SE WILLIAMSON TO PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR: WE DON'T

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000300 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL AU UN SU SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON TO PRESIDENT AL-BASHIR: WE DON'T TRUST YOU AND YOU DON'T TRUST US REF: KHARTOUM 297 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a positive, hour-long meeting with the Sudanese President, SE Richard Williamson clearly and concisely outlined American concerns on Darfur, CPA, Sudanese adventurism in Chad, and other bilateral issues while describing a possible way forward in improving relations based on specific, measurable benchmarks that must translate to real improvement in humanitarian issues and UNAMID deployment in Darfur to be achieved sooner rather than later. President Al-Bashir responded positively and committed to implementing whatever workplan may be arrived at between Sudan and the United States, if agreement can be reached. End Summary. -------------- NOT AN ULTIMATUM - YET -------------- ¶2. (C) Special Envoy Richard Williamson met Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir the evening of February 29 at the Presidential Guest House in Khartoum. Williamson was accompanied by Charge Fernandez, NSC's Cameron Hudson and SE's assistant Jana Chapman-Gates from USUN. President Al-Bashir was accompanied by Foreign Minister Deng Alor, Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail and MFA Americas Officer Director Abdel Basit al-Sanosi (notetaker). ¶3. (C) SE Williamson began by reviewing MFA Deng Alor's discussion with AF A/S Frazer and himself at the AU Summit. This has been followed by Alor and Ismail's recent meetings in Washington, including with Secretary Rice and Deputy Negroponte, these had been 'good meetings, business-like and substantive." Williamson noted that the Secretary had said that the U.S. had no permanent adversaries and the transformation of our relationship with Libya was a recent example of that. The United States was taking seriously President Al-Bashir's initiative which seeks to improve relations and had prepared an interim response in the form of a non-paper. This document had had input from State, USAID, DOD and the White House and showed our seriousness. It is not a "take it or leave it" document and we will await your reply, your own points of concern and items for discussion. ¶4. (C) Williamson acknowledged that the US and Sudan have a complicated relationship, "maybe too complicated," with both sides having been disappointed and both feeling that they have good reasons for distrust. He recalled that this suspicion does not preclude progress and he had led nuclear negotiations with the Soviet Union at the time that President Reagan had called them "an evil empire." The key was to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculations and focus on specifics, on clear measures that can hopefully begin building confidence. Williamson said that President Bush was personally deeply concerned about the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, especially in Darfur. He wants to see real, tangible progress on the ground to relieve human suffering. We must also work to make sure that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) holds together and moves forward. -------------- SUDAN NOT SOLELY TO BLAME FOR DEBACLE -------------- ¶5. (C) The Special Envoy added that the U.S. has not desire to re-litigate the past or trade accusations about past wrongs. "You think you are right and we think we are right," he explained. The challenge is whether together we can come up with a platform or workplan to move forward - to improve the reality on the ground in Darfur, provide greater stability and security, enhance humanitarian relief and see how a better relationship can be arrived at. He noted that in his discussions with UNAMID officials in Darfur he had seen that while there were real Sudanese impediments, it was not entirely Sudan's fault. The UN has not consulted as much as it should have, it had been slow and has made its own mistakes and has often not been as pro-active as we would like to see. ¶6. (C) Williamson continued that we have told President Deby that support of the aggressive JEM rebel movement in Darfur is unacceptable. But we also share concerns about Sudan's support for Chadian rebel groups seeking to overthrow Deby. This is equally problematic. Certainly, we recognize that the Government of Sudan has the right to respond to a security threat caused by armed rebels taking over towns (when JEM, with Chadian help, took over a region in West Darfur in late December/early January) but not in a way that causes massive dislocations and hurting civilians as we saw recently in the fighting in West Darfur (during the Sudanese Armed Forces' February counterattack against JEM). The U.S. is also willing to help on the Abyei issue of our help is needed. ¶7. (C) There is no need to review history as much as there is a need to move forward. The priority for us is to relieve human suffering and bring more stability to Darfur and ensure that the CPA is on the right track. This doesn't mean some ambitious, all encompassing peace deal but real goals with tangible, short-term steps that can improve security and stability and allow the possibility for IDPs to go home. Our relationship may well remain complex and difficult but it can certainly be improved. Sudan's own stability as a whole is important to us. This is the largest country in Africa with nine neighbors, we have enough trouble with two neighbors - Mexico and Canada. So we can achieve a business-like, constructive relationship. It won't be easy, it could take time but we can both exert influence in the right direction by what can be substantively achieve in the next few weeks and months. -------------- WE WILL KEEP OUR WORD, IF WE AGREE -------------- ¶8. (C) President Al-Bashir responded by saying that "frankly, I am delighted with what you have said." When Williamson was appointed as Special Envoy, the Sudanese did some background checking "some institutions did not want us to see you and some did." I was one of those who was against seeing you, he added. We eventually decided to allow you to come to Sudan. "I am not going to tell you how they convinced me but I am now glad that we had you come." The President said that he agreed that to focus on the past would be a waste of time "we would spend all the time blaming each other" and this admission was a constructive step by the Special Envoy. "Despite our complicated relationship, I do believe we can move forward." Al-Bashir recalled how important and positive John Danforth's role had been in securing the CPA and Robert Zoellick had played a similar in Abuja with the defunct Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The intelligence cooperation between our two services, he continued, has also been positive and of benefit to both sides. ¶9. (C) Al-Bashir then said: "based on what you have said in past meetings and what I am hearing from you, I think we can move forward." He joked that he had told Foreign Minister Alor "you helped worsen the relationship and now you can help improve it. That is why we sent him and Mustafa to Washington, to deliver an important message from all of the Government of National Unity." Although he hasn't read it yet, "this non-paper is a demonstration of American seriousness" and Al-Bashir said that he would be getting a detailed vision of the paper from his staff on Sunday (March 2). He added that Sudan was very keen and willing to improve the relationship. He added that "we will also be serious and our comments and concerns will be likewise. We intend to honor whatever agreement we may arrive at with you." ¶10. (C) The Sudanese President added that "I believe that President Bush cares about Sudan and about improving this relationship." He added that "I told Jendayi Frazer once that President Bush is a serious and good man, but some of his aides are not so good." He was "grateful" that President Bush had assigned this difficult task to a serious man. He joked that "we should try to do all this quickly" so as not to coincide with the American electoral calendar. He added that Sudan is working to put its own house in order - in Darfur and on the CPA - and hoped relations will have already improved next time he sees Williamson. -------------- MISTRUST BUT VERIFY -------------- ¶11. (C) SE Williamson responded that the key to an improvement in relations will be practical, positive, business-like steps which lead to measurable improvements. He added that he appreciated the "seriousness and toughness" of the Sudanese officials he had met and that "I will be firm and strong in my discussion and expect the same from your side. Many doubt that we can travel this road." Your officials have doubts, he noted, and so do we, but your initiative showed leadership and President Bush has shown leadership in responding in order to try to ameliorate the suffering in Sudan. Specific steps that provide accountability and test each other are the way to do so. "We should both look to our own national interests and if what is being discussed does not fulfill your own interests, you shouldn't pursue it." But if both sides agree on the priorities, on the necessary steps, if they can communicate, and if the steps are actually taken, "we can make progress." He noted the need for senior points of contact "so that we can deal directly, avoid failure before it happens, and not negotiate in the press." ¶12. (C) President Al-Bashir responded that "as you have said, to be frank and open is the right path to achieve our goals. When you have a wound, you have to clean it first before it can be treated and healing can occur." The issues that the U.S. cares about, these are our issues so we should care about solving them at least as much as you do. "Because there was lack of communication and dialogue, our discourse was in the press, which made things worse." He recalled that no one would have thought that Sudan would end the war in the South but it did. "Deng Alor would not have been able to come to my house, and now he is my Foreign Minister." He said that he never would have thought there could be a better relation between the U.S. and Libya as long as Qaddafi was in power but it happened. "I remember as an officer during the Nimeiry regime, working jointly with the American military on maneuvers and the target was Qaddafi" so anything can change. ¶13. (C) SE Williamson closed by saying that we welcome your response to our ideas, and your own concerns, in about a week. He hoped that the procedural issues related to the embassies in both countries could be resolved quickly. We will seek to be fair in our public statements, "maybe not fair enough to your liking," but we will criticize you at times if we feel it is called for without being needlessly provocative. "We don't trust you and you don't trust us," he closed, "but we can make progress if we are serious about it." ¶14. (C) President Al-Bashir was jovial and relaxed throughout the hour-long meeting. He listed intently, speaking in Arabic and listening to the English. In his body language, words, and in his many jokes, it was clear that he felt the visit had gone well, liked what he heard in what was a tough but fair message and thought that there was a possibility in actually improving the relationship. As with all other meetings with senior Sudanese officials, SE Williamson emphasized the practical nature of getting real, tangible improvement quickly on the ground in Darfur as the key to an improved relationship. The challenge is going to be arriving at the precision needed at identifying the key measures that will lead to an improvement in the situation on the ground - measures that are in Sudan's power to actually implement - monitor and enforce them, and our own ability to respond in kind. Based on the rhetoric, the Khartoum regime seems willing to change but the question for them remains the same: is that will really there, and if it is, does the regime actually have the ability of following through or will this effort join a rather large dustbin of incomplete and inadequate "understandings with Sudan" by the international community? Because of a weekelong trip to Japan by Alor and Ismail on March 2, the Sudanese intend to respond formally around March 10. End comment. ¶15. (U) SE Williamson did not have a chance to clear this cable before his departure. FERNANDEZ