A SNAPSHOT OF SOUTH SUDAN'S CORRUPTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000345 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: A SNAPSHOT OF SOUTH SUDAN'S CORRUPTION REF: A. 07 KHARTOUM 2001 ¶B. KHARTOUM 332 Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Southern Sudan Anti-Corruption Commission will roll out its inaugural anti-corruption strategy with USG assistance in late March, 18 months after the Commission's establishment. Anecdotal evidence suggests that GOSS corruption will continue to seriously embarrass the SPLM as it seeks to wrest power from the National Congress Party (NCP) in the 2009 elections. Abdelaziz Helou has been brought into the party leadership to clean the SPLM,s books and potentially its ranks in the run-up to the Sudanese electoral season. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE PROBLEM -------------- ¶2. (C) Capacity issues, donor detachment, and greed exacerbate wide-spread corruption in South Sudan. ConGen Juba staff has seen various examples of corruption within the GOSS that are well-known to officials (and in some cases to the general public),but that have carried only limited consequences for the offenders. While the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly has wider leeway than its Khartoum counterpart to expose malfeasance, inquiries over the past six months have done little more than generate headlines. Some of the more vocal members of the Assembly who have raised concerns about corruption are exploring hiring private security personnel, citing threats from a "growing Juba mafia" tied to former-Finance Minister Arthur Akuien Chol. -------------- THE PROFITEERS -------------- ¶3. (C) According to Ministry of Finance sources, Vice President Riek Machar,s office already had spent 87% of its budget within a month of the start of the GOSS fiscal year. Ministry sources note that the bulk of the expenditures have been both off-the-books and unbudgeted, including the Vice President's non-official travel in the vicinity of Malakal and throughout Unity State appears. The Vice President is also suspected of financing a character-assassination campaign among his Nuer community against current Unity State governor Taban Deng Gai. Machar's favored candidate to unseat Taban is Machar's own wife, Government of National Unity (GNU) State Minister for Energy and Minerals Angelina Teny Machar. ¶4. (C) GOSS Ministry of Education officials have openly discussed with partners their Undersecretary,s alleged withdrawal of between US$50,000 and $100,000 (no one is sure of the precise figure) from the Ministry's Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) account to pay for his upcoming wedding. The Undersecretary allegedly responded to criticisms from within the Ministry's finance department by claiming "this is our money, no one can tell us how to spend it." European Community officials raised their concerns with the World Bank Mission in Juba. GOSS officials were nonplused by the allegation, asserting their inability to take action in advance of their May mid-term review. ¶5. (C) Sources working with the SPLA told ConGen PolOff that approximately $30 million has been disbursed to date to construct the John Garang Military Academy outside of Juba. However, only $2 million in actual expenditures can reportedly be verified. Sources with access to SPLA budget accounts claimed to ConGen PolOff that none of the remaining $28 million can be accounted for. To date, the Academy consists of a series of pup-tents and four bore-holes. SPLA Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak told PolOff in November 2007 that spending already had begun for the Academy and that he anticipated the facility would be completed by April 2008. Our sources claim they are unable to locate a corresponding contract for the facility. -------------- GOSS PAYS THE CONSEQUENCES -------------- ¶6. (C) GOSS Finance Minister Kuol Athian Mawien told ConGen staff that oil revenues are being reduced by "occasional" KHARTOUM 00000345 002 OF 003 abuse of the GOSS, duty-free status. Certain Ministers have imported goods under their Ministerial authority for use in private ventures. For example, the privately-owned Juba conference center "Home and Away" is reported to have cost US$3 million to construct. Former Finance Minister Akuien, a primary financial backer, is widely suspected of having brought the establishment's building materials and other commodities into Juba via this "duty free" system. ¶7. (C) In an attempt to "catch up" with lost revenue, the GNU subtracts from the South's share of oil proceeds the amount of all tax exemptions issued by the GOSS. GNU revenue officials staffing border customs posts note the value of "dubious" tax-exempt shipments, then the GNU Finance Ministry deducts this amount from the South's share of oil-revenues the following month. Reportedly, this is the reason the GOSS' share of oil revenues in March 2007 dropped to $34 million. ¶8. (C) Gabriel Changson Chang (Akuien,s immediate successor as Finance Minister) told ConGen PolOff that GNU revenue corrections "played a large part in the reduction," though he asserted that open access for the SPLM at the central oil pumping facility in Heglig would empower the GOSS to better account for "financial discrepancies" either those generated internally or forced upon the GOSS "externally." -------------- TABULATING THE COST -------------- ¶9. (C) According to Finance Minister Mawien, the GNU has established a board jointly staffed by SPLM and NCP technical experts to study and account for non-oil revenue generation. This will permit the GOSS to block fraudulent duty-free claims. Mawien also is pushing the GOSS experts on the board to compile data for a GOSS-wide analysis of how much legitimate tax exemptions are reducing the GOSS share from Sudan's oil revenues. It is unlikely that funds lost through past corrupt transactions will be recovered: a UNDP technical advisor in the Finance Ministry told ConGen PolOff that then-FinMin Akuien spent all of the GOSS, $300 million strategic reserve last year. GOSS catch-up contributions to the reserve, plus exorbitant operating and payroll costs borne by the fledgling government, reduced the Ministry of Finance's cash holdings to only $50,000 in August 2007. -------------- CRACKING DOWN AT LAST? -------------- ¶10. (C) While GOSS President Salva Kiir has publicly committed his government (and internally, the SPLM) to a policy of zero tolerance of corruption, critics note that past corruption scandals have led to GOSS cabinet reshuffles, but few have been evicted from the government. In the meantime, some argue that a less public "housecleaning" could be politically palatable at the state-level, thus shoring up local-voter confidence in the SPLM as the 2009 elections draw closer. ¶11. (C) In February, Kiir went beyond political rhetoric when he removed the GOSS Auditor General and two of his immediate deputies, after they attempted to block an external audit of the GOSS Audit Chamber's performance. Kiir also supports the efforts of Anti-Corruption Commissioner Pauline Riek. The Anti-Corruption Commission, established in 2006, is represented in six out of ten states, and currently is preparing to roll-out a GOSS-wide anti-corruption strategy. ¶12. (C) Within the SPLM, Deputy General Secretary Abdelaziz Helou has been tasked with managing the party's effort to improve its anti-corruption image. Helou's first task: a review of internal reports generated by the SPLM,s Interim National Congress on specific (and in some instances, allegedly senior) party members. Kiir has given him a deadline of "before the National Convention." (COMMENT: We note that, with Helou's Darfur duties as well, this will be a tall order. END COMMENT.) -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶13. (C) Although numerous sources repeatedly accuse the GOSS KHARTOUM 00000345 003 OF 003 of corruption, it is always difficult to obtain accurate information. Though we cannot verify the accusations contained in this cable, there is enough specificity in the information provided to make it worth reporting as a way of drawing attention to this growing issue. ¶14. (C) After years of sacrifice in the bush, many former SPLA soldiers, now in the GOSS, have a sense of entitlement to the perks that can come from power and access to public funds. The resentment of average South Sudanese at this behavior, when they are still awaiting the economic benefits of the CPA, has been simmering for some time. There are hopeful signs now that President Kiir is becoming serious about addressing the problem. Of course Kiir must constantly weigh party unity against party discipline, but there is a risk that if left unchecked, corruption will be the factor that brings down the SPLM. With US encouragement, President Kiir should continue to address corruption in a deliberate and pragmatic manner, but he faces the challenge of fighting corruption while building a state from scratch and managing a dangerous, and potentially fatal, political relationship with Khartoum. FERNANDEZ