MINNAWI REFUSES TO ACCOMPANY BASHIR TO EL FASHER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001838 SIPDIS DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/12/2018 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: MINNAWI REFUSES TO ACCOMPANY BASHIR TO EL FASHER REF: KHARTOUM 1819 Classified By: A/CDA Mark Asquino, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a December 22 meeting with poloffs, Senior Assistant to the President Minni Minnawi stated that he has refused to accompany President Bashir to Darfur on December 23 because the Presidency has not acceded to his demands for a defined role in the visit and the chance to speak at a rally. Minnawi is, however, looking forward to traveling to Asmara on December 25 or 26 to meet with Eritrean President Afewerki, as well as traveling to Washington with a small delegation in early January and passing through Doha along the way for discussions with Qatari officials. Though in good spirits, Minnawi remained pessimistic about the situation on the ground in Darfur, noting that the massive mobilization and recruitment of Janjaweed militiamen continues in the hands of Musa Hilal, and the regime's hardliners are showing no signs of releasing their firm grip on the Darfur portfolio. He predicted that as long as the hardliners stay in control, any future peace agreement will meet the same fate as the DPA. End Summary. ¶2. (U) On December 22, poloffs met with Senior Assistant to the President Minni Arko Minnawi at Minnawi's residence in Khartoum. POLOFF served as notetaker. Minnawi told us that he had been asked to accompany President Bashir to El Fasher on December 23 for the signing of a contract for the construction of the Ingaz Western Road linking Darfur with Khartoum. The Presidency, however, had failed to agree to his conditions. "I told them I want to know exactly what my role there will be, and I want an opportunity to speak at the rally," he said, noting that he was denied the chance to do so on a previous occasion. (Note: During this course of the meeting with poloffs, Minnawi received a call from Minister of the Presidency Bakri Hassan Salih seeking to convince him to go to Darfur. But Salih did not agree to Minnawi's conditions, and Minnawi refused once again to acquiesce to his request. End note.) Minnawi added that while he had not been consulted in the planning of the trip, he suspected that President Bashir might use the occasion to declare the formation of several new states within Darfur including a Jebel Marra state for the Fur population and a Bahr al Arab state for Darfur's Arabs. Minnawi stated that he had not been consulted about the question of states either. ¶3. (C) Though he had refused to travel to El Fasher with President Bashir, Minnawi said he was looking forward to traveling to Washington with a small delegation to pay his respects to the Bush administration. He also saw the visit as providing him the opportunity of "leaving my file on the table for Mr. Obama." He agreed to pass through Doha with his delegation for talks with Qatari officials on his way to Washington. In addition, Minnawi stated that he had received nominal approval from the Presidency to travel to Asmara on December 25 or 26 to meet with Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki. ¶4. (C) Minnawi noted that the GOS through Musa Hilal has been recruiting and mobilizing as many as 54,000 Janjaweed militiamen in Darfur in preparation for the fallout from an ICC arrest warrant issuance. He stated that the force contains many Chadian Arabs recruited by Hilal, which in turn has sparked inter-Arab fighting around Kabkabiya. "The other tribes are saying that he is giving preference to the Chadians and not giving them ranks," he observed. Aside from the massive recruitment, government forces have been relatively restrained in recent weeks, he said, save for some bombing in remote desert areas in North Darfur. "They fear that Khalil (Ibrahim) is moving in that area," said Minnawi, adding that as far as he knew JEM has not leftits bases in Chad. He estimated JEM's strength to be approximately 100 to 150 vehicles. ¶5. (C) According to Minnawi, there are currently four individuals within the NCP responsible for creating instability in Darfur: President Bashir, Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafie Ali Nafie, Humanitarian Affairs State Minister Ahmed Haroun and Defense Minister Abdelrahman Hussein. "Ali Osman (Taha) cannot control them," he said. "Whatever new agreement that emerges, it will meet the same fate as the DPA." Minnawi noted an increased level of international monitoring might improve the situation on the ground, but even if the GOS accepted a proposed ceasefire commission and halted SAF military offensives, it would continue to use its KHARTOUM 00001838 002 OF 002 "*secret* hands" to create instability through the arming of various rebel and tribal factions. "This is what I'm expecting they'll continue to do," he said. ¶6. (C) Minnawi stated that he was at a loss as to how to move forward the situation in Darfur. "The people of Darfur need to be strong and unified," he said. "They need to deal with the government with one voice," adding that rebel groups were key to such a unification effort. But he lamented that uniting the plethora of rebel factions was nextto an impossible task. "I met with many of the rebels," he said. "But it's difficult when you have 8 people at a table, and each one claims to head a movement." ¶7. (C) Minnawi stated that he had few insights to the rumors swirling around a possible succession of President Bashir, other than an admittedly hare-brained theory that has Ali Osman Taha replacing Bashir as President and Bashir being handed over to a Sudanese court. When Bashir is found innocent by the court, the logic goes, he will return to the Presidency or run for re-election in the 2009 elections. Minnawi characterized this scenario as highly unlikely, ¶8. (C) Comment: Minnawi was in better spirits than during our previous meeting with him (reftel) despite the fact there has been no apparent progress on implementation of his September 19 El Fasher agreement with Vice President Taha. Minnawi appears content with his upcoming trips to Asmara, Doha and Washington. If he has any plans for a strategic course of action in a post ICC-indictment environment,he was not willing to share them. Thus, the status of Minnawi and his movement appears unlikely without am SLA/MM shift in tactics away from pushing for implementation of the DPA. ASQUINO