S/E WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000278

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPATMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU
SUBJECT: S/E WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR
NAFIE ALI NAFIE

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On February 25, S/E Williamson told
Presidential Advisor Nafie that any chance to move beyond
U.S. and Sudan mutual distrust will come from committing to a
matrix of specific and verifiable actions that both sides can
take and for which each can hold the other accountable. He
proposed that, if the GoS would decide to seriously pursue
such an exercise, before his departure he could provide a set
of U.S. proposals for the GOS to consider. When Nafie
suggested that conditions in Darfur have been
mischaracterized and defended Sudan,s actions, S/E
Williamson pushed back and said that there will be no
progress if either side dwells on the past. End Summary.


2. (C) Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie welcomed
Special Envoy Richard S. Williamson, accompanied by NSC
Africa Director Cameron Hume, and said Sudan looks forward to
improving relations with the United States. Nafie called the
Special Envoy,s visit an opportunity to begin a new phase
and to make a breakthrough on Sudan-U.S. relations. He said
that some countries are &easy-going8 and are willing to
give the U.S. a blank check. &We are not that way, that is
not our nature,8 but they are sincere in wanting to find a
way forward with the U.S.


3. (C) S/E Williamson emphasized U.S. willingness to
seriously explore whether there could be sufficient
alleviation of humanitarian suffering and progress toward
stability on the ground to justify improving relations with
Sudan. He said that by sending FM Deng Alor to the United
States, President Bashir had opened a door through which the
U.S. is prepared to enter. As Secretary Rice had told FM
Deng, the U.S. has no permanent enemies. Recent improved
relations with Libya demonstrate the kind of progress that is
possible if two sides are able to put the past behind them
and focus on the future.


4. (C) The Special Envoy acknowledged that there are reasons
for mistrust on both sides, but said that progress still is
possible if the U.S. and Sudan develop a mutually-agreed
matrix of specific, verifiable and accountable actions, with
clear deadlines. S/E Williamson said that the more specific
the actions required, the less chance of misunderstanding and
disappointment. Such a matrix will provide a clear standard
to measure Sudan,s commitment and performance. For Sudan,
it will provide a clear, written statement of specific
actions, and will provide them the opportunity to table
requests for U.S. action in response to specific actions
taken by Sudan.


5. (C) S/E Williamson said that, for its part, the U.S. will
seek specific measures that Sudan must take to implement the
CPA and ease suffering in Darfur, for example, expediting the
movement of UNAMID equipment through Port Sudan, speeding the
issuance of visas for UN officials, and a consistent policy
on the accreditation of NGOs. In response, S/E Williamson
said, the U.S. can commit to initiating a process to remove
Sudan as a state-sponsor of terrorism (if and only if all
other conditions are met) and easing economic sanctions. The
U.S. would like to establish points-of-contact at every level
to be able to work through implementation problems. If Sudan
lives up to such specific commitments, the U.S. is prepared
to reciprocate. S/E Williamson acknowledged that the
Administration will come under fire from those in the U.S.
who believe that U.S. policy toward Sudan cannot be too
tough, but if Sudan meets its commitments, as Secretary Rice
said in Washington, we are prepared to defend the U.S.
response. The Administration realizes that the situation in
Darfur is not black and white and that the government is not
responsible for all of the violence that takes place.


6. (C) S/E Williamson said that before departing Sudan he
could provide a U.S. non-paper, proposing just such a set of
actions in peacekeeping, humanitarian and political fields
for Sudan. He could leave this non-paper for the GoS to
consider and amend as it sees fit. The paper would serve as
the basis for discussion and the U.S. is open to proposals by
Sudan.


7. (C) Nafie affirmed that Sudan also desires good relations
with the United States, but improving bilateral relations
will be a complex process. Everyone in the regime wants
improved relations with the U.S., but not all believe it is
possible. Sudan must base its relationship with the United
States on its own best interest and on what public opinion
will support. He welcomed S/E Williamson,s commitment to
speak honestly. Nafie agreed that there are suspicions on

KHARTOUM 00000278 002 OF 002


both sides, but there is an opportunity to move forward now
because both sides are interested.


8. (C) Nafie then noted that the main issue dividing the
United States and Sudan now is the Darfur conflict. He
contended they lack a common understanding of the problem.
Nafie asserted that conditions in Darfur have been
exaggerated. He suggested that the U.S. and Sudan need to
come a common evaluation of the situation there as a basis to
move the relationship forward. He said that the Darfur rebel
groups do not represent the local population and that the GNU
does help to mediate ongoing tribal conflict. Nafie asserted
that Chad is manipulating the Darfur situation. On its side,
Sudan has no motivation for poor relations with Chad. He
defended Sudan,s insistence that UNAMID be composed of
African troops and complained that the ground rules on
UNAMID-troop deployments keep changing.


9. (C) S/E Williamson acknowledged that there are legitimate
disagreements and reasons for mistrust on both sides, but
dwelling on them now is counterproductive. If the
U.S.-Sudanese relationship is to move forward, both sides
must leave the past behind. For its part, the United States
is willing to agree to disagree on those issues and identify
points on which we can cooperate and move forward. If both
sides agree on the roadmap the U.S. is proposing, they will
have clear commitments for which they can be held accountable.


10. (C) The Special Envoy again acknowledged that the Darfur
situation is not black and white, and that the U.S. does not
hold the GNU responsible for everything that happens there.
S/E Williamson continued that while peace in Darfur may be
unlikely to be achieved in the near term, there are specific
steps that can and should be accomplished to improve the
situation. For example, it is in Sudan,s self-interest to
commit to assist the deployment of UN civilian police to
counter increasing lawlessness and radicalization in the IDP
camps. At Addis, Sudan agreed to African peacekeepers with
non-African support in UNAMID, but since it has rejected
Nepalese, Thai, and Nordic contributions to UNAMID. Sudan
also could commit to a senior point-of-contact to assist on
UNAMID deployment and appoint a senior customs official to
work with the UN in Port Sudan.


11. (C) Nafie intimated that, after considerable African
troops deploy, Sudan &may consider8 some non-African
countries contributions, such as Nepal and Thailand. S/E
Williamson bristled and said that &we don,t take you and
your country for fools, an yo should not take us for one
either.8 Sudan will have to do more than just consider such
steps, but actually implement them. Otherwise, we should not
even try to go down this road together. The often toxic
Nafie seemed to take this upbraiding well, noting &I like
this frank talk myself.8 He noted that without tribal
reconciliation and a real peace accord &no force on earth
will be able to bring peace to Darfur.8


12. (C) Nafie said that the GNU looks forward to receiving
the U.S. proposals at the end of the week. Rest assured, he
noted that we will not agree to something that is not
palatable to us. S/E Williamson emphasized that the U.S.
non-paper will be open to proposals from the Sudanese side.
The U.S. proposals will serve as an initial basis for
discussion, which he hoped to continue in the weeks ahead.


13. (C) Comment: Nafie was his usual self, both combative
and defensive, charging that the fundamental problem is
misunderstanding and deliberate mischaracterization of
government actions in Darfur, and hinting that Sudan is the
victim of an international conspiracy. But as a notorious
regime &tough guy8 he seemed to respond well to unvarnished
straight talk from the Special Envoy. He had his entire team
of experts with him ready to deal with American overtures.
While departing, Sudan,s Americas Office Director said with
a smile to CDA Fernandez, &We have met the American Nafie.8
End Comment.


14. (U) S/E Williamson reviewed this message before
transmission.
FERNANDEZ