MACHAR PERSISTS IN EFFORTS TO FIND PEACE WITH THE LRA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001755 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: MACHAR PERSISTS IN EFFORTS TO FIND PEACE WITH THE LRA ¶1. (U) This is an action request for AF/SPG, please see paragraph ¶11. ¶2. (SBU) Summary: Despite the latest failure of LRA leader Joseph Kony to sign the Juba Peace Accord, Chief LRA Peace Negotiator and Government of Southern Sudan Vice President Riak Machar persists in his belief that it is better to continue peace talks than to pursue military options against Kony. Kony, he said, cannot easily be killed or captured, and attempts to do so will result in the LRA taking to the field again, resulting in the deaths of thousands and the displacement of tens of thousands of innocent civilians throughout the region. Machar is traveling to the DRC on December 4 to discuss possible strategies for peacefully containing Kony there. End Summary. End summary. ¶3. (SBU) In a meeting with ConGen Juba on December 3, GOSS Vice President Riak Machar confessed his frustration with the latest failure of Joseph Kony to sign the Juba Peace Accords. However, despite the refusal of Kony since April of this year to agree to end hostilities, Machar remains firm in his belief that there is no viable alternative to the peace process. Kony, he said, has been able to elude capture for over 15 years, and provoking him back into hostilities will only result in more innocent civilian deaths and displacement. ¶4. (SBU) Machar said he had sent letters to President Museveni of Uganda and President Kabila of the DRC outlining his intention to continue to pursue the peaceful containment of Kony. He told ConGen Juba he would travel to DRC on December 4 to discuss Kabila's plans for dealing with Kony, and to encourage him to give Kony safe sanctuary in a remote area of DRC where he and his LRA forces can live in peace so long as they refrain from operations against the civilian population in the region. ¶5. (SBU) Asfor a military option to end the LRA threat once and for all, Machar said that the DRC is weak and lacks the capacity to engage Kony, who has proven himself adept over the last two decades at avoiding capture even against more capable forces. Further, his information was that the DRC would not allow foreign forces to enter DRC to confront Kony. Therefore, in his view it was better to give Kony a little food and let him sit peacefully in an isolated area of Congo rather than provoke him into new military action that would be sure to result in a new round of civilian misery and suffering. ¶6. (SBU) In the meantime, Machar said that with Kony contained he could continue his efforts to try to convince him to sign the Juba Peace Accords and lay down his arms. The primary obstacle to Kony signing the accord, said Machar, was his suspicion that Uganda would turn him over to the ICC to stand trial. Kony insists that the ICC warrants must be suspended before he will consider signing. ¶7. (SBU) Machar said he was convinced that Kony still does not properly understand the terms of the Juba Peace Accords, especially the sections related to the ICC warrants, and he said he remains convinced that over time it would be possible to bring Kony along. Kony has asked for, and Machar would like to provide him with, an independent lawyer who can better explain the mechanism contained in the accords that will allow Kony to be tried in Uganda and avoid ICC prosecution. ¶8. (SBU) Machar requested USG support for his continuing efforts to contain Kony, including funds to help feed the LRA as long as Kony stays contained, and money to hire a lawyer to advise him on the terms of the Juba Peace Accords. ConGen Juba warned Machar that such financial assistance was very unlikely, but that his request would be passed on to Washington. ¶9. (SBU) In subsequent talks with members of the SPLA and the GOSS, GonGen Juba found there was little support for continued engagement by Machar in his talks with the LRA leader. However, inside sources also indicate that GOSS President Kiir does not want an open confrontation with Machar over this issue, and so is not inclined to force Machar to suspend his quixotic efforts. It is expected that Machar will go to Congo on December 4 to talk to Kabila. ¶10. (SBU) Comment: While everyone ConGen Juba speaks to in the GOSS is heartily sick of Kony and would like to see an end to these endless and apparently futile peace talks, no one seems to have a viable alternative at this time for effectively dealing with the LRA leader - and Machar has a point that diplomatic engagement with Kony is better than a return to outright hostilities, which will hurt the civilian populations in the area. If it is true that the DRC will not allow foreign troops to engage the LRA in the Congo, it seems highly unlikely that Kony can, in fact, be brought to bay. Machar's continuing interest in prolonging this charade has more to do with his own position within the GOSS than events in neighboring KHARTOUM 00001755 002 OF 002 countries. ¶11. (SBU) Action Request: GOSS Vice President Machar has requested USG financial assistance with his plan to contain Kony, and ConGen Juba will need to provide an answer. We do not suggest providing such assistance. Post does request guidance on a formal response to VP Machar's request. FERNANDEZ