UNAMID ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY DYNAMICS IN WEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000408 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO UN AU SU CD SUBJECT: UNAMID ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY DYNAMICS IN WEST DARFUR REF: A. KHARTOUM 385 ¶B. KHARTOUM 266 ¶C. KHARTOUM 269 ¶D. KHARTOUM 274 ¶E. KHARTOUM 346 KHARTOUM 00000408 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and ( d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Instability is still prevalent in the corridor north of El Geneina, where fighting over the last month displaced thousands and has left the civilians who remain in the area vulnerable to looting and violence at the hands of Arab militias, the Sudanese military, and the Central Reserve Police. UN agencies, the humanitarian community and Darfurians are clamoring for UNAMID to establish a presence in Silea, but an absence of logistical capacity and operational creativity have so far prevented any deployment of peacekeepers. The SAF continues to build its military presence in West Darfur, and new attacks on Jebel Moon or other Chad-supported JEM rebel targets are likely within the coming weeks. Continued fragmentation of rebel groups and alliances of convenience with the GoS compound the complex security and political landscape in West Darfur, which remains firmly under NISS control. End summary. -------------- INSTABILITY PERSISTS IN THE NORTHERN CORRIDOR -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Poloffs traveled to El Geneina, West Darfur from March 10-13 to assess political and security conditions in the state and re-initiate contact with representatives from the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),local government, Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signatory groups and Chadian opposition elements (Ref. A). Conversations with the acting West Darfur UNAMID Head of Office, Civil Affairs and UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) focused heavily on the recent SAF counter-offensive against rebel-held Sirba, Silea and Abu Surug--in the corridor north of El Geneina--and the attendant humanitarian consequences (Refs B-E). ¶3. (C) Acting West Darfur UNAMID Head of Office Joanna Oyediran highlighted that protection of civilians in the northern corridor remains tenuous. She reported that the population is "squeezed" between remaining in the northern corridor--where they receive services but remain vulnerable to looting and sexual violence--and the Chadian border areas, which are more secure but where they have no access to services. The UN has documented some cases of ongoing harassment, human rights abuses, looting and rape in the northern corridor, allegedly perpetrated by both Arab militias and by units of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Central Reserve Police (CRP). ¶4. (C) UNAMID confirmed that SAF units remain present in Silea and Abu Surug, while the CRP maintain a presence in Sirba (the area was secured by local police only until overrun by JEM rebels in late December 2007). "People still don,t feel secure in these areas," Oyediran declared, "though some civilians have returned to Sirba and Abu Surug." The humanitarian community continues to make day-trips to the northern corridor to provide services, though longer-term programming is suspended until security stabilizes. ONE NGO representative characterized the northern corridor as a "catastrophe in terms of protection." ¶5. (SBU) The civilian component of UNAMID and humanitarian organizations echoed that the best immediate hope of re-establishing security in the northern corridor and encouraging the return of thousands of displaced persons is to quickly deploy at least some UNAMID peacekeepers to Silea. Short of creating a foothold for UNAMID, both humanitarian and UN contacts recommended that civilian police with ties to the communities be deployed in the northern corridor as they are less likely to prey on the population. (Note: Our understanding from reporting in reftels is that civilian police have been deployed to Silea. End note.). ¶6. (SBU) (NOTE: UNAMID military officials, for more than a KHARTOUM 00000408 002.2 OF 004 month, have wanted to establish an outpost in Silea, but complain that UNAMID's civilian support staff cannot provide the necessary logistics, including tentage, rations, access to water and long-range communications. Force Chief of Staff, recognizing that UNAMID's credibility is on the line, commented to Fieldoff on March 13 that, in the interim, UNAMID intends to rotate platoons for short periods of time into Silea. END NOTE.) -------------- --- SAF INTENTIONS IN JEBEL MOON AND JEM DISPOSITION -------------- --- ¶7. (C) SAF military action in the northern corridor, aimed at re-taking areas previously captured by the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),are likely to shift to the rugged Jebel Moon area, according to UNDSS officers. UN sources confirm other reports that JEM received new arms and vehicles from Chad in recent weeks but, because of the SAF campaign, no longer has sufficient manpower to utilize them. UNDSS verified that the Sudanese military continues to mass soldiers and material in camps around El Geneina and are fixated on delivering a "knock out blow" to the JEM, which was weakened both politically and militarily in the latest SAF offensive, and by JEM preparing to flee back into Darfur if Chadian President Deby's regime collapses. Several UN officials observed that popular local support for JEM evaporated as the rebel group proved unable to defend Sirba, Silea or Abu Surug--and then rushed to N'djamena to protect Deby. There were also credible reports of rebel abuse of civilians in the period when they held the area. ¶8. (C) Asked by Poloffs to assess the current status of JEM forces and displaced population in Jebel Moon, UNDSS opined that "no senior JEM leadership remains in Jebel Moon" and that most fighters were still in Chad, possibly in the vicinity of the border town of Birak. UNDSS and NGO interlocutors added that the situation remains confusing for humanitarians, as well, since the command structure of JEM shifted, rendering past contacts irrelevant and making access to the area more difficult. ¶9. (C) JEM denies these pessimistic reports, however. Poloffs spoke on March 13 with JEM Ceasefire Commission representative General Bashir, who claimed he was in "within fifty kilometers" of Jebel Moon, though he gave no further details of troop strength. He added that that the movement repelled a SAF attack on Jebel Moon earlier that day and restored its control of the area. Bashir underscored that the region is stable enough for UN and humanitarian missions. The whereabouts of JEM political leadership also remains unclear, though Poloffs were informed by three independent contacts that Khalil Ibrahim may be in Europe, strategizing on next steps to counter SAF operations and eventualities should Deby's regime fall. ¶10. (C) Spurring SAF military operations, too, is the further splintering of JEM, with the most recent fracture leading to JEM-National Unity, led by Abdel Majid Dooda (Ref E). Both UNDSS and UNAMID Head of Office Oyediran downplayed the political and military weight of JEM-National Unity, noting that the group--composed of Eringa tribesmen--has been focused on local issues of security and community welfare in the unsettled region. ¶11. (C) Contributing to the overall instability throughout West Darfur, Oyediran held, is the GoS' "outsourcing" of security to a range of armed groups, including the Popular Movement for Rights and Democracy (PMRD),a predominantly Massaleit faction from the Misterei area (southwest of El Geneina) that split from JEM in June 2007 because of JAM,s inbility 4o pvotec| th(loc`l 0oruhacg. Dhe pAtcXu/rik*ar}ed(ggpq h^clufib M/[!Si"up|zp`ReQsYh"wn"@ype34Qwr`mb&EeeBpQ&Q/ qqd srcCDh`N!~#/Ikiy/A&{QQc|.q8,$xhJ to create a fluid and potentially explosive security environment in West Darfur. -------------- JURY STILL OUT ON UNAMID -------------- KHARTOUM 00000408 003.2 OF 004 ¶12. (SBU) Poloffs paid a courtesy call on the UNAMID Sector West Commander, Senegalese Brigadier General Balle Keita, to gain his views on security in his area of responsibility and current challenges facing the peacekeeping force. Keita articulated three priority areas for assistance: long-range communications that are compatible with UNAMID police and civilian components, additional armored personnel carriers (APC) and more troops, along with the camps needed to accommodate them. Notwithstanding current constraints, Keita asserted, he has pushed units under his command to step up patrols throughout the sector, including at night. He remarked that this new operational tempo was having a positive effect, proudly noting that the SAF in Zalingei "complained that UNAMID was patrolling too much." ¶13. (SBU) Beyond expanding UNAMID,s visible presence, Keita described his personal outreach efforts to IDPs, Arab tribes and armed factions to explain the peacekeeping force's mandate and capabilities. He acknowledged that the "jury is still out" on UNAMID, especially in light of its inability to take decisive steps to enhance security in the northern corridor, and that the sector has no public information officers or a humanitarian liaison. Poloffs highlighted the importance of making a positive early impact on Darfurians' perception of UNAMID; the Sector Commander concurred and pleaded that UNAMID's civilian component and the international community should expedite the delivery of quick impact projects (QIP) to link the new UN force with tangible progress on the ground. ¶14. (SBU) COMMENT: General Keita is among the most proactive and progressive of UNAMID's commanders, as evidenced not only by his analysis of the situation in West Darfur but also by his operational initiative. He recognized the importance of quickly erecting a UNAMID flag in Silea but pointed out that he does not have sufficient troops (with only ONE company in El Geneina itself) or adequate logistical support provided through UNAMID's civilian component. Until either UNAMID units arrive completely self-sufficient with an ability to conduct long-range mobile patrols or UNAMID's Integrated Support Services (ISS) can rapidly fulfill the operational requirements of a re-positioned peacekeeping element, UNAMID's ability to influence security and its credibility will remain feeble. This means that West Darfur's volatile and confusing political/military mix remains ready to erupt at any time (especially given the chance of greater instability in neighboring Chad). END COMMENT. -------------- POLITICS IN WEST DARFUR: NISS IN CHARGE -------------- ¶15. (C) Providing a view on the political landscape in West Darfur, UNAMID and UNDSS contacts flatly stated that National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) unquestionably runs the show in the state. (NOTE: NISS is headed by Abu Garoon based in El Geneina. END NOTE.) West Darfur Governor Abdul Gassim Imam, appointed under the power-sharing provisions of the DPA and resting on the relatively weak constituency of his Fur-dominated faction of the SLA, is only able to impact local, non-security issues, according to UNAMID Head of Office Oyediran. Notwithstanding his short political leash, Imam has sought to expand the efforts of his line ministries--for instance, in HEALTH and social affairs--and allowed space for civil society activities. ¶16. (C) Head of UNAMID Civil Affairs in West Darfur Lameck Kawiche noted to Poloffs that his focus remains on organizing and strengthening civil society so that these groups can better articulate their interests and, eventually, participate in some form of peace process. He cited the usual issues of import to these groups, including compensation, land use, power and wealth sharing and disarmament of Arab militias. Kawiche conceded that most Darfurians he interacts with are not pre-occupied with a peace process or the prospects of a Darfurian reconciliation program, but want to see concrete improvements in security and rule of law. He commented, too, that the paradigm of interaction between the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (which has no permanent presence on the ground anywhere in Darfur),Civil Affairs and the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) has still not been clarified by UNAMID leadership. KHARTOUM 00000408 004.2 OF 004 ¶17. (C) Asked how the political environment might be positively influenced in West Darfur, Oyediran identified three key areas to target. First, the Arab militias must be squarely confronted and eventually disarmed. As UNDSS put it, the "genie has been let out of the bottle," and figuring out how to both contain them and, simultaneously, prevent them from becoming spoilers are dual imperatives. Second, Abdel Wahid needs to be co-opted. While he does not hold a preponderance of rebel military strength in Darfur, he controls the political center of gravity: hundreds of thousands of IDPs, most of them Fur. Finally, Oyediran stressed the importance of addressing the legitimate grievances and concerns of West Darfur,s nomadic groups (mostly Arab but also non-Arab like the Zaghawa),who contend that they are politically and economically marginalized. ¶18. (C) Comment: UNAMID should be encouraged both in El Fasher and via DPKO to step up patrols in Silea and throughout the corridor north of El Geneina. There is now a real opportunity for UNAMID to demonstrate its concern for improving security and monitoring the situation in the area of greatest conflict in Darfur in the last three months. To be able to step up, however, UNAMID needs greater resources - troops, transport and logistics - and needs it now. ¶19. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ