UMMA PARTY LEADER TRYING TO STEER SUDAN AWAY FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001744 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR HUDSON AD PITTMAN DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2013 TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID SOCI KDEM AU UN SU SUBJECT: UMMA PARTY LEADER TRYING TO STEER SUDAN AWAY FROM CRASH LANDING REF: KHARTOUM 1704 KHARTOUM 00001744 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: CDA Albeto M. Fenandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: National Umma Party Leader Sadiq al-Mahdi believes Sudan confronts a choice between "hard and soft landings" as pressure grows on the ruling NCP from various quarters. Al-Mahdi said that Umma is attempting to engage moderates within both the NCP and the opposition to steer Sudan away from confrontation, but that hardliners in the NCP resist any real change, while those in the opposition insist on regime change. Al-Mahdi said that the SPLM sees Umma as a threat rather than a partner, but hopes this will change in time to form a strategic partnership before national elections. He argued that if the West, the opposition, and Sudan,s neighbors deliver a firm, consistent message for peaceful change, the regime will eventually listen. END SUMMARY. PRESSING A BROAD AGENDA FOR CHANGE - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (C) On December 1, Charge Fernandez called on National Umma Party leader and former PM Sadiq al-Mahdi to hear his views on Umma,s current relationship with the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People,s Initiative (SPI) on Darfur. Many in the Umma rank and file have complained about al-Mahdi's perceived rapprochement with the regime that overthrew him in 1989. According to al-Mahdi, Umma is pursuing a strategy of simultaneously trying to engage moderates within the NCP and with other opposition parties on an agenda for change; including Darfur, human rights, and elections. Al-Mahdi believes that a national accord is the best hope for Sudan to avoid a crash landing as pressure on the regime mounts. ¶3. (C) Al-Mahdi described Umma,s difficult dialogue with the NCP. He said that Umma will not form a special relationship with the NCP and will only join the government as the result of elections. Instead, Umma has pressed the NCP for engagement on a comprehensive list of issues, including expanding the Darfur agenda and adding other governance issues beyond Darfur. Umma thought it had achieved agreement, only to see the NCP walk it back. Al-Mahdi said there is an intransigent element within the NCP (which he said includes Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie) who fear compromise and have sought to whittle down this list to exclude things they find threatening. Although Umma is participating in SPI, al-Mahdi described it as in fact a &subtraction8 from the comprehensive agenda Umma is trying to pursue unilaterally with the NCP. SUDAN,S COMPLEX POLITICAL DYNAMIC - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶4. (C) At the same time, al-Mahdi said that Umma is pressing the same agenda with the other opposition parties to try to reach a consensus on what they want from the regime. He said there is an element among the opposition (including Popular Congress Party leader Hassan Turabi) who demand nothing less than regime change. He described Turabi (a one-time regime insider who also is al-Mahdi,s brother-in-law) as waging a personal vendetta against the NCP who purged him in 1999. Al-Mahdi described a complex dynamic, in which Umma is simultaneously reaching out to both NCP and opposition moderates who want to avoid confrontation, in opposition to hawks in both the NCP and the opposition who oppose any dialogue. INTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE NCP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (C) Al-Mahdi agreed with CDA Fernandez that there is an incipient internal struggle within the NCP between hard-liners and (relative) moderates. He said a rivalry between Nafie and VP Taha is part, but not all, of this. Al-Mahdi believes the regime is feeling pressure on multiple fronts. The various intra-Sudan peace agreements it negotiated (CPA, DPA, Eastern) are not working, and its partnership with the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM) is in a shambles. Then this summer came ICC Prosecutor Ocampo,s request for an indictment of President Bashir. Finally, Sudan,s economic problems are only just beginning. The regime banked on oil prices remaining high indefinitely, and failed to invest its revenues during the boom years wisely (for example, by improving agricultural productivity and diversifying exports). Now it is facing straightened KHARTOUM 00001744 002 OF 002 circumstances, with little to show from its earlier windfall. ¶6. (C) Meanwhile, al-Mahdi said, the Darfur rebel movements have raised the threshold for a settlement. The CDA agreed, noting that on a recent visit to Darfur, one rebel told him that their objectives now are either regime-change in Khartoum or a CPA-like settlement that would grant Darfur autonomy and possible independence. Some rebels claim that they no longer believe that Khartoum can deliver on any commitment it makes. ¶7. (C) The CDA wondered whether an ICC indictment would unify the NCP or tear it apart? Al-Mahdi opined that an indictment would force a showdown between NCP moderates and hardliners. He said that the SPLM has the same position on the ICC as does Umma: urging the NCP to be cautious in responding to an indictment, to avoid provoking a confrontation. He noted that the governments of Sudan,s Arab neighbors are delivering the same message as Sudanese reformers and this needs to continue - the regime cares about what the Saudis, Libyans and Egyptians think. SPLM: RIVAL OR PARTNER? - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (C) Asked about Umma,s relationship with the SPLM, al-Mahdi said that the SPLM believes that it must eliminate the Umma party as a rival if it wants to rule all of Sudan, rather than engage it as a partner. He said this position is being pushed by Northern SPLM leaders, such as Yasser Arman and Mansur Khalid, who have their own personal agenda different from that of the SPLM as a whole. Al-Mahdi said that for its part, Umma is keen to develop a strategic relationship with the SPLM and asked for American help in drawing the two together. He is hopeful that SPLM will come to realize the advantages of this. TRAGEDY OR DIVINE PROVIDENCE? - - - - - - - - -c@aQVZODr~ freedom in the North, but does not practice it in the South. The SPLM has recreated Khartoum in Juba. Neither is President Bashir fully in control of the NCP or of the GoS, al-Mahdi said. In neither North nor South is the status quo stable. He described both the NCP and the SPLM as &decapitated.8 This leadership vacuum is a tragedy, he said, but then added that perhaps it is God,s plan for bringing change to Sudan. ¶10. (C) Al-Mahdi concluded by saying that the U.S. and the West can help by sending a clear, consistent, and firm message pressing for change while also engaging them. This would complement what it is hearing from the opposition and beginning to hear from some of Sudan,s Arab neighbors. The regime has never changed without outside pressure, he said. COMMENT - - - - ¶11. (C) Umma,s ambitious strategy of mediating a national political accord between the NCP and the opposition is laudable, but self-serving and probably unrealistic in Sudan,s fractious political environment. Already we have seen that Al-Mahdi himself felt obliged to disassociate himself from the results of the Sudan People's Initiative because he felt that the NCP did not take into account the Umma party's views and confronted an internal revolt to a cozier relationship with the NCP. The NCP are past masters of delay and deception, and of buying off and dividing the opposition, while the SPLM remains conflicted about whether to pursue John Garang's vision of a &New Sudan8 (and if so, whether to partner with other parties in the North) or to opt for an independent South. We expect the NCP to stretch out negotiations with Umma for as long as it is in their interest to do so, while Umma will bend with the wind, looking to see who will come out on top. FERNANDEZ