SENATE STAFFDEL VISIT TO JUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001840 SIPDIS DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU EAID SUBJECT: SENATE STAFFDEL VISIT TO JUBA REF: KHARTOUM 1790 Classified By: CDA Mark Asquino, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In meetings with a Senate staff delegation from December 17-19, senior SPLM officials urged deeper USG strategic coordination with their own party, as well as proactive engagement with the NCP, to produce a favorable outcome should there be an arrest warrant issued by the ICC against President Bashir. They also emphasized the importance of continued USG support for implementation of the CPA. Meanwhile, SPLA generals detailed to the StaffDel what they described as dire logistical and operational shortcomings they face, urging USG support for procurement of an air defense system to protect against potential SAF bombardment. The generals also spoke of what they regarded as the failure of their political counterparts to produce a coherent elections strategy at the SPLM convention in May. They noted that in order to convince dissenters that the SPLM should adopt a national platform, advocates of unity have resorted to arguing that Kiir ought to run for national office so that if he wins, he,ll be in a position to protect the results of the 2011 referendum and guarantee secession. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU). From December 17-19, a Senate Staff delegation comprised of Shannon Smith, Professional Staff Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Michael Kuiken, Professional Staff Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and Major James Kleager, U.S. Army Legislative Liaison, traveled to Juba for meetings with GOSS, SPLM and SPLA officials, as well as briefings on USG programs and operating partners. They were accompanied by Poloff and Juba,s Acting Consul General. ALOR, ARMAN URGE DEEPER STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT -------------- ¶3. (SBU) On December 18, the staffdel met GNU Foreign Minister Deng Alor, SPLM Deputy Secretary General Yassir Arman and NISS Deputy Majok Deng. Alor told the staffdel that the NCP is struggling to chart a course of action following the possible issuance of an arrest warrant by the ICC against President Bashir. Referring to the SPLM,s position, he observed: "It,s clear they have not yet come to a decision," Alor said, noting that there are multiple splits among the party,s factions. In turn, the SPLM is engaging in vigorous discussions of its own to develop strategic plans, he added, and to that end has been engaging with the NCP and other political parties to gather information. "We don,t shy away from dialogue," he stated, adding that he, Arman and Majok Deng were all well placed in Khartoum to do so. Alor continued that the SPLM is preparing for all possible outcomes, including the possibility that a state of emergency will be declared and the constitution scrapped, or the chance that Bashir will remain as President. The SPLM,s course of action would be set in the 24 hours following any such outcomes, he said. ¶4. (SBU) Following Alor,s remarks, Arman emphasized to the staffdel the need for a deeper strategic engagement between the USG and the SPLM on the implications of an ICC arrest warrant issuance. "There are a lot of scenarios out there," he said. "We need to figure out how to work together to influence them, rather than just react to them," adding that he knew of no serious discussions to date between the USG and the SPLM on these issues. President Kiir,s upcoming trip to Washington would be an ideal time for them to begin, he said. Alor echoed these sentiments, noting the need for close coordination between the USG and SPLM. "We need to study the end game together and plan our possible courses of action," he said. BENJAMIN URGES CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR CPA IMPLEMENTATION -------------- -------------- ¶5. (SBU) On December 19 the staffdel met with Dr. Barnaba Marial Benjamin, GOSS Minister of Regional Cooperation. Benjamin characterized the CPA as a nucleus for national and regional stability that was being threatened by the delay tactics of the NCP. "They continue to drag their feet on critical issues," he said, pointing to border demarcation as an issue with wide ranging implications. (Note: On December 18, the GOS and SPLM submitted their first written arguments to the Abyei Arbitration Tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, and the GNU Presidency is set to KHARTOUM 00001840 002 OF 004 hear the final report of the Ad-Hoc Technical Committee demarcating the 1956 North/South border in coming weeks. End Note.) A properly demarcated border is crucial not just for potential separation, but for the determination of geographical constituencies necessary for 2009 elections, he said. He also predicted that the absence of a demarcation could cause conflicts over oil revenue sharing. "If the oil wells turn out to be in the South, will the GNU return its share of revenues to the GOSS?" he asked rhetorically. ¶6. (SBU) Benjamin noted that the international community, particularly the USG, plays a critical role in ensuring implementation of the CPA and countering NCP attempts to avert it. "I hope the new (US) administration takes this responsibility seriously," he said, noting that the stakes will be raised if a potential replacement for President Bashir decides to abrogate the CPA. If that turns out to be the case, the CPA will ultimately have to be protected by the SPLA, he said. "If we complain to the UN, it will take them a year just to condemn Khartoum." DENG HOPES FOR PROACTIVE USG ENGAGEMENT WITH NCP -------------- --- ¶7. (SBU) On December 19, the staffdel met with Dr. Luka Biong Deng, Minister of Presidential Affairs. Deng expressed appreciation to the USG for continuing to stress the importance of CPA implementation, and pointed to the 2009 elections as a major milestone. "I see elections as very central," he said, adding that good progress was being made in their preparation. But he acknowledged that many Southerners were already looking beyond elections toward the referendum, even within the SPLM. "There is admittedly a faction of our party that does not want to see the SPLM take on a national agenda," he said. He predicted a difficult post-election period because "the North is determined for the South not to exercise its right of secession, whereas the South will demand it at any cost." He stated that critics argue that an independent South Sudan will create instability, and the NCP has been provoking conflict to make them appear justified. "They want to project that the South cannot govern itself," he said. But ultimately, he urged the USG and the international community to honor the results of the referendum. "Whatever the outcome, it is our right and we urge that it be respected," he said. ¶8. (SBU) With regard to the ICC, Deng stated that the SPLM will respect the NCP,s internal decision-making process on a replacement for President Bashir, much as the NCP did upon the death of Dr. John Garang. He expressed hope that whoever succeeds Bashir ("We don,t think it will be Ali (Osman Taha)") would abide by the CPA, in part because "they know they can,t have peace in Darfur without us." But he urged the USG to keep a window of engagement open with the NCP in order to influence its leadership. "A proactive engagement with the NCP can influence certain elements and help produce leadership that can help us," he said. SPLA,S NEEDS ARE "AS WIDE AS THE OCEAN" -------------- ¶9. (SBU) On December 19, the staffdel attended an Operations Center Briefing at SPLA headquarters and subsequently met with SPLA chief of General Staff Oyai Deng Ajak and other senior staff. The briefing revealed deficient levels of readiness in many SPLA divisions, and Ajak confirmed that the SPLA has shortages in areas of transport, communications, equipment and infrastructure. "The needs of the SPLA are as wide as the ocean," he said, noting the inherent difficulties in transitioning from a bush guerilla army to a modern military force. Nonetheless, Ajak and Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations James Hoth Mai cited air defense as their top priority for procurement. "During the struggle (i.e. civil war,) we managed to shoot down (SAF) helicopter gunships," said Ajak. "But we could not defend against the Antonov bombers, and we,re still not in a position to do so." When queried by Staffdel member Kuiken on what sort of air defense equipment the SPLA would like to acquire, Ajak replied that they needed "everything" - training, equipment, operational guidelines, etc. He added that the air assets sought by the SPLA were defensive in nature. ¶10. (SBU) The SPLA does enjoy a high morale, said Ajak, despite prolonged absorption of Other Armed Groups (OAGs) into its ranks. Referring to Kiir,s decision to incorporate KHARTOUM 00001840 003 OF 004 OAGs and more recent militia factions into the SPLA under the mantra that "unity is strength," Ajak lamented that due to this the SPLA has become too large - and in some respects its value has suffered as a result. Ajak maintained that the SPLA ideally be reduced to between 75,000 and 90,000 troops. PROSPECT OF RETIRED GENERAL REPLACING BASHIR UNLIKELY -------------- -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Unlike others within the GOSS, notably Minister for Presidential Affairs Luka Biong Deng, Ajak doubted the prospect of a retired SAF general replacing President Bashir as President of Sudan. Many retired generals are not Islamist enough for the current core of the SAF. "The new recruits view them as too liberal, or as agents of the West," he said. "Some are now engaged in business, and most now living outside of Sudan," he said. "I,m extremely doubtful that any of them would work" as Bashir,s replacement. He emphasized that the NCP needed to choose an "intelligent general" able to manage the Islamist wing of the party and move forward with the implementation of the CPA. Quoting President Kiir,s stance that the ICC indictment of Bashir is an internal NCP matter, Ajak reiterated that the CPA remained a red-line for the SPLM and SPLA. Queried by the Acting CG as to whether Taha would make for a better CPA ally given his status as a signatory to the agreement, Ajak dismissed the idea, citing diminishing support for Taha within the NCP and noting that "in Sudan, change must come at the tip of a gun," he continued. ¶12. (SBU) While Ajak noted that NISS Director Salah Ghosh supported Ali Osman Taha, tensions between what Ajak estimated to be a 30,000-strong NISS "militia force" and standing SAF army were constraining Taha,s chances at leadership. Ajak opined that SAF leadership, demoralized and upset at Bashir,s "abandonment" of them during critical fighting period such as recent battles in Darfur and in May in Omdurman, made it unlikely that active SAF generals would stand for anyone aligned with Gosh, or for any Bashir successor less-vested in their interests. "While a young leader is a possibility," Ajak allowed, noting that Bashir,s ascendancy had caught many by surprise, "there are some active SAF generals that desire the position - and we can trust them." Ajak was coy when pressed on what generals he expected to fill a presidential vacancy should one exist. In contrast to GOSS/SPLM officials who stated that the SPLM wished to remain neutral as the situation in Khartoum unfolded, Ajak intimated that the SPLA was open to pursuing engagement with its counterparts during "a potential time of change." (NOTE: GOSS Minister for Regional Cooperation Barnabas Benjamin told Acting CG on December 18 that the SPLM,s preference was "for military man over a Taha or a Nafie proxy, such as the Governor of Jezira State (who is himself, however, a former SAF General),because that quality would make them inherently more predictable in the Sudanese context." SPLM "HAS NOT DONE THEIR HOMEWORK" -------------- ¶13. (SBU) Deng stated that he and others in the SPLA were disappointed that the SPLM appears to have squandered the opportunity to devise a cohesive elections strategy at its May 2008 convention. "They spent all their time figuring out who would occupy what position," he said. "They haven,t devised an election strategy, or done their homework in terms of forecasting political scenarios." He continued by saying that to combat resistance to the "Garang Vision" of a New Sudan and convince recalcitrant separatists that the SPLM should pursue a national elections strategy, advocates of unity have recently floated the argument that Kiir ought to run for national office so that if he wins, he,ll be in a position to protect the results of the 2011 referendum and guarantee a potential secession. ¶13. (C) Comment: Some have suggested that Kiir will only threaten to run in national elections against the NCP candidate in order to induce concessions from the NCP on the referendum or Abyei. Many observers point out that Kiir has no interest in governing at a national level and dislikes being in Khartoum. The SPLM is making a strong push for USG advice and counsel as it enters the next phase of a precipitous post ICC-environment, and will likely make that push during Kiir,s visit to Washington. Discussion of post-ICC scenarios has pushed all quarters of the SPLM into KHARTOUM 00001840 004 OF 004 heightened strategy mode regarding elections. It remains to be seen which wing of the party will win out, but to date the SPLM has shown little interest in national engagement and as a result, has lost some of the goodwill it established during the years of struggle in other marginalized areas of Sudan, notably Darfur and the Eastern States. It will take a serious effort on the part of the SPLM to re-establish itself as a political force in these areas, effort which the SPLM has not been inclined to exert during the first half of the CPA transitional period, choosing instead to focus on its core interests in the South and in its governing (GNU) relationship with the ruling NCP. End comment. ASQUINO