UNAMID UNWILLING TO STOP WEST DARFUR CONFLICT BUT WILLING

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000274 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU SUBJECT: UNAMID UNWILLING TO STOP WEST DARFUR CONFLICT BUT WILLING TO SUPPORT HUMANITARIAN AID REF: KHARTOUM 266 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The UNAMID military component continues to monitor, despite limited access and visibility, recent fighting in West Darfur and movements of SAF troop concentrations in the region. The military Chief of Staff expects an escalation in hostilities in West Darfur, with operations possibly shifting to western Jebel Marra. Current UNAMID guidance is that the force will not/not directly intervene in fighting taking place in West Darfur. UNAMID's role, for the time being, will be confined to liaising with rebel groups and supporting the humanitarian community, potentially by providing area protection for massed IDPs. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) UNAMID peacekeepers continue to monitor the movement of Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and report on ongoing fighting in West Darfur. According to both UNAMID observations and press accounts, SAF troops, weapons and materiel are still flowing into El Geneina, which provides the launch pad for SAF offensive operations in the region against the Chad-supported JEM rebel group (reftels). UNAMID has confirmed reports that Antonov bomber aircraft, HIND attack helicopters and MiG-21 fighter jets targeted the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Jebel Moon stronghold. UNAMID's Joint Analysis Cell (JMAC) reports that Government of Sudan (GOS) tanks, artillery, 12.7mm gun-trucks and troop transport trucks and an unconfirmed number Arab militia, estimated in the thousands, massing in and around El Geneina intends to maintain an offensive operational tempo in the coming days. ¶3. (SBU) Before leaving for Nigeria, UNAMID Force Commander (FC) Martin Luther Agwai told FieldOff that the peacekeeping force "can do nothing to stop SAF attacks in West Darfur." Despite FieldOff urging that the FC engage, even informally, with the SAF Western Area Commander to allow for greater UNAMID access to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, Agwai doubted that the SAF would heed any appeals. However, Agwai pledged to continue pushing UNAMID civilian leadership to address the West Darfur offensive at the political level in Khartoum (this happened on February 24). ¶4. (SBU) UNAMID force Chief of Staff Brigadier General Patrick Davidson-Houston, who has been the senior military official in El Fasher in the FC's absence, explicitly instructed senior staff officers on February 24 not/not to intervene in the fighting, "quite simply because we do not have the capability." UNAMID's focus would be to liaise with rebel groups, monitor hostilities and combatant movements, support the humanitarian community, and provide protection for displaced civilians. ¶5. (SBU) Chief of Staff Davidson-Houston cautioned that while the hostilities clearly affected humanitarian assistance, both the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) factions may be "playing up the situation" to gain media attention to indirectly apply pressure on the GoS to scale back its operations - giving the rebels critical time to regroup. The Chief of Staff also speculated, based on unconfirmed reporting from the JMAC, that more serious clashes could lie ahead as Chadian opposition fighters trickle back across the border south of El Geneina and JEM fighters, some returning from Chad themselves, move to reinforce positions in Darfur - essentially continuing the battles which raged in Chad over the past weeks inside Darfur. Late February UNAMID reports of heavily armed troop convoys heading to Nyala via Tawila could suggest a shift in operations to the Jebel Marra, Davidson-Houston opined. ¶6. (SBU) Comment: The SAF military offensive in West Darfur underscores at least two key security dynamics in the region. First, there remains a strong GOS intent to pursue a military solution to the Darfur crisis, especially as far as the JEM, with its dreams of power in Khartoum, is concerned. Second, UNAMID's inability to intervene - politically or militarily - in any significant way reinforces the growing perception that the UN force is little better or more impartial than its predecessor. Taken together - along with analysis of SAF troop build-ups, escalation of attacks, allegations of new recruitment of Arab militia and the use of heavier weaponry - these twin dynamics suggest that the GoS will continue to respond aggressively to rebel attacks and that UNAMID will do little or nothing about it. Furthermore, with the Force Commander expected to be out of Sudan until at least March 8, the Deputy Force Commander's continued absence (though he is expected to return to the field "within days") and the rare presence of Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rodolphe Adada in El Fasher, the UNAMID ship will probably continue to drift without a rudder, above all to the detriment of the Darfurian civilians most impacted by the conflict between rebel factions and the Khartoum regime. FERNANDEZ