Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM425
2008-03-23 11:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

BASHIR TELLS ADVISOR THAT THE DAKAR AGREEMENT IS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2156
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #0425 0831159
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231159Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0278
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000425 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: BASHIR TELLS ADVISOR THAT THE DAKAR AGREEMENT IS
OFF

REF: A. NDJAMENA 397

B. STATE 26477

C. KHARTOUM 397

D. KHARTOUM 285

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000425

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: BASHIR TELLS ADVISOR THAT THE DAKAR AGREEMENT IS
OFF

REF: A. NDJAMENA 397

B. STATE 26477

C. KHARTOUM 397

D. KHARTOUM 285

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Senior Presidential Advisor Minni Minawi told poloff
March 22 that President Bashir had rejected Minawi's proposal
to travel to Ndjamena in order to encourage negotiations
between President Deby and Chadian rebel Timane Erdimi.
Minawi had hoped that his own direct appeals to President
Deby would encourage negotiation between Deby and Erdimi (who
are related and come from the same Zaghawa tribe) but
reportedly President Bashir said he did not want any senior
GOS officials traveling to Ndjamena (both Presidential
Advisor Ismail and First Vice President Salva Kiir had
separately told Charge Fernandez that they were also going to
ask Bashir for permission to go to Chad for talks).
According to Minawi, President Bashir said that the Dakar
peace agreement is off due to Deby's alleged new provision of
250 vehicles to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Darfur rebel group since the signing of the Dakar peace
accord. Minawi also claimed Bashir said he has no control of
Chadian rebels such as Mahamat Nouri "who has already entered
Chad."


2. (C) In a meeting with CDA Fernandez March 23, MFA
Undersecretary (and high-ranking NCP member with
responsibility for the Darfur portfolio) Mutrif Siddiq was
not quite as frank, noting that the agreement really needs a
monitoring mechanism to be enforced. "The agreement is too
loose and the border is too long" to be properly enforced,
said Siddiq. He claimed that last week JEM staged a "big
attack" on SAF positions between the Chad border and Jebel
Moon using more than thirty vehicles. Several soldiers,
including a SAF colonel, were killed in the attack. He said
the bulk of JEM forces are now in Agre and Abeche inside the
Chad border planning further crossborder attacks on SAF
positions. Siddiq claimed that Sudan had registered a formal
complaint at the AU and the UN following the JEM attack, to
document the JEM violation of the peace agreement. CDA urged
Siddiq to adhere to the agreement and agreed that a
monitoring mechanism is essential to prevent cheating by both
countries and their proxies.


3. (C) Comment: Given Deby's weakened state, it is hard to
imagine that he would be in a position to provide 250
vehicles to JEM within the last week, although it is very
probable that Deby (and Bashir with the Chadian rebels) are
reinforcing their allies in each other's country with
whatever they have in stock. Sudan, as the wealthier, more
organized state has much more to offer to the rebels it
patronizes. More likely, President Bashir is looking for
excuses to justify his continuing support of the Chadian
rebels - and the Sudanese complaint to the AU and UN with
regard to what sounds like a relatively small-scale JEM
attack is likely a "documented" excuse for Sudan to justify
continued support to the Chadian rebels. The Chad offensive,
though not yet achieving its primary goal of toppling Deby,
has nonetheless served Khartoum's interests in weakening JEM
and allowing the SAF to retake, in a brutal campaign that has
caused "massive collateral damage", former JEM positions in
West Darfur.
FERNANDEZ