Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM462
2008-03-30 13:52:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

DARFUR: HAC INTERROGATES AMCIT HUMANITARIAN WORKER

Tags:  ASO APER CASC PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI SU 
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VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKH #0462/01 0901352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD770271 MSI7469-695)
P 301352Z MAR 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0332
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0119
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000462 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
DEPT FOR CA/OCS/ACS/AF
AMEMBASSY CAIRO FOR DAVID POTTER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ASO APER CASC PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: HAC INTERROGATES AMCIT HUMANITARIAN WORKER

REF: A) KHARTOUM 340

B) KHARTOUM 106
C) KHARTOUM 100
D) KHARTOUM 91

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000462 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY TEXT DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN DEPT FOR CA/OCS/ACS/AF AMEMBASSY CAIRO FOR DAVID POTTER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASO APER CASC PGOV PREL PHUM SOCI SU SUBJECT: DARFUR: HAC INTERROGATES AMCIT HUMANITARIAN WORKER REF: A) KHARTOUM 340 B) KHARTOUM 106 C) KHARTOUM 100 D) KHARTOUM 91 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. During the week of March 10, a Korean-American employee of the American Jewish World Service, visiting El Fasher, North Darfur, was questioned by officials of the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) for possible links to a Darfur rebel group which has opened an office in Israel and was prevented from departing Sudan until March 17. The incident rattled an already shaky Darfur humanitarian community and is the second time in three months that HAC has detained an American citizen in Darfur (Ref B). END SUMMARY. HAC LEVELS ALLEGATIONS AGAINST AMCIT VISITOR -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During the week of March 10, Matthew Emry, a Korean-American employee of the American Jewish World Service (AJWS),was questioned by HAC officials in El Fasher and Khartoum over alleged affiliations to Darfur rebel movements. AJWS is an international development organization that offers grants to many international non-governmental organizations operating in Darfur, including International Rescue Committee (IRC),which Emry was visiting during the time of the incident. The IRC had sponsored Emry's visa for his travel to Sudan. On March 16, Emry was permitted to travel to Khartoum, where he was again questioned by HAC until he was permitted to depart on March 17. ¶3. (SBU) IRC Country Director Sherman contacted conoff on March 17 to report that Emry had been questioned in El Fasher by HAC and was at the time being questioned in Khartoum. Sherman told conoff that HAC officials had accused Emry of supporting rebel groups, specifically Sudan Liberation Army leader Abdulwahid Nur who recently opened an SLA office in Tel Aviv. Emry was permitted to depart later that evening. Sherman told conoff that Emry had never been officially arrested or charged. A week after the incident, Sherman met with the HAC to discuss delayed visas for IRC employees. Instead, HAC officials used the meeting to accuse Sherman of using the IRC to support SLA/Abdulwahid. [NOTE: According to a March 27 report in the Sudanese newspaper Al-Ahdath, Emry was being investigated for posing as an IRC employee to conceal his AJWS �
A;employment and meet Darfur IDPs affiliated with Abdelwahid. The paper went on to claim that Emry himself was behind Abdelwahid's recent decision to open an SLA office in Israel (Ref A). END NOTE] ¶4. (SBU) IRC AMCIT employee Melissa Alvarado (please protect) contacted FieldOff during the week of March 24 to recount the circumstances of Emry's interrogation. According to Alvarado, Emry's treatment had been "harsh" and that he had "looked awful" by the time he left for Khartoum. During those four days, Emry was questioned at the HAC office in El Fasher and then released to the IRC guesthouse at night. In addition to questioning Emry about his ties to rebel movements, HAC officials, according to Alvarado, seized his laptop, which contained sensitive information about women's health programs being carried out in Darfur by AJWS partners, including IRC (Alvarado works in Gender-Based Violence for IRC). HAC authorities demanded Emry surrender his personal e-mail address and password, which authorities then changed after having gone through his messages. ¶5. (SBU) Alvarado told fieldoff that during Emry's interrogation in El Fasher she contacted IRC Country Director Sherman in Khartoum to ask for assistance. She was told that IRC would make no overtures to the Embassy on Emry's behalf. Alvarado disagreed with her Country Director's decision not to involve the Embassy or other Khartoum offices, especially as she is now concerned about her own personal security. Alvarado says that during IRC Country Director Sherman's meeting with HAC officials in Khartoum during the week of March 24, HAC officials had mentioned Alvarado by name and had inquired about her own possible affiliations with Darfur rebel movements. FieldOff encouraged Alvarado to register with the Embassy and to remain in contact in the field to follow up on any possible situations that may arise. ¶6. (SBU) COMMENT. This incident was the second in three months involving HAC action against AMCITs of the INGO community in El Fasher. This latest incident shows a heightened sense of paranoia among HAC officials with regard to INGOS' work in Darfur, paranoia fed by the heavy negative coverage the regime gave to Abdulwahid's recent opening of an office in Israel. Such GoS reaction is having tangible effects on the ground for not only INGOs; many IDPs continually tell us that they have already noticed a decreased presence of international humanitarian organizations, and this latest incident will do nothing to convince them otherwise. Embassy will continue to press HAC and other GOS officials on the unacceptable and self-defeating nature of such actions. Embassy and El Fasher field office will reinforce with the INGO community the need to maintain contact with the Embassy in order to ensure the accountability and security of its members, particularly in cases involving AMCITs. ¶7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ

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