DARFUR ARAB WARLORD BARGAINS WITH KHARTOUM

UNCLAS KHARTOUM 000267 SIPDIS SENSITIVE, SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL UN SU CD SUBJECT: DARFUR ARAB WARLORD BARGAINS WITH KHARTOUM Reftel: A: KHARTOUM 01968 B: KHARTOUM 01978 -------------- Negotiations to Return to the Government -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Arab militia leader Mohammed Hamdan (aka Hamati) has been negotiating with the Sudanese Government on his return to an alliance with Khartoum in recent weeks, according to two UN sources and an independent NGO with strong ties to Darfur's rebel movements. Hamdan defected from the Government-sponsored Arab militias in late 2007 and was reported to have forged a quasi-alliance with two of Darfur's rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM)/Abdulwahid and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Hamdan's recent negotiations with the Government are reflective of the Arab militias' pragmatic approach to the ongoing conflict, whereby they continue to adjust their loyalties to secure the best deal by playing the Sudanese Government and the mostly African rebels against each other (reftels). ¶2. (SBU) According to an internal UN report obtained by Poloff in mid-February, a local source in Nyala, South Darfur told a UN official that the Advisor to the Minister of Federal Rule and the leader of a notorious Arab militia, Musa Hilal, along with ICC-indicted Arab militia leader Ali Kosheyb, met with Hamdan in December 2007 to convince him to re-establish his alliance with Khartoum. Three senior generals of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) later traveled to Nyala to meet with Hamdan. He rejected both of these overtures. -------------- Hamdan's Conditions -------------- ¶3. (SBU) However, in January 2008, according to the same source, Hamdan submitted the following conditions to the Government in order to "buy" back his allegiance: promotion of Hamdan to the rank of "liwa" (major general); promotion of ten of his commanders to high military ranks; integration of his forces into the SAF; provision of land near Melha, North Darfur--a significant water point between El Fasher and Libya--to his brother; and payment of three billion Sudanese pounds. -------------- Government Counter-offer -------------- ¶4. (SBU) While the Government initially refused these demands, a National Congress Party (NCP) representative approached one of Hamdan's uncles, "Saeed," in early-February to request a second meeting with the militia leader. The representative claimed that Khartoum was prepared to promote five (versus ten) of Hamdan's commanders to high-level military ranks and pay two billion Sudanese pounds in advance and one billion after Hamdan met the following conditions: the release 50 of his vehicles to support the Chadian opposition and launch of three attacks on JEM positions in West Darfur and one attack in North Darfur. Hamdan traveled to Nyala, South Darfur on February 1, possibly to finalize the arrangement. ¶5. (SBU) Though Hamdan continues to deny any agreement with Khartoum, the two UN sources and the independent NGO predict that such a return is imminent. One UN source speculated that Hamdan was involved in the Government's support for the Chadian opposition and in the SAF's recent fighting against JEM forces in South and West Darfur. SAF Military Intelligence stated in early February that Hamdan should withdraw his forces from El Daein, South Darfur to the North of Nyala. If such a withdrawal occurs in the coming weeks, UN sources state that it will represent an indication of Hamdan's loyalties. ¶6. (SBU) Comment: Such bargaining demonstrates the pragmatic nature of Darfur's Arab militias. These ruthless Janjaweed, resentful of outside control, also fear being made the scapegoats for Khartoum's (and their own) transgressions in the region, worry about their traditional economic and political marginalization in Darfur, and will go with whoever offers them the best deal. End comment. ¶7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ