UNMAMID CIVIL AFFAIRS ATTEMPTING TO LAY GRASSROOTS

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000333 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU SUBJECT: UNMAMID CIVIL AFFAIRS ATTEMPTING TO LAY GRASSROOTS FOUNDATION FOR PEACE IN DARFUR UNAMID UNABLE TO STOP FIGHTING IN WEST DARFUR BUT WILLING TO TRY TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN EFFORT -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) UNAMID Head of Civil Affairs provided an overview of incipient efforts to strengthen civil society in North Darfur and its influence in an eventual peace process. UNAMID will hold a broad civil society workshop on land issues in mid-March, the first in a series that will focus on various topics related to the Darfur conflict. Helping to build internal Civil Affairs staff capacity and fortifying the nascent institutions of the TDRA are two critical areas of potential (and requested) USG assistance. END SUMMARY. -------------- STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY IN NORTH DARFUR -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Poloffs met March 5 with UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) Head of Civil Affairs and acting civilian Chief of Staff Wariara Mbugua to discuss ongoing efforts to organize and strengthen civil society in North Darfur to more effectively participate in an eventual peace process. Mbugua described her vision of civil society engagement as shifting the focus of dialogue with civil society representatives from general themes of security and power-sharing and wealth-sharing to specific discussions on IDPs expectations for compensation, security, and political empowerment. She emphasized that Civil Affair's (CA) role is facilitative, thus putting the onus on civil society groups, including tribal representatives and IDPs, to sharpen their own agendas and represent their constituencies. ¶3. (SBU) As part of this effort, UNAMID CA in North Darfur hosts weekly civil society meetings, usually attended by up to 40 participants of diverse gender, political, tribal (including Arab), intellectual and professional affiliations. The CSOs collectively nominated a Secretariat that takes minutes, drafts agendas and, eventually, may play a role in determining which representatives will participate in peace talks as "experts" in a specific domain (i.e., land, power sharing, wealth sharing, security, compensation, humanitarian). ¶4. (SBU) Mbugua observed that the forum has gained momentum over the last weeks and, to preserve its transparency, also includes government officials from the land commission. She contended that the presence of GoS officials in the meetings did not deter civil society members from voicing their opinions, though she conceded that political parties, present at the gatherings, should eventually be "peeled away" once UNAMID's political affairs capacity grows. CA has also closely monitored and reacted to any reprisals against civil society participants. In mid-March, UNAMID will facilitate a workshop in El Fasher focused on land issues, to be followed by other workshops on specific peace-related topics. (Note: PolOffs will attend the workshop. End Note.) ¶5. (SBU) Mbugua noted that CA is working closely with the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) to help identify representative civil society leaders to participate in the peace process. Above all, she stressed, the nominees for such positions--who would convey the views of their constituencies and report back to them--must come from the CSOs themselves, without interference from UNAMID. Mbugua commented that part of her strategy is to encourage CSOs to make their positions known more publicly, which could give civil society stakeholders greater leverage over other actors, especially the armed movements. Mbugua stated that UNAMID Civil Affairs offices in South and West Darfur were pursuing similar approaches in organizing and fortifying civil society, though making progress in these other two states remained a challenge because of the more complex tribal dynamics--particularly with regard to Arab tribes--and GoS interference. -------------- --- USG HELP: BUILDING CAPACITY AND BACKING THE DPRC -------------- --- ¶6. (SBU) Following up on previous conversations with FieldOff, Mbugua identified two critical areas where the U.S. Government might be able to lend assistance in bolstering Darfurian civil society. First, she noted that the newly established Darfur Peace and Reconciliation Council (DPRC) in North Darfur lacks the most basic capacity and desperately needs help in operationalizing its mandate. Expediting the institutional strengthening of the DPRC would not only reinforce a key structure in the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA),but also provide a tangible demonstration of Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) implementation. Mbugua expressed a similar interest in "invigorating" other institutions of the TDRA, such as the Land Commission, so they can perform much-needed administrative functions. For example, she suggested that CA could co-locate staff with the commissions. ¶7. (SBU) Second, Mbugua suggested that the U.S. might help build UNAMID Civil Affair's internal staff capacity so as develop such skills as grassroots negotiation, mediation and facilitation. She pointed out that her existing staff excelled as reporting and monitoring officers, understood the political context, and had excellent contacts. However, the expanded civil affairs mandate of UNAMID required aptitude in transforming and building relationships between different groups, skills that many of her mid-level civil affairs officers lacked. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Mbugua is among the few officers in UNAMID, the JMST, and the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC) who has been capable of articulating a vision for addressing the issue of civil society in the peace process, and who understands that UNAMID's mandate still includes implementation of the DPA. The fact remains, however, that UNAMID Civil Affairs, JMST and DDDC have all under-performed, for various reasons, so far. The USG could consider programmatic approaches to building UNAMID Civil Affairs staff capacity, including through mediation and facilitation skills workshops. Finally, having been a principal proponent of the DPA and its institutions, the USG can play a concrete and visible role in its implementation--and help the peace process--by supporting Mbugua in her efforts to increase the capacity of the TDRA's institutions so they can function as intended. FERNANDEZ