USG STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS OF THE SUDANESE CENSUS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000422 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: USG STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS OF THE SUDANESE CENSUS REF: A. KHARTOUM 399 ¶B. KHARTOUM 389 ¶C. KHARTOUM 384 ¶D. KHARTOUM 382 ¶E. KHARTOUM 361 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: As long feared by the international community, multiple problems with conducting the census across the South and in Darfur have surfaced in recent weeks, leading to the risk of a serious undercount in these areas and a widespread perception that the census will be inaccurate. Now is the time for the USG to increase pressure on the GoS to follow through with its commitments and encourage people to participate in the census in order to preserve the validity of the CPA. End Summary. -------------- PROBLEMS IN DARFUR -------------- ¶2. (SBU) With less than a month before Sudan's national census is to take place, a plethora of serious issues has surfaced which will affect the conduct and outcome of the census, particularly in South Sudan and Darfur. If the USG acts now to engage the GoS on a number of these issues, it may help to mitigate problems with the census and set a more successful stage for Sudan's 2009 elections. This cable proposes detailed steps to address this issue before it is too late and outlines a follow up strategy should the census not turn out as well as it should - a distinct possibility. ¶3. (SBU) In Darfur, there is a dire need for advocacy on the census - what it is, how it can benefit the population and how it influences regions' power and wealth-sharing at the national level. There is also a need to set straight the record on how the census feeds into elections. There is a common misperception that if one does not participate in the census, he/she will not be able to vote in the elections. Neither the CPA nor the Interim National Constitution (INC) links the national elections directly with the outcome of the population census. In other words, the completion of the census is - from the perspective of the CPA/INC - not an explicit prerequisite for the conduct of the national elections. Voter registration will dictate who can vote in the elections and when the National Electoral Commission is created, it will set out rules and regulations on the voter registration process. Because the CPA and the INC are relatively silent on the issue of voter registration, the false idea that the census dictates who can vote in 2009 has gained momentum. The USG needs to help the GoS debunk this myth. ¶4. (SBU) Because there is a lack of understanding about the census, there is widespread skepticism and outright rejection of participation in the census in Darfur. Opposition parties such as Umma, SLA/Minni Minnawi, and DUP, as well as IDPs, the native administration, and students say that they will not participate in the census. Negative feelings about the census are fueled by a misunderstanding of the census, but also the feeling that peace and stability must return to Darfur before a normal course of democratic practices, such as the census and elections, can go forward. Many Darfuris are also concerned that the supposed influx of Chadian Arabs into Darfur will skew census data and show that the lands once occupied by IDPs are now home to a whole different group. If major groups in Darfur do not participate, it will lead to an undercount of the region, thus impacting Darfur's political representation in the Parliament and wealth-sharing figures. ¶5. (SBU) A panicky North Darfur Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) office has said that there are major logistical challenges to the GoS' ability conduct the census in Darfur. Not only will GoS enumerators not be allowed access to IDP camps and rebel areas to conduct the census, the GoS seems to lack a plan for enumeration in these areas. This is largely due to the CBS Head Office in Khartoum, through Director Abdeen, refusing to acknowledge that the GoS will have any problems - logistically or security-wise - in carrying out the census in Darfur. As of last week, the North Darfur CBS office cited that there is no way to get census questionnaires from Khartoum to the states and thereafter, localities. Although the CBS Head Office is requesting UNMIS and UNAMID help in the transportation of these materials, neither has confirmed their support for the process. Local enumerators in North Darfur will also face lack of security support and communication tools (satellite phones),according to the CBS. -------------- MAJOR PROBLEM IN THE SOUTH -------------- ¶6. (SBU) In the South, there is an insufficient number of questionnaires to cover the existing number of households. Moreover, as IDPs and refugees return to the South in advance of KHARTOUM 00000422 002 OF 003 census enumeration, there are no excess forms that can be used in the case of returns or emergencies. Although the Southern Sudan Center for the Census and Statistical Evaluation (SSCCSE) has requested on several occasions that the CBS grant the South more questionnaires, the CBS has denied these requests. The questionnaire shortage will cap the population of the South to an artificial ceiling, thus leading to an undercount. -------------- PROBLEMS ON A NATIONAL SCALE -------------- ¶7. (U) An issue that affects the entire country - the GoS has not yet released the promised USD 18 million to the CBS. The USD 18 million is necessary to pay enumerators. If this funding does not materialize, there will be a serious issue at the end of April when enumerators expect to be paid. ¶8. (SBU) There will be no independent monitors observing census enumeration or data processing. Although the Carter Center tried to deploy an independent census monitoring effort, it was unsuccessful in getting permission from the GNU to carry out an autonomous mission separate from the government-run Monitoring and Observation Committee (MOC)(ref E). This means that there will only be one voice publicly commenting on the conduct and results of the census (whether it is free and fair) - and that voice is the government's. -------------- PROPOSALS TO THE GOS -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In order to mitigate the damage that will result from so many looming pitfalls, we recommend that the USG take the following actions immediately: ¶A. Demarche the GoS on public relations problems it will encounter if the census is viewed as inaccurate and/or manipulated; ¶B. Urge the GoS to adopt immediately a strategy for enumeration in IDP camps, and to assure Darfuris that IDPs will be counted; ¶C. Urge the GoS to release the USD 18 million in census funds that is being withheld; ¶D. Urge the CBS to release the appropriate number of questionnaires (including extra forms for repatriation/emergency cases) to South Sudan, making the point that there should be extra forms, not a shortage; ¶E. Encourage the GoS to allow independent international observers to monitor census enumeration and data processing, lest the result be criticized as skewed and manipulated, setting a bad precedent for elections; ¶F. Urge the GoS to allow observers to monitor census data processing, which the US is willing provide if allowed; ¶G. Fund the printing of additional forms needed for South Sudan if the MOC will accept this; ¶H. Encourage UNMIS and UNAMID to assist the CBS in distributing census material from Khartoum to states and localities; ¶I. Encourage UNAMID to help CBS enumerators negotiate access to IDP camps; ¶J. Encourage UNFPA to request more census advocacy support from UNMIS/UNAMID and for UNMIS/UNAMID to provide this support [NOTE: Only 8 weeks ago UNFPA approached UNMIS to provide support for census advocacy. UNMIS has provided census awareness campaigns on Radio Miraya and has distributed the same material to local stations in Darfur to transmit. Additionally, they are creating a promo on the census that is due to air next week in the South. They are trying to negotiate with the GNU to allow the promo to also air on Sudan TV. End note]. -------------- AND IF IT GOES BADLY . . . -------------- ¶10. (SBU) If the South and Darfur are undercounted and census results are flawed or manipulated, the USG needs to be prepared to make a statement that elections can go forward without the census, but that the experience with the census shows that preparations for elections must begin immediately and international observers must be allowed (see para 3 above). Additionally, the USG should urge UNMIS, as the UNSC-mandated body to provide electoral assistance to the GoS in the 2009 elections, to step up pressure on the GoS to ratify the electoral law and establish a National Electoral KHARTOUM 00000422 003 OF 003 Commission. Electoral preparation, which is crucial one year out from elections, can only take place if basic legal and organizational foundations are in place. In order to avoid potential election pitfalls, the international community needs to get its act together sooner rather than later and pressure the GoS to prepare early, inform widely, and deliver on time. FERNANDEZ