AEC TO URGE SPECIAL SESSION ON ABYEI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000466 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: AEC TO URGE SPECIAL SESSION ON ABYEI REF: A. A) KHARTOUM 435 ¶B. B) KHARTOUM 432 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4. (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Newly installed Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) chairman Sir Derek Plumbly met with AEC working group chairs (UK, Norwegian, Italian and Dutch Ambassadors plus CDA Fernandez) on March 30 to discuss a more aggressive AEC stance on political issues and to outline a common agenda for a March 31 meeting with visiting AU Foreign Ministers (led by South African Foreign Minister) who are looking at the pace of CPA implementation. ¶2. (C) Plumbly began by discussing the AU Foreign Ministers' visit to Sudan and the opportunity it represents to highlight the work of the AEC, the progress made in CPA implementation since 2005, and the considerable remaining challenges confronting Sudan. CDA Fernandez agreed and urged that the AU Foreign Ministers be encouraged to support the development and capacity building of the SPLM and of the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) "not as rivals to the NCP, but as good partners and effective stakeholders in CPA implementation." The better trained and strengthened the SPLM is the more likely it is that the CPA will hold. An overstretched SPLM and inefficient GOSS is an open opportunity for mischief by the National Congress Party. ¶3. (C) The Dutch Ambassador added that another point to be made is the integral nature of problems in Sudan, how lack of CPA implementation can negatively affect Sudan's stability and events in Darfur and that the opposite is also true -- that greater violence in Darfur (and instability in Chad) have reverberations in the fragile NCP-SPLM relationship. Plumbly agreed that, while the focus of the AU visit was CPA, they needed to be reminded of Darfur. ¶4. (C) Sir Derek then raised recent meetings he had with Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salahudin and NCP negotiator Said al-Khatib where they had both condemned SPLM "escalation in Abyei" over the past few days by SPLM Abyei head Edward Lino. Lino was attempting to establish an illegal administration in violation of the CPA's Abyei protocol, summoning local police chiefs and administrators. An NCP attempt to get answers or explanations to these actions from FVP Salva Kiir had been unsuccessful and the NCP had issued new conditions for the resumption of talks on Abyei: the immediate termination of the SPLM administration, the withdrawal of new SPLA troops sent into Abyei (beyond the existing SAF-SPLA Joint Integrated Unit - JIU),and stopping "any unilateral steps that threaten the stability of the area and lead to spoiling the atmosphere of peace and national dialogue." ¶5. (C) Both the Norwegian Ambassador and CDA Fernandez noted that they had met with Foreign Minister Deng Alor (reftel a) early last week and he had been relatively optimistic and admitted to some possible NCP concessions. CDA Fernandez noted that the problem was that both sides were cheating and being less than honest. The NCP had been much more dishonest by not implementing the ABC Report in 2005 and leaving the issue unresolved since then. They had also been encouraging and arming the Misseriyya Arabs since at least November 2007 (during the NCP-SPLM cabinet crisis) which had resulted in clashes in Abyei and surrounding areas. The SPLA had upped the ante by appointing Lino, an SPLA intelligence officer, in January and by strengthening their military presence. It was an elaborate and dangerous game of "chicken" to see who blinked first. ¶6. (C) The Dutch Ambassador agreed and noted that the escalation and defusing of tensions in Abyei had become a pattern now for at least six months, and a further problem is that "there are not two sides, but four sides in Abyei - the SPLM, the NCP, the Ngok Dinka, and the Misseriyya - and the tribal agenda does not exactly overlap with the larger political one." It is also not clear whether the SPLM has one position on Abyei or whether the three principals most closely involved - Deng Alor, Cabinet Affairs Minister Pagan Amun and GOSS Presidential Affairs Minister Luka Biong Deng - are all coordinating or playing a separate, deeper game related to internal SPLM dynamics. Plumbly asked whether holding a special plenary of the AEC on Abyei is a good idea or not. All agreed that it was a good idea but that Plumbly should seek out prior agreement from the two sides because they have - for different reasons at different times - often shied away from discussing such contentious matters in an open forum. All present welcomed CDA Fernandez's visit to Abyei later this week as a useful step to get some ground truth on volatile events in the troubled area and asked for an update upon his return. Plumbly would also compare notes KHARTOUM 00000466 002 OF 002 with UN SRSG Qazi who returns today from Abyei. ¶7. (C) Comment: While there is indeed a pattern of escalation (by one or both sides) followed by further negotiation, the fact remains that this constant tension is hardening positions by raising the human costs to those in the region among the Ngok Dinka and Misseriyya. The possibility that one side or the other "could go too far" as part of the larger SPLM/NCP rivalry remains as a constant danger. The NCP's just announced "conditions for resumption" of talks by themselves constitute an escalation of public pressure on the SPLM in response to Lino asserting himself. For two years, without a deal or administration, Abyei was calm, and this is no longer the case. CDA Fernandez's visit will be our highest level visit there in over a year (the NCP has often blocked attempts by senior visitors or diplomats based in Khartoum from visiting the region). End comment. FERNANDEZ