S/E WILLIAMSON CLARIFIES FACTS OF UNAMID

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000280

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, AND EAP
NSC FOR PITTMAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU CH
SUBJECT: S/E WILLIAMSON CLARIFIES FACTS OF UNAMID
DEPLOYMENT WITH CHINESE ENVOY

REF: DLO KHARTOUM IIR 6890014608

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) In a February 25 meeting with Chinese Envoy Liu Guijin
in Khartoum, S/E Williamson reported that he had asked
Khartoum to take practical steps to facilitate the deployment
of UNAMID and "get more boots on the ground" in Darfur. He
urged China to convey to Khartoum the importance of
expediting UNAMID deployment. Guijin argued that Khartoum
had made a "certain degree of compromises," agreeing to the
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for UNAMID in February,
"more or less" resolving land allocation for UNAMID sites,
and agreeing to night flights for the peacekeeping force
after UNAMID had improved airport facilities. He cautioned
that a peacekeeping force is not sustainable without a
political settlement and urged Western countries to use their
influence on Darfur's rebel groups to press them toward
negotiations. S/E Williamson asserted that Guijin's reports
on the status of UNAMID were "inconsistent with the facts as
we know them," and said that the patience of President Bush,
Congress, and the American people is "up." In a subsequent
meeting with Embassy's Defense Attache, the Chinese DATT
offered a more pessimistic view of UNAMID deployment than
Guijin. End summary.

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More Boots on the Ground
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2. (C) Meeting with Chinese Special Envoy for Darfur Liu
Guijin in Khartoum on February 25, Special Envoy Williamson
explained that his message to the Sudanese Government was
that it must take practical steps to deploy the UN-AU Mission
in Darfur (UNAMID) to alleviate humanitarian suffering.
Acknowledging that the UN has--at times--not been as
respectful of Sudan's sovereignty as it could, he emphasized
that the Sudanese Government should respond to the
international community's interest in constructive dialogue
to "get more boots on the ground" in Darfur.


3. (C) S/E Williamson reported that he had asked Khartoum to
decrease the processing time for the import of UNAMID
equipment, to set target dates for deployment of 3,600
African peacekeepers within the next three months, and to
consider Thai and Nepali troop contributions. The USG and
Sudan shared an interest in seeing the dissolution of IDP
camps and the return of IDPs to their homes, according to
Williamson, and UNAMID would facilitate this development by
improving security. He underscored, however, that forced
returns is contrary to international humanitarian law. The
USG and China shared a "growing commonality of interests,"
and though policy differences existed, the two countries can
work together on Sudan, he said. S/E Williamson asked that
"other important voices" convey to Khartoum the importance of
expediting UNAMID's deployment.

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"A Certain Degree of Compromises"
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5. (C) Guijin agreed that China and Sudan shared the "same
objectives in Darfur" and said that there are two fundamental
solutions to the conflict: UNAMID deployment and the peace
process. He argued that Khartoum had made a "certain degree
of compromises," agreeing to the Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA) for UNAMID in February, "more or less" resolving land
allocation for UNAMID sites, and agreeing to night flights
for the peacekeeping force after UNAMID had improved airport
facilities. During his current trip, Guijin said asked
Sudanese officials to accept Thai and Nepali troops and
claimed that Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada
later told him that "there is no problem with the Nepal."


6. (C) The priority, according to Guijin, is to help African
troop contributors and the UN meet their commitments. He
reminded S/E Williamson that UNAMID still lacks pledges for a
transportation battalion and 24 helicopters. While the
remaining 179 members of the Chinese engineering unit are
ready to deploy and the equipment is in place in Darfur,
"they are waiting for the green light from the UN."


7. (C) In contrast to UNAMID deployment, the peace process is

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moving more slowly, said Guijin. China has no direct links
with Darfur's rebel groups, and he requested that Western
countries, particularly those in Europe, use their influence
to press them toward negotiations. "Without a political
settlement, the peacekeeping operation is not sustainable."
He noted that while China would never ask France to expel
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) leader Abdulwahid al Nur from
Paris, it had a "moral obligation" to do so.

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Non-Interference
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8. (C) Guijin said that China will pursue a diplomatic
approach with Sudan "that is familiar to us" and consistent
with China's basic foreign policy principle of
non-interference. Beijing's goal continued to be a
"practical, workable, long-term, fundamental solution" to the
Darfur conflict. However, while you must criticize a boy
when he has done something "bad," Guijin explained, it is not
necessary to do so in public. "Sanctions, coercions don't
work, even if you try to overthrow the Government," he said.
Guijin recounted that State Minister of Foreign Affairs
Samani Al Wasila had traveled to Washington in September 2007
with a message to improve relations and "nothing happened."

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Inconsistent "Facts"
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9. (C) Parrying Guijin's arguments, S/E Williamson asserted
that Guijin's reports on the status of UNAMID were
"inconsistent with the facts as we know them." Sudan has
raised more impediments to the deployment of the peacekeeping
force that he had seen in 30 years of diplomatic work, said
Williamson, and the SOFA agreed to by Khartoum was the
weakest in UN history. A meaningful peace process is
difficult in the current security environment, said
Williamson. "Realistically, it will be a peace process for
process' sake until the situation changes," noting that the
patience of President Bush, Congress, and the American people
is "up."

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Follow-Up Meeting with Chinese DATT
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10. (C) Following the meeting between S/E Williamson and
Guijin, Embassy's Defense Attache (DATT) met with Senior
Colonel Dong Jian Dong, the Chinese DATT, to discuss UNAMID
operations in more detail (reftel). Dong stated that
progress on the Nyala UNAMID Super-Camp was moving slowly.
The initial Chinese engineers arrived in early December but
did not start residing at the Super-Camp until mid-February
due to the lack of UNAMID security forces. The initial
Chinese engineering equipment that arrived at Port Sudan was
scheduled to take nine days to be transported to Nyala, which
had stretched to six weeks. Initial equipment flown into
Khartoum International Airport was scheduled to take seven
days to transport to Nyala but stretched to three weeks, he
said. Dong attributed these delays to Sudanese customs
inspection and UNAMID inefficiency in coordinating
transportation. The remaining Chinese heavy engineer
equipment left China by ship in mid-February and should
arrive at Port Sudan around March 1. The Chinese DATT
predicted as long a delay in transporting this equipment to
Nyala as with the initial shipment. He also reported that
Chinese engineers do not believe there are sufficient water
sources at the Super-Camp site to sustain the UNAMID forces
projected for the location.


11. (U) S/E Williamson did not have a chance to cleare this
message.
FERNANDEZ