S/E WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000278 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPATMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU SUBJECT: S/E WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR NAFIE ALI NAFIE Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: On February 25, S/E Williamson told Presidential Advisor Nafie that any chance to move beyond U.S. and Sudan mutual distrust will come from committing to a matrix of specific and verifiable actions that both sides can take and for which each can hold the other accountable. He proposed that, if the GoS would decide to seriously pursue such an exercise, before his departure he could provide a set of U.S. proposals for the GOS to consider. When Nafie suggested that conditions in Darfur have been mischaracterized and defended Sudan,s actions, S/E Williamson pushed back and said that there will be no progress if either side dwells on the past. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie welcomed Special Envoy Richard S. Williamson, accompanied by NSC Africa Director Cameron Hume, and said Sudan looks forward to improving relations with the United States. Nafie called the Special Envoy,s visit an opportunity to begin a new phase and to make a breakthrough on Sudan-U.S. relations. He said that some countries are &easy-going8 and are willing to give the U.S. a blank check. &We are not that way, that is not our nature,8 but they are sincere in wanting to find a way forward with the U.S. ¶3. (C) S/E Williamson emphasized U.S. willingness to seriously explore whether there could be sufficient alleviation of humanitarian suffering and progress toward stability on the ground to justify improving relations with Sudan. He said that by sending FM Deng Alor to the United States, President Bashir had opened a door through which the U.S. is prepared to enter. As Secretary Rice had told FM Deng, the U.S. has no permanent enemies. Recent improved relations with Libya demonstrate the kind of progress that is possible if two sides are able to put the past behind them and focus on the future. ¶4. (C) The Special Envoy acknowledged that there are reasons for mistrust on both sides, but said that progress still is possible if the U.S. and Sudan develop a mutually-agreed matrix of specific, verifiable and accountable actions, with clear deadlines. S/E Williamson said that the more specific the actions required, the less chance of misunderstanding and disappointment. Such a matrix will provide a clear standard to measure Sudan,s commitment and performance. For Sudan, it will provide a clear, written statement of specific actions, and will provide them the opportunity to table requests for U.S. action in response to specific actions taken by Sudan. ¶5. (C) S/E Williamson said that, for its part, the U.S. will seek specific measures that Sudan must take to implement the CPA and ease suffering in Darfur, for example, expediting the movement of UNAMID equipment through Port Sudan, speeding the issuance of visas for UN officials, and a consistent policy on the accreditation of NGOs. In response, S/E Williamson said, the U.S. can commit to initiating a process to remove Sudan as a state-sponsor of terrorism (if and only if all other conditions are met) and easing economic sanctions. The U.S. would like to establish points-of-contact at every level to be able to work through implementation problems. If Sudan lives up to such specific commitments, the U.S. is prepared to reciprocate. S/E Williamson acknowledged that the Administration will come under fire from those in the U.S. who believe that U.S. policy toward Sudan cannot be too tough, but if Sudan meets its commitments, as Secretary Rice said in Washington, we are prepared to defend the U.S. response. The Administration realizes that the situation in Darfur is not black and white and that the government is not responsible for all of the violence that takes place. ¶6. (C) S/E Williamson said that before departing Sudan he could provide a U.S. non-paper, proposing just such a set of actions in peacekeeping, humanitarian and political fields for Sudan. He could leave this non-paper for the GoS to consider and amend as it sees fit. The paper would serve as the basis for discussion and the U.S. is open to proposals by Sudan. ¶7. (C) Nafie affirmed that Sudan also desires good relations with the United States, but improving bilateral relations will be a complex process. Everyone in the regime wants improved relations with the U.S., but not all believe it is possible. Sudan must base its relationship with the United States on its own best interest and on what public opinion will support. He welcomed S/E Williamson,s commitment to speak honestly. Nafie agreed that there are suspicions on KHARTOUM 00000278 002 OF 002 both sides, but there is an opportunity to move forward now because both sides are interested. ¶8. (C) Nafie then noted that the main issue dividing the United States and Sudan now is the Darfur conflict. He contended they lack a common understanding of the problem. Nafie asserted that conditions in Darfur have been exaggerated. He suggested that the U.S. and Sudan need to come a common evaluation of the situation there as a basis to move the relationship forward. He said that the Darfur rebel groups do not represent the local population and that the GNU does help to mediate ongoing tribal conflict. Nafie asserted that Chad is manipulating the Darfur situation. On its side, Sudan has no motivation for poor relations with Chad. He defended Sudan,s insistence that UNAMID be composed of African troops and complained that the ground rules on UNAMID-troop deployments keep changing. ¶9. (C) S/E Williamson acknowledged that there are legitimate disagreements and reasons for mistrust on both sides, but dwelling on them now is counterproductive. If the U.S.-Sudanese relationship is to move forward, both sides must leave the past behind. For its part, the United States is willing to agree to disagree on those issues and identify points on which we can cooperate and move forward. If both sides agree on the roadmap the U.S. is proposing, they will have clear commitments for which they can be held accountable. ¶10. (C) The Special Envoy again acknowledged that the Darfur situation is not black and white, and that the U.S. does not hold the GNU responsible for everything that happens there. S/E Williamson continued that while peace in Darfur may be unlikely to be achieved in the near term, there are specific steps that can and should be accomplished to improve the situation. For example, it is in Sudan,s self-interest to commit to assist the deployment of UN civilian police to counter increasing lawlessness and radicalization in the IDP camps. At Addis, Sudan agreed to African peacekeepers with non-African support in UNAMID, but since it has rejected Nepalese, Thai, and Nordic contributions to UNAMID. Sudan also could commit to a senior point-of-contact to assist on UNAMID deployment and appoint a senior customs official to work with the UN in Port Sudan. ¶11. (C) Nafie intimated that, after considerable African troops deploy, Sudan &may consider8 some non-African countries contributions, such as NEPAL and Thailand. S/E Williamson bristled and said that &we don,t take you and your country for fools, an yo should not take us for one either.8 Sudan will have to do more than just consider such steps, but actually implement them. Otherwise, we should not even try to go down this road together. The often toxic Nafie seemed to take this upbraiding well, noting &I like this frank talk myself.8 He noted that without tribal reconciliation and a real peace accord &no force on earth will be able to bring peace to Darfur.8 ¶12. (C) Nafie said that the GNU looks forward to receiving the U.S. proposals at the end of the week. Rest assured, he noted that we will not agree to something that is not palatable to us. S/E Williamson emphasized that the U.S. non-paper will be open to proposals from the Sudanese side. The U.S. proposals will serve as an initial basis for discussion, which he hoped to continue in the weeks ahead. ¶13. (C) Comment: Nafie was his usual self, both combative and defensive, charging that the fundamental problem is misunderstanding and deliberate mischaracterization of government actions in Darfur, and hinting that Sudan is the victim of an international conspiracy. But as a notorious regime &tough guy8 he seemed to respond well to unvarnished straight talk from the Special Envoy. He had his entire team of experts with him ready to deal with American overtures. While departing, Sudan,s Americas Office Director said with a smile to CDA Fernandez, &We have met the American Nafie.8 End Comment. ¶14. (U) S/E Williamson reviewed this message before transmission. FERNANDEZ