UNAMID LEADERSHIP DEBATES DARFUR SECURITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000486

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/CRS, AF/C, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS: PGOVAU PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU CD
SUBJECT: UNAMID LEADERSHIP DEBATES DARFUR SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS


Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In one of the most inconclusive sessions
of the two-day internal UNAMID brainstorming session on the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and Related Issues, UNAMID
leadership on March 31 made myriad excuses for UNAMID,s
performance to date without highlighting any relative
successes or offering any ways forward. The Force Commander
argued that managing expectations is UNAMID's greatest
challenge, that DPA non-signatories' continued fragmentation
threatens the search for Darfur peace, and that "the world
had to be ready to invest in the force" more than it was.
Joint Mediation Support Team chief Sam Ibok enraged
working-level participants by saying he had never heard of
any of the complexities facing UNAMID before this session and
berated staff for sending "sanitized" reports to the Security
Council that did not accurately reflect the reality on the
ground. Civil Affairs officers insisted that Darfur
insecurity came from banditry and Arab militias armed by the
GoS, while West Darfur reps blamed insecurity on the regional
dimensions of the crisis. In short, everyone present got a
turn to rant about the nature of the crisis without offering
any way of addressing each problem, leaving one DPKO Darfur
Team Member with the impression that "the mission is
hopeless." However the mission is not hopeless; UNAMID needs
to develop a coherent strategy, including an effective
ceasefire mechanism for UNAMID to lead - this can be
organized by calling for a Joint Commission meeting,
involving both the signatories and non-signatories of the
DPA. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Approximately 35 participants attended the two-day
"brainstorming session" at the Peace Secretariat in
El-Fasher. Attending the conference were senior UNAMID
leadership including: Force Commander, G. Martin Luther
Agwai; Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada; and
Deputy Joint Special Representative Henry Anyidoho. JMST,
Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and DPKO
all sent representatives to the meeting. The U.S. Embassy
was the only non-AU/UN contingent at the meeting and special
permission was granted for this representation. (COMMENT: It
is remarkable that UNAMID's most senior leadership in Sudan
can afford to spend two entire work days consumed by a
"brainstorming session" - especially one that was hampered by
a late-start, much pontificating, raised tempers, and mutual
accusations. This use of time, perhaps more than the actual
content of the meetings, is most telling of UNAMID's current
status and leadership. END COMMENT).

FORCE COMMANDER: BIGGEST CHALLENGE IS MANAGING EXPECTATIONS
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) UNAMID Force Commander (FC) Agwai was the key
presenter during the "Security Arrangements" segment of
UNAMID,s two-day brainstorming session on the DPA and
Related Issues. During the course of his statement, the FC
made excuses for all aspects of UNAMID performance three
months after Transfer of Authority from AMIS. He bemoaned
the lack of command and control structures in the mission.
He highlighted the international community's "failure" in
asking AMIS to do "what the whole world couldn't" and then
transferring the responsibility for picking up the slack to
UNAMID. He called for greater investment in the UNAMID force
by the international community, specifically by bringing the
ten existing UNAMID battalions up to UN standards instead of
focusing on new deployments that could never be supported by
the ten currently "dysfunctional" battalions on the ground.


4. (SBU) Other obstacles to UNAMID success that the FC
enumerated included the absence of a functioning Ceasefire
Commission, which jeopardizes UNAMID,s security, especially
with disgruntled, MSA-seeking former members; problems of
mobility for the force, in particular broken APCs and a lack
of new vehicles; and the continuing fragmentation of the DPA
non-signatories, whose incessant splintering into smaller
factions made them "easy to pick off" and vulnerable to a
resurgence of janjaweed activity. He stressed the need for
the force to know what areas of Darfur were controlled by
which group, a statement he later contradicted in a wrap-up
session by declaring, to the astonishment of all present,
that "conflict mapping is impossible, so stop asking UNAMID
to do the impossible."


5. (SBU) The FC declared that managing the world's
expectations for Darfur was UNAMID,s greatest challenge, but

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he, like Deputy Joint Special Representative Anyidoho,
complained that even UNAMID,s small success stories never
made it to the news. He considered UNAMID's commencement of
night patrols, construction of new camp facilities, provision
of humanitarian escorts and initiation of dialogue with civil
society at local levels to be noteworthy accomplishments but
ones that went unreported, as the world seemed to focus on
UNAMID's shortfalls, as it had done with AMIS.

JMST CHIEF RAISES TEMPERS
--------------


6. (SBU) In response to the FC,s briefing, Joint Mediation
Support Team Chief Sam Ibok declared that he had never heard
of the "complexities" facing UNAMID that the FC had just
described. He lashed out at staff for perpetuating a false
perception about UNAMID and demanded "unsanitized" reports be
sent to the UN Security Council (UNSC) about the "real"
security situation. A member of the DPKO Darfur Planning
Team, who is among those responsible for preparing, compiling
and promulgating the Secretary-General,s reports to the
UNSC, pointed out to Ibok that those reports were written for
open (public) meetings of the UNSC and were accordingly
widely available.


7. (SBU) Ibok then broached the subject of non-military
logistical support to DPA signatories and non-signatories as
a way to counter the effects of a stalled Ceasefire
Commission. The FC replied that such support "sounds
beautiful and easy" but would be ultimately hampered by
problems of establishing criteria for potential beneficiaries
and incentives for participation. Questions of how to
reinvigorate the cessation of hostilities agreement,
particularly in light of rebel movements, blatant disregard
for it, went unanswered by all UNAMID leaders.

LITANY OF THREATS TO DARFUR SECURITY
--------------


8. (SBU) As the session continued, virtually every
participant weighed in with a new seemingly insurmountable
obstacle to eventual Darfur security. The Chief of Civil
Affairs for UNAMID/Nyala, Ali Hassan, blamed insecurity not
on the rebels but on bandits and sophisticated Arab militias
outfitted by the GoS with government uniforms, vehicles and
heavy weapons. He said the latter group drove the conflict
in South Darfur and caused thousands of new displacements.
Hassan advocated for the international community to take a
firm stand against the GoS, arming of these groups.


9. (SBU) Representatives of UNAMID/El Geneina stressed the
need to consider the regional aspects of the Darfur conflict,
in particular the Chad-Sudan dimension in West Darfur, which
should not be held hostage to the Arab situation in South
Darfur.


10. (SBU) By the time Joint Special Representative Adada
closed the session, saying that UNAMID deployment was
critical in the absence of a credible peace agreement, all
UNAMID leaders were frustrated, and the audience seemed
disillusioned. The DPKO staffer who had responded to Ibok,s
comment about sanitized UNSC reports remarked to FieldOff
that given the discussion just observed, the future of UNAMID
was "hopeless."

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) The future of UNAMID is not hopeless; it just needs a
jump-start. Agwai has a legitimate concern about the absence
of an effective ceasefire mechanism. We should continue to
push, both in Sudan and in New York, for UNAMID to call a
Joint Commission to establish an interim mechanism that
facilitates UNAMID's deployment, provides information to the
UN/AU mediation team, and support humanitarian operations
until final security arrangements can be negotiated as part
of a political settlement. As the DPA--which created the
Joint Commission--is included at present in UNAMID's mandate,
UNAMID could call a Joint Commission meeting, which, if held
outside Sudan, could also include DPA non-signatories as
observers. The USG should also take a lead role in
developing a transparent and workable plan to provide
non-military logistical support based on past case studies of
other conflicts--and U.S. support for pre-disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration activities. While
development of such a plan would not commit us to funding, it

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would energize international efforts to reassure the rebel
movements that participation in a peace process does not mean
that they will become destitute, as has happened to many of
the forces of the sole DPA signatory, Minni Minawi.


12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
FERNANDEZ