JMST'S SAM IBOK ON DARFUR PEACE PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000485 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AS A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018 TAGS: PREL KPKO MARR AU UN SU SUBJECT: JMST'S SAM IBOK ON DARFUR PEACE PROCESS REF: KHARTOUM 476 KHARTOUM 00000485 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d ) ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On April 1 AU Chief Mediator of UNAMID,S JMST San Ibok briefed senior UNAMID representatives on the Darfur peace process as part of the two-day "UNAMID Brainstorming on DPA." Ibok highlighted that of the five major rebel movements, only two (SLA-Unity and the URF) have indicated their current willingness to negotiate with the JMST. Ibok also stated that UNAMID needs to take a "critical look" at itself, and indicated that the ineffective structure of two special envoys will be replaced by one lead "joint special negotiator." Ibok also openly discussed UNAMID,s relationship with the Government of Sudan (GoS),its challenges, and its immediate needs. END SUMMARY ¶2. (SBU) Approximately 35 participants attended the two-day "brainstorming session" at the Peace Secretariat in El-Fasher. Attending the conference were senior UNAMID leadership including: Force Commander, G. Martin Luther Agwai; Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada; and Deputy Joint Special Representative Henry Anyidoho. JMST, Political Affairs, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and DPKO all sent representatives to the meeting. The U.S. Embassy was the only non-AU/UN contingent at the meeting and special permission was granted for this representation. ¶3. (SBU) Commenting on the focus of the conference, Ibok stated that the question of whether the DPA has been accepted by the people of Darfur is irrelevant. He added that UNAMID "needs to move away from the polarization of the DPA" and that the JMST has recently been focusing on "people,s issues" of security, compensation, reconstruction, and development. According to Ibok, many of Darfur,s communities are extremely fragmented and polarized, and it will be the work of the JMST to attempt to address their varied concerns. 5 MOVEMENTS, 2 READY TO NEGOTIATE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) According to Ibok, there are five main rebel movements: SLA-Unity, SLA-Abdel Wahid, SLA-Abdul Shafi, the United Resistance Front (URF),and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Ibok stated that it appears as if SLA-Unity and the URF are ready to work with the JMST. Ibok also stated that his team has had &encouraging discussions8 with SLM-Abdel Wahid, specifically highlighting the meeting between UNAMID, UNSCR members, and Abdel Wahid Al-Nur the week of March 16 in Geneva. (Note: After the meeting another JMST member, Muin Shreim also told emboffs that the JMST members will be traveling to Jebel Marra this week to meet with SLA-Abdul Wahid field commanders. End Note.) ¶5. (SBU) Ibok stated that SLA-Abdul Shafie continues to pose difficulties for the JMST. "I am personally confused about where Abdul Shafie stands. He is trying to re-establish himself, and I don,t think even he has clarity about what he wants to do," stated Ibok. With respect to the Justice and Equality Movement, Ibok stated that this group refuses to negotiate and is currently taking a military approach to the conflict. Later in the session, Civil Affairs Human Rights Officer with UNMIS West Darfur stated called the fight between JEM and the Government of Sudan the "original problem" that deserves most of JMST,s attention and energy. Before moving to his next topic, Ibok again reiterated that none of the parties except for SLA-Unity and the URF appear ready for negotiations. "THE GOS IS NOT READY FOR NEGOTIATIONS" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (SBU) Ibok stated that "although it is tempting to think that the Government of Sudan is ready for negotiations, they do not appear to be interested right now." Ibok emphasized that the Government of National Unity has many conflicting parties with differing positions. He said that the National Congress Party (NCP) often views Darfur,s problems in terms of security, not political grievances. He also briefly mentioned that the SPLM has been proactive in attempting to work with the JMST, while Minni Minnawi,s position has not always been clear. According to Ibok, Minnawi has tried to involve himself in the peace process, but not always been helpful in his engagement. (Note: To be reported septel, KHARTOUM 00000485 002 OF 003 other conversations with UNAMID staff and JEM leaders corroborate Ibok,s assertion that the Government may not be willing to negotiate at this time, but instead preparing for an attack on JEM positions in West Darfur. Contary to Ibok's account, SLM/Minawi presented a written statement of its position on the peace process to the JMST in October 2007, which remains unchanged. The position states that, as the DPA has not been integrated into the national legal framework, the SLM/Minawi will not participate in negotiations as part of the Government of National Unity, a position the UN's own legal analysts deemed sound. End Note.) CHALLENGES: CHAD, NEGOTIATION VENUES, AND UNAMID ITSELF - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Ibok stated that there are a number of challenges currently facing the JMST. According to Ibok, the bilateral relationship between Sudan and Chad is a big part of the equation, but this is not part of the mandate of the JMST. He expressed skepticism in the latest Sudan-Chad agreement, saying that this is one of five arrangements - all of which have not been honored in the past. ¶8. (SBU) Although not yet ready for negotiations, Ibok stated that the issue of a venue will continue to present a challenge to the JMST, asserting that none of the rebel movements can agree on a venue. According to Ibok, some movements do not want to return to Libya, others do not want to negotiate in any country bordering Sudan, and still others specify Geneva or the Netherlands as the only acceptable places for talks, with South Africa as an African possibility. (NOTE: One frustrated UNAMID Human Rights officer sniffed that UNAMID should stop catering to the movements by convening negotiations in comfortable European locations and should consider holding them instead in Abu Shouk IDP camp outside El Fasher for a truly representative experience. END NOTE) ¶9. (SBU) Ibok also stated that the AU and UN need to take a critical look at their own organization, structure, and achievements. He stated that UNAMID has realized that there needs to be a single joint chief mediator instead of the current structure of two special envoys. Although the two special envoys have worked well together, said Ibok, they have done so only because their personalities work well together. Ibok admitted that this dual negotiation structure has made UNAMID,s work more difficult and that things such as coordinating the two special envoys, calendars have slowed progress and made their work unnecessarily complicated. He expressed hope that the new single leader will take charge of the negotiations and be held accountable for his or her work. Ibok also stated that there will be a restructuring of the JMST to make it more effective and efficient. However, repeated calls by UNAMID Nyala Civil Affairs Chief Ali Hassan for UNAMID to absorb the JMST into its structure fell on deaf ears. NEEDS: BETTER INTELLIGENCE AND COORDINATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶10. (SBU) Ibok stated that better internal African Union-United Nations coordination is needed for the peace process. In particular, he stated that previous negotiations overestimated the level of security that AMIS could provide, and this hampered the peace process. He stated UNAMID will need realistic expectations of what the UNAMID peacekeeping operation can guarantee. He also encouraged the peacekeeping operation and civil affairs to be involved in the peace process and negotiations. Ibok also stated that territorialism and information-hoarding within UNAMID have been a problem. ¶11. (SBU) Ibok also stated that negotiators and those working on the peace process need better intelligence about the rebel movements and GoS forces (including their locations, numbers, and military strategies.) He said that during negotiations on the DPA, the negotiators were essentially "blind" to what was happening on the ground. He said that when negotiating with the rebel movements, it is necessary to know their strength, influence, and popularity and that good intelligence would greatly aid them in their work. (NOTE: A DPKO representative in the audience at the meeting remarked to FieldOff that such calls were especially ironic coming from Ibok himself, as he was loathe to leave Khartoum and knew little himself about what was happening on KHARTOUM 00000485 003 OF 003 the ground. END NOTE). COMMENT - - - - ¶12. (C) It is unfortunate that Ibok almost entirely glossed over the role of the SPLM in the peace process, especially after SPLM representatives in El-Fasher recently reported that planning for Juba II is coming together (reftel). The JMST is correct that only SLA/Unity and the URF have declared their willingness to negotiate within a multilateral framework, though JEM has announced its readiness to negotiate directly with the Government. Shafie remains unengaged in the peace process, continues to lack military and political influence, and is viewed by the other movements as a tool of the SPLM. Despite Ibok's refreshing honesty about the state of the UN/AU peace process, rumors are circulating his transfer from the head of JMST to the head of UNAMID political affairs and high-level opposition to this appointment, including from DPKO U/SYG Guehenno. While Ibok's political acumen, diplomatic skills, and background on the issues is commendable, he is known as a poor manager who will likely not be well-placed to address the political and resource challenges within UNAMID. The critical appointment for the peace process will be that of the JMST chief mediator ("Joint Special Negotiator" in Ibok's words). This appointment is stalled because the nominee, Mohammed Sahnoun, is reticent to accept the post unless Eliasson and Salim bow out, which they are resisting. End comment. FERNANDEZ