UNAMID Force Commander (FC) Agwai was the key presenter during the "Security Arrangements" segment of UNAMID,s two-day brainstorming session on the DPA and Related Issues. During the course of his statement, the FC made excuses for all aspects of UNAMID performance three months after Transfer of Authority from AMIS. He bemoaned the lack of command and control structures in the mission. He highlighted the international community's "failure" in asking AMIS to do "what the whole world couldn't" and then transferring the responsibility for picking up the slack to UNAMID. He called for greater investment in the UNAMID force by the international community, specifically by bringing the ten existing UNAMID battalions up to UN standards instead of focusing on new deployments that could never be supported by the ten currently "dysfunctional" battalions on the ground. ¶4. (SBU) Other obstacles to UNAMID success that the FC enumerated included the absence of a functioning Ceasefire Commission, which jeopardizes UNAMID,s security, especially with disgruntled, MSA-seeking former members; problems of mobility for the force, in particular broken APCs and a lack of new vehicles; and the continuing fragmentation of the DPA non-signatories, whose incessant splintering into smaller factions made them "easy to pick off" and vulnerable to a resurgence of janjaweed activity. He stressed the need for the force to know what areas of Darfur were controlled by which group, a statement he later contradicted in a wrap-up session by declaring, to the astonishment of all present, that "conflict mapping is impossible, so stop asking UNAMID to do the impossible." ¶5. (SBU) The FC declared that managing the world's expectations for Darfur was UNAMID,s greatest challenge, but KHARTOUM 00000486 002 OF 003 he, like Deputy Joint Special Representative Anyidoho, complained that even UNAMID,s small success stories never made it to the news. He considered UNAMID's commencement of night patrols, construction of new camp facilities, provision of humanitarian escorts and initiation of dialogue with civil society at local levels to be noteworthy accomplishments but ones that went unreported, as the world seemed to focus on UNAMID's shortfalls, as it had done with AMIS. JMST CHIEF RAISES TEMPERS -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In response to the FC,s briefing, Joint Mediation Support Team Chief Sam Ibok declared that he had never heard of the "complexities" facing UNAMID that the FC had just described. He lashed out at staff for perpetuating a false perception about UNAMID and demanded "unsanitized" reports be sent to the UN Security Council (UNSC) about the "real" security situation. A member of the DPKO Darfur Planning Team, who is among those responsible for preparing, compiling and promulgating the Secretary-General,s reports to the UNSC, pointed out to Ibok that those reports were written for open (public) meetings of the UNSC and were accordingly widely available. ¶7. (SBU) Ibok then broached the subject of non-military logistical support to DPA signatories and non-signatories as a way to counter the effects of a stalled Ceasefire Commission. The FC replied that such support "sounds beautiful and easy" but would be ultimately hampered by problems of establishing criteria for potential beneficiaries and incentives for participation. Questions of how to reinvigorate the cessation of hostilities agreement, particularly in light of rebel movements, blatant disregard for it, went unanswered by all UNAMID leaders. LITANY OF THREATS TO DARFUR SECURITY -------------- ¶8. (SBU) As the session continued, virtually every participant weighed in with a new seemingly insurmountable obstacle to eventual Darfur security. The Chief of Civil Affairs for UNAMID/Nyala, Ali Hassan, blamed insecurity not on the rebels but on bandits and sophisticated Arab militias outfitted by the GoS with government uniforms, vehicles and heavy weapons. He said the latter group drove the conflict in South Darfur and caused thousands of new displacements. Hassan advocated for the international community to take a firm stand against the GoS, arming of these groups. ¶9. (SBU) Representatives of UNAMID/El Geneina stressed the need to consider the regional aspects of the Darfur conflict, in particular the Chad-Sudan dimension in West Darfur, which should not be held hostage to the Arab situation in South Darfur. ¶10. (SBU) By the time Joint Special Representative Adada closed the session, saying that UNAMID deployment was critical in the absence of a credible peace agreement, all UNAMID leaders were frustrated, and the audience seemed disillusioned. The DPKO staffer who had responded to Ibok,s comment about sanitized UNSC reports remarked to FieldOff that given the discussion just observed, the future of UNAMID was "hopeless." COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) The future of UNAMID is not hopeless; it just needs a jump-start. Agwai has a legitimate concern about the absence of an effective ceasefire mechanism. We should continue to push, both in Sudan and in New York, for UNAMID to call a Joint Commission to establish an interim mechanism that facilitates UNAMID's deployment, provides information to the UN/AU mediation team, and support humanitarian operations until final security arrangements can be negotiated as part of a political settlement. As the DPA--which created the Joint Commission--is included at present in UNAMID's mandate, UNAMID could call a Joint Commission meeting, which, if held outside Sudan, could also include DPA non-signatories as observers. The USG should also take a lead role in developing a transparent and workable plan to provide non-military logistical support based on past case studies of other conflicts--and U.S. support for pre-disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration activities. While development of such a plan would not commit us to funding, it KHARTOUM 00000486 003 OF 003 would energize international efforts to reassure the rebel movements that participation in a peace process does not mean that they will become destitute, as has happened to many of the forces of the sole DPA signatory, Minni Minawi. ¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ