UNAMID STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: SIGNED AND SEALED, BUT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000225 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UN US SU SUBJECT: UNAMID STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT: SIGNED AND SEALED, BUT DELIVERED? REF: KHARTOUM 184 -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) UNAMID and GoS officials finally signed a Status of Forces Agreement on February 9 in Khartoum. The SOFA is comprehensive in scope and contains all of the core provisions sought by the UN, including full freedom of movement, unimpeded use of communications, expedited procedures (visas, permits, licenses) for UNAMID personnel and contractors to carry out their mandated tasks and provision of land and services for UNAMID facilities, among other key arrangements. The lead UN negotiator for the SOFA expressed satisfaction with the agreement but conceded that practical implementation - where the GoS regularly fails - will have to be coordinated at the field level. An early test of the GoS commitment to the agreement will be whether or not it rapidly grants visas to the U.S. military and police personnel slated to join UNAMID. -------------- OVERVIEW OF KEY PROVISIONS -------------- ¶2. (SBU) At a February 9 ceremony in Khartoum, AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rodolphe Adada and GoS Minister of Foreign Affairs Deng Alor signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that supplements the legal framework in which UNAMID operates. It covers the activities of UNAMID military (including military observers and military liaison officers),civilian and police personnel, as well as associated contractors. The SOFA also addresses UNAMID property, communications capabilities, accoutrements, travel and transport, privileges and immunities, basing and services provision, safety and security of UNAMID personnel, uniforms and arms, entry to and exit from Sudan, liability and dispute settlement, among other topics. ¶3. (SBU) This cable is not a legal assessment of the SOFA but rather an initial analysis of select aspects of the agreement and their potential operational or political implications for UNAMID. The focus is on those provisions that are most critical to ensuring the effective functioning of the peacekeeping force and that might have a direct impact on U.S. contributions (e.g., U.S. military officers assigned to UNAMID). -------------- SCOPE AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The SOFA clearly extends the scope of its authorities throughout "Darfur and in other parts of the Sudan including at points of entry and exit at which UNAMID is operating" (para 2). The implication - elaborated more concretely in various provisions throughout the agreement - is that UNAMID personnel (including contractors) nd euipment will be exempt from the range of licenses, permits, fees, customs, and other restrictions that consistently bottlenecked the flow of critical peacekeeping gear and material into the country in the past. ¶5. (SBU) The agreement further stipulates that "UNAMID, its members and contractors, together with their property, equipment, provisions...vehicles, vessels and aircraft...shall enjoy full and unrestricted freedom of movement without delay throughout Darfur and other areas of Sudan where UNAMID is operating...without the need for travel permits or prior authorization or notification" (para 12). In a February 10 conversation with Poloffs, senior UN legal negotiator for the SOFA Stadler Trengove expressed satisfaction with the "travel and transport" provisions, observing that the UN "got everything it wanted," though he cautioned that the proof of this would be in actual implementation on the ground. (Note: Both the Darfur Peace Agreement and UN Security Council Resolution 1769 require freedom of movement for peacekeepers, though the GoS has repeatedly violated this principle in the past. End Note.) ¶6. (SBU) Trengove further explained that certain operational contingencies - such as night flights - were deliberately left out of the SOFA so as not to bog down negotiations (and therefore jeopardize other gains made by the UN during negotiations) and allow such procedures to be worked out between UNAMID and GoS authorities in Darfur (reftel). It was with this eventuality in mind, he remarked, that the agreement specifically provides the possibility for the JSR and GoS to conclude supplemental arrangements (para 59). -------------- FREEDOM TO COMMUNICATE KHARTOUM 00000225 002 OF 003 ¶8. (SBU) Confronting the contentious issue of basing, land and resource rights, the SOFA holds that the GoS "shall provide without cost to UNAMID when possible and in agreement with the Joint Special Representative for as long as may be required such areas for headquarters, camps or other premises as may be necessary for the conduct of the operational and administrative activities of UNAMID..." (para 16). The GoS is further committed to making available key resources, including water and electricity, "free of charge, or, where this is not possible, at the most favourable rate..." (Comment: Availability of adequate land for basing and access to water or other resources continues to stymie the deployment of UNAMID, which is of course also plagued by its own challenges in force and equipment generation and civilian recruitment. End Comment.) ¶9. (SBU) The SOFA specifically addresses the status of military observers and military liaison officers (paras 28 and 36),positions that may be more likely to be filled, in some cases, by non-African countries than the national peacekeeping battalions. The relevant provisions require that UNAMID provide the names of military observers and liaison officers to the GoS, an arrangement that could potentially formalize the GoS' ability to "veto" nominees, especially from Western countries. The SOFA also requires that the GoS facilitate "without delay and free of charge" multiple entry visas to all UNAMID military, police and civilian personnel, including contractors. Military observers and liaison officers are authorized to carry weapons (para 39) - an obstacle that created some concern for potential contributions of U.S. military personnel. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Based on an initial analysis of the document and the feedback of UN lead legal negotiator Stadler Trengove, the SOFA, on paper at least, appears to be a sufficiently strong and broad document to enable UNAMID to carry out its mandated tasks. The lynchpin, of course, will be its implementation - and the GoS' track record in this department does not bode favorably. That the agreement does not define the specifics of certain key procedures - for instance, those relating to UNAMID movements, night flights or notification of imported materials (para 15) - leaves open the possibility that the GoS will exploit these technicalities to impede the force's effective functioning. ¶11. (SBU) Equally important in the agreement's application will be UNAMID's ability to competently and consistently coordinate its activities with the GoS. Trengove observed that no formal coordination mechanism currently exists between UNAMID and the GoS (not to mention within the various arms of the UN in Sudan - UNMIS, JMST, DDDC, etc.) - a necessity that the international community should push JSR Adada to establish. Furthermore, implementation will hinge on accountability; the UN Security Council must vigilantly monitor the execution of the SOFA and be prepared to respond decisively to any violations or attempts to undermine the agreement. The jury is still out on the efficacy of the SOFA, but the results of UNAMID's efforts to address the recent fighting in West Darfur and the outcome of the nominations of non-Africans, including Americans, to civilian and/or military posts may provide an early litmus test of the GoS' willingness to follow through on KHARTOUM 00000225 003 OF 003 its commitments. Another key initial test of GoS sincerity will be whether or not it rapidly grants visas to the eight U.S. military and ten police personnel slated to join UNAMID. POWERS