YASIR ARMAN ON USG-SUDAN RELATIONS, ELECTIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000396 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINS KDEM SU SUBJECT: YASIR ARMAN ON USG-SUDAN RELATIONS, ELECTIONS, INTRA-SPLM DYNAMICS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto Fernandez. Reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: SPLM Deputy Secretary General Yasir Arman has called on the USG to admit that it needs Khartoum as much as it loathes it, and to recognize that in the absence of "meaningful leverage" against the National Congress Party, it must refocus its efforts on "internal mechanisms for change in Sudan: the 2009 elections." Arman praised the appointment of the new special envoy and expressed confidence that he has the "right attitude and charisma" for the job. However, Arman cautioned that renewed USG attempts to engage Khartoum could be futile. "They will engage you until Washington's political clock runs out," he warned, "and do so in a way that does not even allow you to grasp that you are losing." He also called for specific and consistent USG engagement with all parties on the issue of Sudan's elections. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) ConGen PolOff met with Deputy Secretary General Yasir Arman March 4 while he was in Juba for internal SPLM planning meetings for the party's forthcoming national convention. Arman's Juba travel was sandwiched between just-concluded negotiations with NCP counterparts on the (still elusive) national elections law and onward travel (with Abdelaziz Helou) to Europe and then Darfur. Arman maintained that despite recent agreement on percentages, the NCP would hold-out on finalizing the elections law until it could be assured of one thing: outright victory in the 2009 elections. Arman contended the NCP has two avenues through which this can be achieved: force the SPLM's agreement to form a political alliance or manipulate the national census "to ensure the numbers are in the NCP's favor." He claimed the latter has been made more possible through the NCP's "eleventh-hour alterations" to the census questionnaires. (NOTE: In fact, GOSS Minister Luka Manoja signed off on the NCP's proposed changes in November on behalf of the GOSS. However, he did so without the knowledge or authority of President Kiir. END NOTE.) Per Arman, an NCP/SPLM political alliance has seen growing traction within Juba-based SPLM circles despite his personal objections to such a coalition. ¶3. (C) Arman named GOSS Vice President Riek Machar as one of the leading proponents of an NCP/SPLM coalition, but demurred to single-out others, although he admitted they held cabinet positions within the GOSS. The Deputy Secretary General expressed frustration with the fact that the NCP is gaining ground with its arguments that a 2009 election with NCP and SPLM running on separate tickets could see mutual losses, and thus an abrogation of the CPA. He conceded that many in the SPLM now believe that an NCP/SPLM coalition is the safest way to protect the South's right to the referendum in 2009 in the face of lackluster NCP commitment to other areas of the peace agreement. Arman clearly disagreed with the hypothesis, and expressed concern that those closest to Kiir appeared to be those most enamored of it. His own preference is that the SPLM run on its own, noting that despite his personal rapport with Northern opposition parties, recent actions by these parties exposed inconsistencies which Arman viewed as "dangerous and exploitable flaws" on any campaign trail. However, Arman acknowledged that he had not discussed with the GOSS President any electoral strategy when the two met on March 2. "We're too focused on the national convention and our efforts in Darfur. This is the busiest the party has ever been." ¶4. (C) Arman conceded that while the SPLM is distracted by the demands of convention-planning, the party is equally paralyzed by the three choices that it faces regarding elections at the national level: run alone, run with the NCP, or run against the NCP with another opposition party. (COMMENT: We find it striking that he did not name a fourth paradoxical choice: who to run for the Presidency at the national level. END COMMENT.) The first and third options would prove most difficult, he noted, but the first, with the right kind of commitment within the party and the right type of aggressive engagement by "our friends the Americans" could still yield a victory. Arman noted that the SPLM now has 380,000 registered members in the North (not including the three states of Darfur) and that membership drives are ongoing (quietly) within IDP camps in South and North Darfur. "The figure makes me very happy," he continued, "while we don't have 5 million as some have claimed, South Africa's African National Congress announced only 600,000 at their last convention -- and we're not done." While some contests at the SPLM convention (the party's first in 14 years) would be predictable -- such as the election of Salva Kiir Mayardit to Party Chairman -- Arman predicted that some leadership seats would see fierce competition. Arman was coy about his KHARTOUM 00000396 002 OF 002 own aspirations, admitting he was not certain yet if he would attempt to remain Deputy Secretary General, and reluctant to indicate whether he held higher aspirations. "I have ambitions for the SPLM, and for the transformation of Sudan. The convention will see the SPLM consolidate its ranks, tackle corruption, re-organize, and get back to the renewal of the SPLM's vision and its commitment to that vision. That is enough for me." ¶5. (C) Arman returned to the subject of SE Williamson's visit, pointedly asking why the U.S. had not yet fully engaged Sudan on the 2009 elections. "You should have direct consultations with the Government of National Unity on this subject," he counseled. "Jendayi should be making calls. I was surprised that the Special Envoy did not raise it." Darfur cannot be solved through external pressure, but through internal change in Sudan, he continued. The 2009 elections will be the mechanism for that change -- "and you need to take significant steps now to make sure they happen." Bringing the conversation back to the hard choices facing the SPLM, he noted "Don't treat us like HAMAS and tell us you don't like the outcome after it has been decided. Engage us now." Arman commented that he had read the GNU transcript of both of the SE's meetings with Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie, and believed the SE "handled him well." However, he cautioned, the U.S. must recognize obstacles to its success: lack of leverage, the American political calendar, and "the fact that you need Khartoum as much as you loathe them." Pressed on the last point, Arman explained that Darfur could not be stabilized without the assistance of Khartoum. "Acquiescence is not the answer, they must complement your efforts," he continued, "but instead they will play at engaging you until time runs out. Darfur cannot be solved through external pressure but through internal change in Sudan. The only mechanism for such a phenomenon is elections." ¶6. (C) COMMENT: Yasir's question on the status of USG involvement with Sudan's progress toward the 2009 elections has been heard elsewhere, and remains a serious point of concern within the party. The SPLM fears that the U.S., distracted by Darfur, misses the larger issue of power in Khartoum and the possibility that the NCP's hold on power could be consolidated through (dubious but "good enough" for Africa) democratic elections in Sudan. Despite the SPLM's own waffling on elections, our statements (or lack thereof) are viewed as a barometer for USG commitment to the SPLM and its vision for Sudan's democratic transformation. While active consideration of a coalition with the NCP is worrisome, Kiir has not yet made a decision on elections personally. Arman freely admits that intra-party stock-taking at the MaQ convention will set the SPLM's elections agenda. Discussions in Juba and elsewhere make it clear that a determination on how (and with whom) to run will occur no sooner than summer 2008, one year in advance of planned elections if they occur on time. End comment. FERNANDEZ