UNAMID FORCE COMMANDER ENGAGES WITH SLA-UNITYUNAMID UNABLE

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000358 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU SUBJECT: UNAMID FORCE COMMANDER ENGAGES WITH SLA-UNITYUNAMID UNABLE TO STOP FIGHTING IN WEST DARFUR BUT WILLING TO TRY TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN EFFORT ¶1. (SBU) As part of his ongoing efforts to engage with all Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatory factions, AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Force Commander Martin Luther Agwai traveled March 9 to Al Hosh (N 15 degrees 02'21.9", E 024 degrees 47'56.1"), North Darfur to hold introductory discussions with members of Sudan Liberation Army-Unity. The Force Commander's (FC) principal objectives were to open dialogue with the rebel group, seek their assurances of cooperation with the humanitarian community, explain UNAMID's mandate and gain SLA-Unity's views on efforts to unite Darfur's numerous splintered armed groups. ¶2. (SBU) The Force Commander described UNAMID's mission (and provided an Arabic copy of the UNAMID mandate),the challenging political environment in Darfur, and the international community's urgent desire to help resolve the conflict. For their part SLA-Unity - represented by Special Coordinator Abdul Rahman Banat and council member Adam Idriss - expressed appreciation for the FC's visit and welcomed the opportunity to maintain open channels of communication. The rebel group recounted the African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) many missteps and queried the FC on the anticipated nature of the relationship between UNAMID and the non-signatory movements. Agwai underscored UNAMID's more robust mandate and his vision that any peace agreement - and a ceasefire tatprecedes it - must be all-inclusive. SLA-Unity echoed the importance of a comprehensive ceasefire, pledged to study the peacekeepers' mandate (which they had not seen previously) and, at the next meeting, provide feedback. ¶3. (SBU) Responding selectively to a number of Force Commander Agwai's queries, Banat affirmed that SLA-Unity would continue to facilitate humanitarian access and protect non-governmental organizations operating in the group's area of control. He deferred any response on the possibility of positioning UNAMID forces in terrain controlled by SLA-Unity, offering that the question must be put to his "higher political authorities." (Comment: Asked subsequently by FieldOff regarding the whereabouts of his political leadership, Banat claimed that both Suleiman Jamous and Sharif Harir were currently in Brussels, though for what reason or for how long remains unclear. European Union contacts could not confirm that either of the SLA-Unity political leaders is, in fact, in Brussels. End Comment.) ¶4. (SBU) On the status of rebel unification efforts, SLA-Unity Special Coordinator Banat only remarked that discussions "are ongoing intensively, though there is still no conclusion." He cautioned UNAMID and the international community to not exacerbate the problem of rebel splintering by recognizing and giving legitimacy to "every armed group with a Thuraya," which was one of the reasons that political negotiations last year in Libya failed, he held. Unlike other groups without military strength, Banat asserted, SLA-Unity is a force to be contended with and one that must be represented on any holistic ceasefire commission (CFC). (Note: Approximately 60 SLA-Unity fighters, armed mostly with AK-47s and transported by four light machine gun-mounted Landcruisers were visible in the vicinity of the meeting. End Note.) To this end, Banat urged UNAMID and the international community to press the Government of Sudan to commit to a cessation of hostilities and allow non-signatories to sit on a ceasefire monitoring mechanism. ¶5. (SBU) Comment: The visit to SLA-Unity's stronghold in North Darfur was of greater symbolic than substantive value. SLA-Unity Special Coordinator Banat did not appear to be particularly well informed or capable of articulating his group's military or political objectives, thus limiting the discussion to superficial rhetoric. That they were unaware - or unwilling to disclose - the status of rebel unification efforts, pointed to this particular group's lack of sophistication and organization, which remains one of the impediments in building a viable peace process. Asked specifically by FieldOff about relations with the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM),Banat only grimaced and shook his head. Pressed to give greater clarity on the group's constituency, the rebel coordinator claimed that SLA-Unity was "broad based and included all tribal affiliations," but declined to provide any further details - highlighting yet another challenge in the political track: weak or non-existent linkages between many of the rebel factions and ordinary Darfurians. In subsequent conversations with FieldOff, FC Agwai acknowledged that the trip was only useful in the message it sent regarding UNAMID's willingness to engage all groups, and that he would seek to engage movements more at the senior field commander/political level where both sides might be able to take authoritative steps toward concrete objectives, such as a written commitment to ensure humanitarian protection or, eventually, a cessation of hostilities. FERNANDEZ