UNAMID COMMANDER: BUILDING UP WHAT WE HAVE SHOULD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000246 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SPG, IO, SE WILLIAMSON, NSC FOR BPITTMAN AND CHUDSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2018 TAGS: KPKO PGOV UN AU SU SUBJECT: UNAMID COMMANDER: BUILDING UP WHAT WE HAVE SHOULD BE THE PRIORITY KHARTOUM 00000246 001.4 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: UNAMID Force Commander believes that the international community's efforts would be better spent beefing up existing units, in terms of personnel, transport and logistics, already on the ground in Darfur rather than focusing on units still not accepted by the Sudanese Government that will only represent a small portion of the overall force. While pointing to tangible increases in patrolling and convoys, which are projecting UNAMID's presence more than AMIS ever did, he cautioned that the force is not a solution for ongoing fighting in Darfur absent a real peace treaty between rebels and the Sudanese Government. End summary. -------------- STRENGTHENING WHAT WE ALREADY HAVE -------------- ¶2. (C) UNAMID Force Commander Martin Luther Agwei urged CDA Fernandez on February 20 to have Washington focus on steps that could strengthen the capability of the existing UNAMID force on the ground rather than emphasizing exotic non-African units that will, even if accepted by Khartoum, constitute only a small part of the overall 26,000 man force (note: only 1,000 troops - a Thai infantry battalion and two Nepalese companies - out of a projected 19,000 military force, are still to be approved by the Khartoum regime. Some units and air assets have yet to be identified). Agwei was in Khartoum as part of a first ever full briefing to the diplomatic corps by all elements of UNAMID. The brief was led by Joint Special Representative Adada (septel). ¶3. (C) General Agwei said that bringing up the existing 8 600-man African battalions to full size (800 men UN standard as opposed to the AMIS standard of 600 men),making them actually self-sufficient, and upgrading their transport would make a qualitative difference on the ground in Darfur. "By all means, send me more troops, including the Thais, but beefing up the 8 under-strength units will make a huge difference," he pleaded. Such a change with existing units would increase the force by 1600 men. Two new battalions, Nigerian and Rwandan, transported in October 2007 by the USAF and partially equipped by the State Department, are full size units. But Agwei noted that only the South African battalion is more or less self-sufficient logistically. All the other units rely on contract services so that they must curtail their patrolling to get back in time to be fed before dining facilities close. An acute shortage of MREs (Meals-Ready to Eat) prevents deeper and more sustained patrolling. Most vehicles, inherited from AMIS, are worn out and break down frequently. This has become a bigger issue as UNAMID is now actually getting out of their barracks much more than AMIS ever did. The unreliability of transport tends to limit units to better maintained roads. -------------- - BETTER UNAMID PERFORMANCE WILL NOT END THE WAR -------------- - ¶4. (C) Agwei noted that despite the severe limitations he described, things are improving with the force. Night patrols are now occurring. He noted that AMIS carried out zero convoys in the 5 months he was AMIS Force Commander but there have been 15 ground convoys since December 31 and these have continued even after the January 7 attack by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on a UNAMID convoy in Tine. Such convoy project UNAMID's physical presence to both civilians and to potential abusers. Agwei had just held a meeting with his Sector Commanders and encouraged them "to be a little stubborn" at SAF or militia checkpoints. Instead of turning around at the first sign of blocked passage, they were to try to work or talk their way through and this was often succeeding. He wanted to make sure that the force had a more aggressive, outgoing ethos in place as new units arrive in the next few months. ¶5. (C) While feeling that UNAMID is doing the best it can with the current force on the ground, Agwei cautioned that additional forces will not prevent the fighting currently raging in Northwest Darfur that has displaced thousands of civilians. "This is a Sudanese Army counter-offensive to attacks launched and towns seized by heavily armed JEM rebels over the past few months, it is a legitimate response by a sovereign government," even though - he admitted - carried out with the brutality and disregard for innocent life characteristic of the Sudanese Army. The best UNAMID can do in such situations is get in with humanitarian workers as KHARTOUM 00000246 002 OF 002 soon as possible once the fighting dies down. This is what happened on February 11 and 12 when UNAMID accompanied OCHA and UNICEF into the still smoldering West Darfur towns of Abu Suraj and Sirba with much needed food and medical aid for tens of thousands of people. Agwei acknowledged that to the international community, such action may not have looked like much but it was exactly what the force should do, 'we are not a combatant between the rebels and army, we are not with either side." ¶6. (C) Comment: While Qere may be just a little bit of special pleading in Agwei's remarks, the General is right that there is an open opportunity to improve UNAMID's performance and early presence on the ground in Darfur by strengthening existing units. Certainly the idea of combat troops unable to move because of broken down vehicles or having to break off patrols to get back in time for dinner before the kitchen closes is not what the Security Council had in mind when it authorized this life-saving mission. End comment. FERNANDEZ