MFA PLEDGES SUPPORT TO US CEASEFIRE MECHANISM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 001841 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: MFA PLEDGES SUPPORT TO US CEASEFIRE MECHANISM, PROMISES TO CLEAR SORGHUM SHIPMENT REF: A. STATE 132193 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1793 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1790 Classified By: A/CDA Mark Asquino, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) A/CDA Asquino provided additional information on December 23 to MFA U/S Mutrif Siddiq regarding the US proposal to support a ceasefire monitoring mechanism within UNAMID, as requested in reftel. Siddiq reported that his government had made a decision to accept the US proposal to support the ceasefire monitoring mechanism, but only as part of UNAMID, not as a separate entity. Siddiq pointed out that UNAMID had not yet finalized its monitoring plan, noting "they are discussing the details now," and said that UNAMID had promised to brief GOS officials soon. (Note: UNAMID polchief Abdul Mohammed told polchief December 23 that the plan was not yet in final form and had not been approved by DPKO. End note.) A/CDA inquired whether the GOS will take unilateral steps to commit itself to a ceasefire once the mechanism is finalized. Siddiq replied that the President's announcement was "unconditional," but required the rebels to accept the proposal in order for it to be effective. In a separate meeting with polchief, senior NCP negotiator Yehia Babiker also claimed that a unilateral ceasefire would not be practical. He said there must be a political framework linked to a ceasefire, as was negotiated and effectively implemented during the North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement process. ¶2. (C) A/CDA raised a second issue with Siddiq, that of the World Food Program's shipment of Sorghum to Port Sudan, due to arrive December 30, which according to information from WFP has not yet been approved by Customs. A/CDA noted that the shipment had received an international certificate, and according to the current procedures should not require any additional clearances. Siddiq agreed and promised that the shipment would clear customs and be off-loaded immediately upon arrival at Port Sudan. Although additional inspections might occur, he said, they would not delay the off-loading of the shipment in any way. ¶3. (C) In closing the meeting, Siddiq provided an update on JEM and said that none of the vehicles that reportedly crossed the border from Chad on December 12 (Refs B and C) had moved further into Darfur. Siddiq predicted that JEM would likely remain in its current positions for now. He added that JEM could be expected to attack if it saw conditions as favorable within the context of the ICC's Bashir arrest warrant's decision and what signals JEM received on USG Sudan policy from the new administration. . ¶4. (C) Comment: Although the GOS claims it wants the US to assist with a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, often pointing to the success of the Nuba Mountains mechanism during the CPA process, the regime is more sensitive about Darfur. It is not yet clear that it really wants the US directly involved in a Darfur monitoring process. For now, it can hide behind the UN and UNAMID bureaucracy, as the GOS knows as well as we do that it will likely take UNAMID months to organize a plan, and that UNAMID may ultimately use an absence of a political agreement to explain lack of progress. Pressing the government on unilateral security commitments that can be monitored by UNAMID may be the best way forward in gradually improving the security situation in Darfur in 2009. If the regime does not take radical actions in response to an ICC indictment, then increased UNAMID deployment and capacity along with additional GOS commitments should translate into an improved security situation in Darfur, even if the political process continues to sputter. Given recent remarks from NCP insiders that the regime will not "commit suicide" in response to the ICC, we believe such radical actions are unlikely. If this is the case, there may be continued impetus for the GOS to prove it wants to resolve the Darfur crisis even after the ICC makes its announcement, especially with elections looming in 2009/2010. ASQUINO