S/E WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SUDAN'S FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000277

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPKO AU SU
SUBJECT: S/E WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SUDAN'S FOREIGN
MINISTER DENG ALOR

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a February 25 meeting with S/E
Williamson, Foreign Minister Deng Alor said Sudan is ready
for a dialogue and hopes the U.S. can assist it in reaching a
number of mutual objectives; including implementing CPA,
ending the Darfur conflict, and normalizing Sudan,s
relations with the International Community. S/E Williamson
said that the U.S. and Sudan can move beyond mutual distrust
by committing to a matrix of specific and verifiable actions
that both sides can take and for which each can hold the
other accountable. He proposed that if the GoS decides to
seriously explore a work program to move torward improved
relations, that before his departure he could provide an
initial draft of such U.S. proposals for the GoS to consider.
He noted that there is a limited window of opportunity and
that the next several months will be key. End Summary.

Sudan Ready for Dialogue with U.S.
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2. (C) On February 25, Foreign Minister Deng Alor welcomed
Special Envoy Richard S. Williamson, accompanied by NSC
Director Cameron Hudson, to Sudan and said that his visit is
an opportunity to build on the progress that began with
Deng,s visit to Washington. Deng affirmed that Sudan seeks
to improve its relations with the United States and is ready
for a dialogue. As part of this process of improving
relations, Sudan believes the United States can help to
resolve two key issues of mutual concern.


3. (C) First, Deng said, the United States brokered the
original Abyei peace agreement and now could help resolve the
Abyei dispute, which remains the most difficult issue in
implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The
Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) report and the location of
Abyei,s northern boundary remain the chief obstacle. Deng
said that a small joint NCP-SPLM committee has been unable to
reach agreement. He added that a delegation including
Government of National Unity (GNU) Minister of Presidential
Affairs Pagan Amun, along with SAF and SPLA officers, was to
go to the region that same morning to meet with the two
sides. The sooner the dispute is resolved, the better, he
added. There is an &unhealthy situation8 there that could
deteriorate at any time.


4. (C) Second, Deng said that the United States can help
Sudan chart a course to work with the international community
to resolve the Darfur conflict and end Sudan,s international
isolation. &We want to listen to your ideas and cooperate
with the international community,8 he noted. American help
could include assisting Sudan in improving its relations with
Chad and working with France to bring Darfur rebel leader
Abdul Wahid to come to the conference table.


5. (C) Deng also cited bilateral issues that Sudan desires
to resolve, including Sudan,s removal from the U.S. list of
state sponsors of terrorism and moving toward the easing of
U.S. economic sanctions. Sudan also would like assistance
with Sudan,s new embassy in Washington.

U.S. Seeks Specific Commitments to Avoid Disappointments
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6. (C) S/E Williamson affirmed the serious U.S. commitment
to explore improving relations with Sudan if practical steps
can be taken to improve the situation in Darfur. He noted
that the U.S. has no permanent enemies, citing the case of
Libya, and that his role here is not to relitigate, but to
attempt forward progress on alleviating the humanitarian
suffering and instability in Darfur and beyond. He
acknowledged that there are reasons for deep mistrust on both
sides, but said that progress still is possible if the U.S.
and Sudan develop a mutually-agreed matrix of specific,
verifiable and accountable actions, with clear deadlines.
S/E Williamson said that the more specific the actions
required, the less chance of misunderstanding and
disappointment. The matrix will provide a means for both
sides to measure the other,s commitment and performance.
For Sudan, it will provide a clear, written statement of
specific actions the U.S. is prepared to take in response to
specific actions from Sudan.


7. (C) S/E Williamson said that, on its part, the U.S. will
seek specific measures that Sudan must take to implement the
CPA and ease suffering in Darfur, for example, expediting the
movement of UNAMID equipment through Port Sudan, speeding the
issuance of visas for UN officials, and a consistent policy
on the accreditation of NGOs. In response, S/E Williamson
said, as Secretary Rice made clear during his meeting with

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her in Washington, the U.S. could consider, after progress is
made, to measures such as deleting Sudan as a state-sponsor
of terrorism and easing economic sanctions. The U.S. would
like to establish points-of-contact at every level to be able
to work through problems in implementation. If Sudan lives
up to its commitments, the U.S. would then be prepared to
reciprocate. S/E Williamson acknowledged that the
Administration will come under fire from those in the U.S.
who believe that U.S. policy cannot be too tough on Sudan,
but if Sudan meets its commitments, the State department is
prepared to defend the U.S. response.


8. (C) S/E Williamson said that before departing Sudan he
could president Bashir with provide a U.S. non-paper
outlining for such a set of actions on Sudan,s part. He
would leave this non-paper for the GoS to consider and amend
as it sees fit. The paper will serve as the basis for
discussions and the U.S. is open to proposals by Sudan. More
discussion on the non-paper could continue in the next few
weeks if Sudan decides to take next steps.

Turning a New Page
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9. (C) FM Deng welcomed this U.S. commitment to a dialogue.
Sudan also is committed to turning a new page in its
relations with the U.S. Deng welcomed S/E Williamson,s
proposal for a paper that would serve as a basis for
discussion. He suggested that Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali
Nafie would be the best point-of-contact for the S/E, given
Nafie,s role in setting policy in Darfur. He also suggested
that working-level teams be appointed to work on each of
issues to be included in the matrix.


10. (C) S/E Williamson noted that the U.S. electoral clock
is ticking and that realistically there are only a few months
in which to achieve progress. He commented that the next
four months will prove whether there is an opportunity for
improved relations.


11. (C) FM Deng repeated his hope that the United States can
help Sudan resolve the Abyei boundary issue. CDA Fernandez
commented that the U.S. believes that the ABC report remains
the best way forward. Deng remarked that he shared this
view.

Comment
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12. (C) FM Deng is one of our most sympathetic contacts in
the GNU and his openness to S/E Williamson,s ideas is not
surprising. Whether others in the government, less committed
to implementing the CPA, resolving Darfur, and improving
relations with the U.S., will be as supportive is open to
debate. It remains to be seen which side will prevail within
the GNU over the next few days and weeks and whether the
regime is willing and able to change its behavior. End
comment.


13. (U) S/E Williamson reviewed this message before
transmission.
FERNANDEZ