Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM289
2008-02-28 05:55:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

UN/AU MEDIATION BRIEFING FOR S/E WILLIAMSON CONVOLUTED AND

Tags:  PREL PGOV PHUM MARR MCAP MOPS SU 
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VZCZCXRO9376
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0289 0590555
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 280555Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0056
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000289 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF S/E WILLIAMSON
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MARR MCAP MOPS SU
SUBJECT: UN/AU MEDIATION BRIEFING FOR S/E WILLIAMSON CONVOLUTED AND
LACKING STRATEGY

REF:

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000289 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF S/E WILLIAMSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM MARR MCAP MOPS SU SUBJECT: UN/AU MEDIATION BRIEFING FOR S/E WILLIAMSON CONVOLUTED AND LACKING STRATEGY REF: ¶1. (SBU) In a convoluted briefing for S/E Williamson on February 25, the senior leadership of the UN/AU Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST) offered few details on its strategy to re-energize the Darfur peace process and was unable to articulate methods for addressing the challenges confronting the mediation. Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General and UN Chief Mediator Taye Brooke Zerihoun instead recounted the tortuous history of the UN/AU mediation effort since the 2006 Addis Ababa agreement. He explained that Khartoum's ongoing attempts to foment division within Darfur's rebel movements, the conflict between Sudan and Chad, the pre-conditions to participation in negotiations set by Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid al Nur, and the slow pace in deployment of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) have led some to question whether the peace process was launched at the right time. He nonetheless argued that UNAMID will be less effective without a political settlement for the region. ¶2. (SBU) The one positive development since peace talks collapsed in Sirte, Libya in November 2007, according to Taye, was that the myriad rebel factions had begun an "internal dialogue" that has led to their consolidation into five main groups. He did not outline how the mediation plans to capitalize on this success. The UN/AU will conduct further consultations with the "international partners" on this question both before and during a meeting of the Tripoli Format scheduled for March 18-19 in Geneva. -------------- What Has Changed Since Abuja? -------------- ¶3. (SBU) S/E Williamson questioned why the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and Abdulwahid's SLM--two groups that walked out of the Abuja peace talks and remain among the most formidable political and military forces in Darfur--would return to negotiations. Taye and the Chairman of the Darfur Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDDC),Abdul Mohammed, restated the history of the final stages of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) negotiations and underscored Abdulwahid's erratic personality. "The agreement was written for Abdelwahid, not Minni," said Mohammed, "and it wasn't until the last minute that we found he wouldn't sign." Regarding JEM, Taye said that the movement's "agenda" expanded beyond Darfur and was heavily influenced by both the Chadian leadership and Popular Congress Party (PCP) leader Hassan Al Turabi. ¶4. (SBU) Pressed by S/E Williamson whether these dynamics had evolved, Taye acknowledged Abdulwahid's ongoing, erratic behavior and unwillingness to join negotiations unless he "was the King" of the rebel movements. Taye suggested that the international community consider "targeted measures," such as travel bans, that would limit some rebel leaders' access to their supporters and funders in the diaspora. S/E Williamson said that if the mediation was unable "to change the rebels' interests, it doesn't matter if they join the peace process." ¶5. (SBU) Mohammed described the UN/AU plan to establish advisory councils of civil society representatives to attend peace talks in order to pressure the rebel leaders to respond to their constituents and to decrease "their grandiose perception of themselves as political actors." When S/E Williamson asked why the UN/AU did not convene these advisory bodies before the talks, Taye cautioned against "overestimating civil society," which remained politicized and volatile. "It's a balancing act," he explained. "If the profile of civil society is too high, you risk losing the parties, yet we want to help the rebels broaden their base of support to re-assure them they won't become (irrelevant and weak like) Minni Minawi." ¶6. (U) S/E Williamson did not have an opportunity to clear this message. FERNANDEZ

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