UNAMID IS ITS OWN WORST ENEMY ON DEPLOYMENT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000434 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: UNAMID IS ITS OWN WORST ENEMY ON DEPLOYMENT ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: For at least the second time in four months, UNAMID leadership in El Fasher has attempted to use logistical considerations as an excuse for delaying deployment of the peacekeeping force in Darfur. The latest attempt, articulated by the Chief of Planning, was in direct response to Special Envoy Williamson's March 5 declaration that the United States intended to see deployed 3,600 troops by the end of May 2008. While UNAMID officials in El Fasher insist they share the U.S. goal of expediting deployment of the peacekeeping operation (which has seen not even 300 new troops brought in since the January 1 Transfer of Authority),they advocate a go-slow approach to avoid stretching its already-strained infrastructure even thinner. The debate illustrates the perennial disconnect between UNAMID leadership on the ground and that at New York Headquarters, and the USG seems caught in the middle. However, our plans to push ahead with obtaining inventory lists from reluctant Sector Commanders for battalions to be augmented seem to have sparked progress, as both DPKO and UNAMID now appear amenable to a deployment compromise reconciling UN, UNAMID and USG priorities. Still, there is no reason to believe that this instance will be the last time UNMAID tries to cut off its nose to spite its face on troop deployment. END SUMMARY. "THIS BLASTED DEADLINE IS GOING TO SCREW US" -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On March 20 UNAMID Planning Chief summoned EmbOffs in El Fasher to Force Headquarters to present an e-mail based on a PowerPoint presentation that the Planning Chief had given the day before to UNAMID Senior Management. The e-mail had been sent to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) on March 19 by the Planning Chief in an attempt to stave off the U.S. move to equip and deploy all Rwandan battalions according to UN standards and to rotate them by the end of May, per Special Envoy Williamson's March 5 remarks at the UN Security Council stakeout. "If these intentions are right as I heard them," the Chief warned, "it's going to screw us." He went on to say that while UNAMID shares the U.S. intention to expedite UNAMID deployment, it thinks the U.S. emphasis on bringing in four Rwandan battalions by May will undermine the overall mission. ¶3. (SBU) The Planning Chief first outlined UANMID's priorities to show the divergence with those of the USG. First was deployment of the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions not to where they are "logistically easy" - Nyala and El Fasher, respectively - but rather to where they are "operationally sound" - Umm Kadada and Kulbus/Silea, respectively. [NOTE: On the sidelines of this discussion, the Planning Chief noted that if the Egyptians brought in a third battalion, their troop numbers would exceed those of the Senegalese, which could lead the Egyptians to seek a Sector Commander (SC) appointment. The Chief expressed concern over this possibility, citing the Deputy SC in El Geneina, an Egyptian, as a poor example to follow. END NOTE]. Despite the priority UNAMID places on this adjustment in deployment plans, however, the Planning Chief said the UN has not yet secured formal agreement with either the Egyptian Defense Ministry or the Ethiopian Government to request the change of venue for those countries' incoming battalions. ¶4. (SBU) Next among UNAMID's priorities, which the Planning Chief claims the Force Commander (FC) shares, are expanding the existing base camp at Kulbus to accommodate a half battalion; building new base camps at Silea and Korma (the latter of which he claimed was all the more important as Korma is in a JEM-held area); expanding the camps at Tine and Umm Barru; and expanding the camp at Umm Kadada to accommodate the Egyptian battalion. ¶5. (SBU) According to the Planning Chief, UNAMID sees U.S. intentions for the Rwandans as potentially undermining the operation. Carrying out the U.S. priority of equipping and rotating four Rwandan battalions by "this blasted deadline" of end May, for example, would require creation of 120 extra bedspaces in each location to accommodate the additional forces, which in turn would require additional land procurement to accommodate bed expansion - in short, such tasks would usurp the attention and resources UNAMID engineers would have otherwise spent focusing on the FC's stated priorities over the next two to three months. The Chief continued that rotating the four Rwandan battalions would further stretch UNAMID's already taxed helicopter assets and would potentially jeopardize ration re-supply schedules. Furthermore, the Planning Chief argued, the Rwandans had indicated they do not plan to rotate until fall, vice May, 2008. Finally, the Planning Chief reiterated the sentiment expressed by the Deputy Force Commander that simply equipping these Rwandan battalions would not by default render them self-sustaining, something that the UN was neither able nor willing to do. ¶6. (SBU) The Acting CISS articulated his own list of impediments to expedited deployment, despite eventually admitting that preparing for the arrival of only one plused-up Rwandan battalion would likely KHARTOUM 00000434 002 OF 002 be doable. He reiterated the Deputy FC's stance on the need to guarantee self-sustainment among the incoming troops, mentioning in particular the areas of tentage, generators, water distillers and kitchens. He worried about the lack of engineers to prepare the ground for this influx of new troops and about deQQE; Package) still sitting in Port Sudan. Lastly, the Acting CISS reminded that the incoming battalions would be deploying during the rainy season, which would necessitate the use of UN aircraft since roads would be largely impassable. In addition to repeating the Planning Chief's concerns about the strain such a situation would present for UN air operations scheduling, he also worried about UN air capacity: "You can't put everything into an Mi-26." UN HQ-UNAMID DISCONNECT PERSISTS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The Planning Chief acknowledged that UN Headquarters in New York and UNAMID Headquarters in El Fasher disagreed over how to deal with the U.S. stated intention to equip and deploy four Rwandan battalions and rotate them in May. He scoffed that the UN "did not have the balls to tell the Special Envoy 'no'," and he berated UN HQ for its insiQQ+3 into Nyala and the Ethiopian battalion into El Fasher, instead of putting them in more mission-critical areas elsewhere in Darfur. The Planning Chief said that New York needed to approach the Government of Ethiopia as soon as possible about the venue change to discourage the GOE from first waiting for an Egyptian response to the proposed switch. In a statement that hinted at a disconnect within UNAMID leadership itself, the Chief acknowledged that his recommendation against the U.S. plan could be overruled by the FC, should such a directive come from New York. In a subsequent meeting on March 22, the Acting Chief of Integrated Support Services (CISS) shared the Planning Chief's sense of frustration with New York's inactivity on the Egyptian/Ethiopian front. "I DON'T WANT TO LOOK A GIFTHORSE IN THE MOUTH" -------------- -- ¶8. (SBU) The Planning Chief requested a meeting several hours later with EmbOffs, in which he elaborated on possible ways forward, something he had been unwilling or unable to provide to EmbOffs in the earlier discussion. Initially the Planning Chief suggested that bringing in and accommodating all four Rwandan battalions would be feasible if they were each reduced by one company. Later he said that he had spoken with DPKO and come to the conclusion that to bring in one 800-man Rwandan battalion by end May, along with deploying the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions, could satisfy both UNAMID and U.S. needs. The Acting CISS inquired about USG plans for equipping battalions beyond just the Rwandans, reminding that if that were the case, "$100 million won't go very far." ¶9. (SBU) The Planning Chief acknowledged that New York shared our concern that the FC's priorities seemed to be shifting, but he assured that the FC and UNAMID were on the same page [NOTE: The FC will return to El Fasher March 23, at which time we can better assess his perspective on the Rwandan issue]. The Planning Chief was supportive of the U.S. plan to conduct spot-checks of existing Rwandan equipment during the week of March 24, blaming the lack of a complete and detailed response from the sectors to the FC's request to provide inventory lists on "immature communications." ¶10. (SBU) COMMENT: Earlier this year DPKO Under-Secretary-General Guehenno warned that full UNAMID deployment would take the better part of 12 months. Given the problems that UNAMID has faced so far in the realms of contracting, procuring, recruiting, accommodating and feeding, just to name a few, Guehenno's prophecy seems to be self-fulfilling. While these logistical challenges are real, it is important for us to keep UNAMID's feet to the fire with regard to expediting deployment. It is just as important to maintain pressure on UN HQ to overcome its political indecisiveness on issues affecting UNAMID progress, namely the Egyptian and Ethiopian deployments. The March 23 arrival in El Fasher of a team from New York tasked with working on an overdue Integrated Deployment Plan for UNAMID could do much to improve communication and cooperation between the two sides of the Darfur peacekeeping coin. In the meantime it is also important for us to bear in mind that it will very shortly be our turn to deliver on the "compromise" reached with UNAMID. Once the contract for outfitting the Rwandan battalion is awarded by the end of March, the pressure will be on to ensure that deadlines are met to keep this deployment on track for 3,600 by May ¶31. Given that so few deadlines are met in Darfur, this will be a challenge. ¶11. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ