CHAD: RFC'S ERDIMI PLANS LAND GRAB WHILE OTHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000397 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND AF/C NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU PARIS FOR KANEDA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV UN AU SU CD FR SUBJECT: CHAD: RFC'S ERDIMI PLANS LAND GRAB WHILE OTHER REBELS MOVE TO TOPPLE DEBY REF: A. KHARTOUM 00311 ¶B. KHARTOUM 00385 KHARTOUM 00000397 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and ( d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) As other Chadian rebel factions conspire to topple President Idriss Deby, RFC leader Timan Erdimi plans to "occupy" as much territory as possible and then negotiate with a transitional government to achieve his political objectives, he told Poloff in Khartoum on March 15. Explaining that rival opposition leaders Mahamat Nouri and Ahmed Soubian are incapable of conceptualizing or executing a strategy to govern the country, Erdimi confirmed other reports that he resisted Sudanese pressure to ally with the other rebel movements. Describing Chad under Deby as a country without any effective institutions that is dominated by a corrupt and exploitative Zaghawa elite, Erdimi pledged to institute a "strong state and strong rule of law." Though Erdimi claimed that Deby has rebuffed his overtures for political dialogue, Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minawi--who is attempting to mediate between Erdimi and Deby, both fellow Zaghawas--characterized Erdimi's demands as unrealistic but indicated that senior RFC commanders want to "change Deby's mentality rather than Deby's government." End summary. -------------- RFC Strategy: Occupy Territory -------------- ¶2. (C) Rally of Forces for Change (RFC) leader Timan Erdimi told Poloff on March 15 in Khartoum that while he will not participate in joint "combat operations" with the Chadian rebels allied with Mahamat Nouri, Abdelwahid Aboud, and Ahmed Soubian--the "National Alliance"--he shares their desire to unseat President Idriss Deby. As the National Alliance topples Deby's government, Erdimi plans to send his forces into Chad to "occupy" as much land as possible. According to this strategy, he would then negotiate with the transitional government to secure agreement on his two principal objectives: 1) Top posts for him and his movement in a new Chadian regime and 2) Retention of his forces. He said that he is waiting for the National Alliance "to organize itself" and that once he receives word that they have crossed into Chad, he will tell his own forces to begin the offensive. ¶3. (C) Erdimi estimated that the National Alliance consists of 3,000 fighters and confidently predicted that they would be able to overthrow the regime, even without the help of the RFC's slightly less robust force. "There is no army any more," said Erdimi, claiming that as the National Alliance's fighters advance toward N'djamena, the force will swell with volunteers. Purporting to maintain contact with Medecins Sans Frontiers, the Red Cross, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and other humanitarian organizations, Erdimi claimed that the opposition will coordinate its offensive with aid agencies to ensure minimal impact on civilians. -------------- Nouri, Soubian Have No "Program" -------------- ¶4. (C) Confirming reports that he has resisted Sudanese pressure to ally with the other movements (Refs. A and B), Erdimi said he told National Congress Party (NCP) officials, including Director General of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Salah Ghosh, that such an alliance would require a common political platform. Nouri and Soubian, however, are only focused on overthrowing Deby and do not have a "program for the country" beyond changing the regime, said Erdimi. He questioned whether either of these other rebel leaders could conceptualize--not to mention execute--a strategy for governing Chad. "It will just be more of the same if they're in power," said Erdimi. -------------- RFC Doesn't "Work" for Sudan KHARTOUM 00000397 002.2 OF 004 -------------- ¶5. (C) Admitting that Sudan is "not happy" about his decision to go it alone, Erdimi said that "he could not work for them (the NCP)." He downplayed Sudan's influence on the Chadian opposition, explaining that all previous Chadian insurgencies--including the first coup in 1966--and Deby himself, were launched out of Darfur, irrespective of the state of Chad-Sudan bilateral relations. "Everything always comes from the East," said Erdimi. Asked what he would do if the NCP tried to keep him in Khartoum, he declared he would "beat the drum" and stimulate public pressure for his release. "This is our program," continued Erdimi. "If it pleases the U.S. or pleases Sudan, that's not our concern." -------------- Chad Needs Strong State, Rule of Law -------------- ¶6. (C) The most pressing issue confronting Chad is the interplay between politicians and the military, diagnosed Erdimi. Nouri and Soubian--as well as the numerous international experts from the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and elsewhere--have never understood this dynamic, which explains why attempts to modernize the country have failed. By contrast, Erdimi pledged to establish "institutions of law" that would regulate the military's power and mitigate tribal tensions. Until these institutions are in place, elections are impossible. "They (Nouri and Soubian) say they will give power to the people," said Erdimi. "What people? Where are they? Chad is like Darfur--it needs a strong state and strong rule of law." -------------- Deby: Corrupt and Ineffectual -------------- ¶7. (C) Erdimi, a Zaghawa who is Deby's nephew, slammed the current Chadian government for its corruption and ineffectual leadership, painting a picture of a discriminatory and out-of-control regime. "Idriss does not know how to govern a country," said Erdimi. "He entertains himself. He reigns; he does not govern. There are no institutions outside of his patronage." ¶8. (C) Deby's autocratic style has allowed the Zaghawa to act with impunity throughout the country, said Erdimi, ignoring the rule of law and victimizing the other ethnic groups through wanton violence, including murder and rape. "The Zaghawa profit from the absence of the state," lamented Erdimi. "This is disgusting. The government is one day bound to change, and we will have to live with all the others. We must be citizens like all the rest, not above them." Erdimi alleged that Deby has even brought Zaghawa kinsmen from Sudan to fill senior government posts. -------------- Opposed to JEM But Sympathetic to SLM -------------- ¶9. (C) Blaming the Chadian government for causing instability in the Central African Republic, Congo and Darfur, Erdimi confirmeQnwx C3ion with President Bashir. Deby's meddling in regional affairs ~QMQ!MI-dimi. Erdimi underscored that he would "never become involved in internal Sudanese politics like Deby," stating explicitly that the Darfur issue "is not our affair." ¶10. (C) He nonetheless expressed some sympathy for the Sudan Liberation Movement's (SLM) political goals to end the marginalization of Darfur. "We understand the conflict with the jalabas (derogatory slang for the traditional Arab ruling elite in Sudan)," he said. He characterized the violence perpetrated against civilians by Arab militias in Darfur as the "humanitarian catastrophe of the century" and said that, once in power, he would work to protect the IDPs in Chad by KHARTOUM 00000397 003.2 OF 004 moving them away from the volatile border. Erdimi also said that the new governing institutions he promised to erect would benefit the IDPs. Though not opposed to EUFOR in principle, he said that the force could only remain in country after Deby's fall if it fulfilled its mandate of protecting civilians rather than serving as a tool of French influence in the country. -------------- Open to Negotiations? -------------- ¶11. (C) Erdimi claimed that he is "open to negotiations" but that Deby has refused his overtures at political dialogue. "In one hand, I have the kalash (slang for a Kalashnikov) and in the other, I have peace." His demands include the post of Prime Minister so that he can establish an effective administration and the retention of his forces to guarantee that Deby adheres to the agreement. "Idriss can stay as the head of state, but we will run the country," he said. Erdimi dismissed the utility of international guarantees for a negotiated political settlement, saying that Deby has broken all previous commitments and faced little international outcry. "Our guarantee is our own forces," he stated. -------------- Frustration with the West -------------- ¶12. (C) Expressing frustration for the U.S. and Europe's preference to preserve the status quo in N'djamena and criticizing France for having no long-term strategy for Chad, Erdimi boasted that the rebels could defeat Western forces. "The Americans and the French will never accept the deaths of any of their soldiers," he said. "We just have to kill one Western soldier, and the force will withdraw." Erdimi cited the public outcry surrounding the recent death of one EUFOR soldier as affirmation of his analysis. He said that he is not interested in political dialogue with France, claiming that he last interacted with French officials in 2006 when approached by French intelligence. (Note: This claim contradicts Foreign Minister Deng Alor's assertion, reported in Ref. B, that France recently signaled to Erdimi that it is "ready for new leadership" in N'djamena. End note.) -------------- Minawi Mediates -------------- ¶13. (C) In a subsequent meeting with CDA Fernandez and Poloff on March 15, Senior Assistant to the President and SLM leader Minni Minawi--who maintains regular contact with Erdimi, a fellow Zaghawa--described his efforts to forge a negotiated settlement. He denied Erdimi's assertions that Deby rejected political dialogue. Instead, Minawi reported that Erdimi's demands were conveyed in writing to a delegation led by Deby loyalist Ahmed Togoy, who had planned to present them to Deby on March 15. ¶14. (C) However, Minawi said he told Erdimi on March 14 that his demands--the post of prime minister, retention of forces, and compensation--are unrealistic. To maintain an ethnic balance, the post of prime minister must be held by a Chadian Southerner, according to Minawi, who warned Erdimi that refusal to negotiate will "make the situation worse for the African tribes in Chad." ¶15. (C) Minawi indicated that the RFC commanders are more flexible than Erdimi and want to "change Deby's mentality rather than Deby's government." One senior RFC commander, Mohammed Hano, admitted to Minawi that Erdimi has a "personal problem" with Deby and will never negotiate but that the majority of the RFC want to prevent a protracted struggle with other Zaghawa. Minawi continues to pass messages between Erdimi and Deby in an attempt to start a dialogue and, during his last conversation with Deby by phone on March 13, gained a commitment from the Chadian president to "open the gate to negotiate" as long as Libya is not involved in the mediation. ¶16. (C) Neither the National Alliance nor the RFC can unseat Deby alone, predicted Minawi. The RFC is not large enough to KHARTOUM 00000397 004.2 OF 004 dUfiv Ddb{gs!ck}#lcqlStQ(cAnD$sxc`Ja|awo wkLh!Je`~QrbXq&u`.6_#~bb|oge$5xtQnUNg8nugck%w q}Q4dNOQ cQ4QL}@"oQQQnEs`7yFW9,+Q&0osQ $0QbQh angered the RFC and precipitated their withdrawal from N'djamena. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶17. (C) Erdimi's scenario for a Chad post-Deby is more concrete than those of other Chadian opposition representatives met by Post in the last week (Ref. B). It is noteworthy, however, that in contrast to Soubian and Abdelwahid Aboud's supporters, his emphasis is on establishing a strong central government rather than paying lip service to democracy, transparency, and elections. While it also seems apparent that he is willing to exert somewhat more independence from Khartoum than his rival rebel leaders--as exemplified by his rejection of an alliance with Nouri and Soubian and his expression of solidarity with the SLM--an Erdimi regime in N'djamena will still strengthen the NCP's hand within Sudan and throughout the region. Erdimi's strategy of seizing as much territory as possible and then negotiating with triumphant rebels in N'djamena sounds to us like a recipe for anarchy and protracted conflict. End comment. ¶18. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ