UNAMID WILL BRING SECURITY BUT NOT A PEACE DEAL, SAY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000421 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF S/E WILLIAMSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU SUBJECT: UNAMID WILL BRING SECURITY BUT NOT A PEACE DEAL, SAY DARFUR'S NGO LEADERS AND EXPERTS ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Darfur needs security before traditional leaders can play any role in tribal reconciliation, an indigenous NGO leader and Darfur expert told emboff in two separate meetings in El-Fasher ON March 19. Contacts emphasized that the Government of Sudan's recent push for tribal reconciliation is an attempt to divert attention from its own direct role in the Darfur crisis. Both contacts were dismissive of the UNAMID'S mediation efforts, urging further direct U.S. engagement with rebel leaders and the GoS. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) ON March 19, econoff met Ahmed Adam Yousif, Manager of the Ajaweed Oraganization for Peace and Reconciliation in El-Fasher. According to Yousif and his organization's literature, Ajaweed is the largest non-governmental organization in Darfur working to "foster peaceful co-existence across differing tribes, ethnicities, and communities." ON the same day econoff met separately with Dr. Abduljabbar Abdellah Fadul, a former civil servant, director of the Darfur Natural Resource planning Unit, and currently the General Director of "The Darfur [Organization] for Development, Services, and Information." Abduljabbar (as he is known to all) was recently a fellow at Tufts University, and has served as a Darfur researcher and consultant to organizations and individuals including USAID, DAI, and Sudan expert Alex de Waal. SECURITY FIRST, THEN TRIBAL RECONCILIATION - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) Yousif and Abduljabbar both separately emphasized that only after there is stability and security will it be possible to encourage tribal reconciliation and a renewed role for tribal leadership. Recalling the proverb "good fences make good neighbors" Yousif said that it is necessary to first build up the walls of protection before dialogue between tribes can begin. Yousif stated that he is confident that UNAMID's deployment will bring security to Darfur. In a separate meeting, Abduljabbar emphasized the GoS's culpability in the crisis, stating, "The reason the government is pushing tribal reconciliation is because it wants to absolve itself of any responsibility and blame this mess ON the tribes." Both Yousif and Abduljabbar stated that most current reconciliation initiatives (such as those led by Yousif Bakheet) are government programs thinly disguised as independent NGOs. Abduljabbar also emphasized that the majority of people in Darfur have a mixed ethnic heritage; that ethnicity is overemphasized in the conflict; and that it is not accurate to reduce Darfur's problems to tribalism. Abduljabbar also expressed optimism that UNAMID's deployment will bring the secure conditions necessary for tribal reconciliation initiatives. TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (SBU) Both Yousif and Abduljabbar downplayed the role of many of Darfur's traditional leaders (e.g. the nazir- "tribal chief," malik-"king," sultan, etc.). Yousif stated that traditional leaders have been "paralyzed" by the government as it appoints, directs, and controls these leaders. Yousif stated that most of the traditional leaders have migrated to the cities, leaving the constituencies that they represented behind. Abduljabbar emphasized that this migration was a "fleeing for safety" as local communities turned against their leaders. According to Abduljabbar, rebel leaders rejected these leaders' affiliation with the National Congress Party and subsequently targeted and assassinated several of them in 2003 and ¶2004. "Darfur's tribal leadership has been castrated by the government and should not play a role today," concluded Abduljabbar. "WE NEED MORE U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) Yousif reported that he has not seen any positive signs from the UN-AU Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST). He added that the JMST is "noticeably absent ON the ground," and that he has little confidence in its ability to broker a deal between the rebels and the government. "The peace process is totally out of our hands and I am not hopeful about what the AU and UN is doing," stated Yousif. Abduljabbar separately stated that one reason SLM-Abdulwahid opened an office in Israel was to make an overture to the U.S. and to START to engage more with Washington. According to Yousif, the rebel movements will only listen to the United States because "they believe it will come to their rescue as it did with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in the North-South civil war." Yousif also emphasized that the U.S. could put additional pressure ON the rebels by directly stating what the United States is prepared to do in Sudan, and by further "squeezing" the countries which arm and support them (such as Chad and Libya.) COMMENT - - - - ¶6. (SBU) These contacts' confidence in UNAMID's ability to bring security Darfur strongly contrasted with their bleak outlook ON its prospects for brokering a peace deal. We knew that the JMST was not KHARTOUM 00000421 002 OF 002 active enough in Darfur as opposed to Khartoum and outside Sudan, but their harsh indictment that the JMST is "noticeably absent ON the ground" speaks volumes about the JMST's lack of interaction with NGO and community leaders. It is noteworthy that both of these ardent supporters of tribal reconciliation emphasized that now is not the time for tribal reconciliation, nor a renewed role for tribal leaders. These natives of Darfur also provided some convincing arguments for why the U.S. could take more of a lead in the peace process, given the ineptitude of the UN/AU mediators, and why the rebels may be willing to FOLLOW U.S. leadership at this critical period in the conflict. It is likely that U.S. engagement behind the scenes with rebel leaders to push them toward negotiations will have an impact over time. Clearly, we also need to push the JMST and UNAMID Civil Affairs to become more active ON the ground in Darfur. FERNANDEZ