FOREIGN MINISTER PROMISES SWIFT ACTION ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000435 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/EX, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2018 TAGS: SU KPKO ABLD AMGT ASEC PGOV PREL SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER PROMISES SWIFT ACTION ON BILATERAL ISSUES, SEES SOME PROGRESS ON ABYEI REF: A. A) KHARTOUM 428 ¶B. B) KHARTOUM 386 ¶C. C) KHARTOUM 296 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Deng Alor agreed to the immediate visa issuance of US Military Observers requested by UNAMID, and promised rapid progress on other visas and on security measures. He also will be raising the issue of NEC containers with President Al-Bashir in the next two days. Alor had not seen the final draft of a Sudanese non-paper for the USG but, despite describing it as a "purely NCP document" strongly urged US engagement with the Sudanese as follow up. He said that there had been some additional progress and agreement in principle on Abyei but still no definitive breakthrough. End summary. -------------- VISAS FOR AMERICAN MILITARY AND DIPLOMATS -------------- ¶2. (C) CDA Fernandez arranged to meet Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Alor on March 24 immediately after Alor's week-long absence in Juba and Nairobi. CDA reminded Deng of their discussion on March 15 of visas for US military Observers for UNAMID (reftel b). Alor responded that so far UNAMID has only asked for three of them and "orders have been given for them to receive their visas in Washington." He said that once UNAMID formally notified the Sudanese MFA of the other MILOBS, he would make sure their visas were issued as well. Since UNAMID notified the MFA only on March 19, approval will have come in just five days (over a long holiday weekend),if indeed they are now issued. Alor also agreed to clear up any backlog of official American visas still outstanding, including the incoming RSO and DLO. In Charge's presence he asked his office director to have the Sudanese Embassies in Washington and Addis Ababa informed immediately. ¶3. (C) CDA then raised the issue of Embassy security. This continues to be a major concern as Embassy buildings, especially the Chancery, are quite susceptible to a "Jeddah style" armed attack because we have no Marines. Charge asked that the Minister push his staff to accomplish two things: secure non-diplomatic plates for Embassy vehicles and permission for arming some members of the local guard force protecting our various offices in Khartoum. Charge noted that both requests have been made repeatedly for months and while we have heard "informally from the Ministry" that these steps will be approved, we have nothing in writing and nothing has happened yet. CDA Fernandez recalled that the request for arming guards was made in early December, even before the murder of two Embassy staff on January 1 while the requests for non-dip plates (also made by the UK Embassy which still waiting for a response) dated from early January. Alor asked "what type of weapons do you want to arm them with?" Charge responded that he was not sure but he thought 9mm pistols and the FM answered "you should ask for Kalashnikovs." He then called in his office director and asked him to follow up with the Protocol and Americas Departments, who have been working on these issues. -------------- PRESSING ON NEC CONTAINERS -------------- ¶4. (C) Charge asked if there was anything new on the release of containers for NEC construction recounting MFA U/S Siddiq's explanation that the current containers being held could be released upon the holding of the next US-Sudan discussion on improving relations (reftel a). Alor said that Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail and himself would be raising the issue in the next couple of days with President Al-Bashir. Deng had raised the issue two weeks ago with the President after speaking with A/S Jendayi Frazer and Al-Bashir had said at the time "let's wait until we deliver our written response to the Americans." This response was delivered on March 23 (reftel a) so it was an opportune time to ask him again. ¶5. (C) Alor explained that he had the Sudanese non-paper on his desk but did not have a chance to review it yet, it was "an NCP (National Congress Party) document and not a Government of National Unity paper." VP Ali Osman Taha had told him that "the NCP should take the lead in drafting it because you don't have any problems with the U.S., we do." CDA agreed with that logic but noted that the document gave "an NCP spin" to the issue of Abyei and also included some ridiculous things like the US apologizing for the 1998 cruise missile attack on a Khartoum pharmaceutical plant. "They included that?" Alor laughed, "maybe they should ask President Clinton to apologize." -------------- ZIGZAGS FOR ABYEI -------------- ¶6. (C) Alor said that he would study carefully the portion of the Sudanese document dealing with the CPA and specifically on Abyei. Although he had not attended the entire meeting of the SPLM's Interim Political Bureau (IPB) held in Juba March 16-19, he was there for the session on Abyei. Alor said that First Vice President Salva Kiir had agreed to Ali Osman Taha's suggestion that oil and land be separated as issues in settling the dispute. He had not yet decided on Taha's suggestions that a special fund be set up using Abyei's revenues (after deducting funds for local people per the CPA) to promote infrastructure projects to promote national unity and tie the country together. He said that the NCP proposal has Kiir himself chairing this fund. Alor said that discussion on Abyei's borders still hovers around the "blue line" of the ABC report, minus El-Merriam and Higlig (reftel c). Reportedly President Al-Bashir objected to the "straight line" of the blue line, "because it reminds him of the hated ABC report recommendations." Can you imagine that, he joked "we will have to make it a zigzag in order to please him." ¶7. (C) The Foreign Minister said that, even though he has not studied Sudan's (or rather, the NCP's) response to the USG non-paper, he believes that this dialogue is worth moving forward on "in order to test the NCP's true intentions." He believes that MFA U/S Mutriff Siddiq is the right choice to lead the Sudanese side "because he is one of them and a decent guy, for an Islamist," he laughed. ¶8. (C) Comment: As usual in Sudan, follow-through is the key - not just with adversaries in the NCP, but with our friends in the SPLM (and UNAMID in Darfur too). Post will continue to follow up with Sudanese officials as well as UNAMID on all these issues to see if good intentions are translated into actual deeds. DPKO in New York also needs to be pressed to get UNAMID to accept the remaining American MILOBS. Alor's candid observations on Abyei, a subject close to his heart, show how close we are to an agreement there but also how it could still fall apart. It also shows that the overheated rhetoric on total NCP intransigence on Abyei is an exaggeration - at least sometimes. End comment. FERNANDEZ