S/E WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SUDAN'S FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000277 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU SUBJECT: S/E WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SUDAN'S FOREIGN MINISTER DENG ALOR Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 25 meeting with S/E Williamson, Foreign Minister Deng Alor said Sudan is ready for a dialogue and hopes the U.S. can assist it in reaching a number of mutual objectives; including implementing CPA, ending the Darfur conflict, and normalizing Sudan,s relations with the International Community. S/E Williamson said that the U.S. and Sudan can move beyond mutual distrust by committing to a matrix of specific and verifiable actions that both sides can take and for which each can hold the other accountable. He proposed that if the GoS decides to seriously explore a work program to move torward improved relations, that before his departure he could provide an initial draft of such U.S. proposals for the GoS to consider. He noted that there is a limited window of opportunity and that the next several months will be key. End Summary. Sudan Ready for Dialogue with U.S. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On February 25, Foreign Minister Deng Alor welcomed Special Envoy Richard S. Williamson, accompanied by NSC Director Cameron Hudson, to Sudan and said that his visit is an opportunity to build on the progress that began with Deng,s visit to Washington. Deng affirmed that Sudan seeks to improve its relations with the United States and is ready for a dialogue. As part of this process of improving relations, Sudan believes the United States can help to resolve two key issues of mutual concern. ¶3. (C) First, Deng said, the United States brokered the original Abyei peace agreement and now could help resolve the Abyei dispute, which remains the most difficult issue in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) report and the location of Abyei,s northern boundary remain the chief obstacle. Deng said that a small joint NCP-SPLM committee has been unable to reach agreement. He added that a delegation including Government of National Unity (GNU) Minister of Presidential Affairs Pagan Amun, along with SAF and SPLA officers, was to go to the region that same morning to meet with the two sides. The sooner the dispute is resolved, the better, he added. There is an &unhealthy situation8 there that could deteriorate at any time. ¶4. (C) Second, Deng said that the United States can help Sudan chart a course to work with the international community to resolve the Darfur conflict and end Sudan,s international isolation. &We want to listen to your ideas and cooperate with the international community,8 he noted. American help could include assisting Sudan in improving its relations with Chad and working with France to bring Darfur rebel leader Abdul Wahid to come to the conference table. ¶5. (C) Deng also cited bilateral issues that Sudan desires to resolve, including Sudan,s removal from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism and moving toward the easing of U.S. economic sanctions. Sudan also would like assistance with Sudan,s new embassy in Washington. U.S. Seeks Specific Commitments to Avoid Disappointments - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶6. (C) S/E Williamson affirmed the serious U.S. commitment to explore improving relations with Sudan if practical steps can be taken to improve the situation in Darfur. He noted that the U.S. has no permanent enemies, citing the case of Libya, and that his role here is not to relitigate, but to attempt forward progress on alleviating the humanitarian suffering and instability in Darfur and beyond. He acknowledged that there are reasons for deep mistrust on both sides, but said that progress still is possible if the U.S. and Sudan develop a mutually-agreed matrix of specific, verifiable and accountable actions, with clear deadlines. S/E Williamson said that the more specific the actions required, the less chance of misunderstanding and disappointment. The matrix will provide a means for both sides to measure the other,s commitment and performance. For Sudan, it will provide a clear, written statement of specific actions the U.S. is prepared to take in response to specific actions from Sudan. ¶7. (C) S/E Williamson said that, on its part, the U.S. will seek specific measures that Sudan must take to implement the CPA and ease suffering in Darfur, for example, expediting the movement of UNAMID equipment through Port Sudan, speeding the issuance of visas for UN officials, and a consistent policy on the accreditation of NGOs. In response, S/E Williamson said, as Secretary Rice made clear during his meeting with KHARTOUM 00000277 002 OF 002 her in Washington, the U.S. could consider, after progress is made, to measures such as deleting Sudan as a state-sponsor of terrorism and easing economic sanctions. The U.S. would like to establish points-of-contact at every level to be able to work through problems in implementation. If Sudan lives up to its commitments, the U.S. would then be prepared to reciprocate. S/E Williamson acknowledged that the Administration will come under fire from those in the U.S. who believe that U.S. policy cannot be too tough on Sudan, but if Sudan meets its commitments, the State department is prepared to defend the U.S. response. ¶8. (C) S/E Williamson said that before departing Sudan he could president Bashir with provide a U.S. non-paper outlining for such a set of actions on Sudan,s part. He would leave this non-paper for the GoS to consider and amend as it sees fit. The paper will serve as the basis for discussions and the U.S. is open to proposals by Sudan. More discussion on the non-paper could continue in the next few weeks if Sudan decides to take next steps. Turning a New Page - - - - - - - - - ¶9. (C) FM Deng welcomed this U.S. commitment to a dialogue. Sudan also is committed to turning a new page in its relations with the U.S. Deng welcomed S/E Williamson,s proposal for a paper that would serve as a basis for discussion. He suggested that Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie would be the best point-of-contact for the S/E, given Nafie,s role in setting policy in Darfur. He also suggested that working-level teams be appointed to work on each of issues to be included in the matrix. ¶10. (C) S/E Williamson noted that the U.S. electoral clock is ticking and that realistically there are only a few months in which to achieve progress. He commented that the next four months will prove whether there is an opportunity for improved relations. ¶11. (C) FM Deng repeated his hope that the United States can help Sudan resolve the Abyei boundary issue. CDA Fernandez commented that the U.S. believes that the ABC report remains the best way forward. Deng remarked that he shared this view. Comment - - - - ¶12. (C) FM Deng is one of our most sympathetic contacts in the GNU and his openness to S/E Williamson,s ideas is not surprising. Whether others in the government, less committed to implementing the CPA, resolving Darfur, and improving relations with the U.S., will be as supportive is open to debate. It remains to be seen which side will prevail within the GNU over the next few days and weeks and whether the regime is willing and able to change its behavior. End comment. ¶13. (U) S/E Williamson reviewed this message before transmission. FERNANDEZ