Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM1744
2008-12-03 10:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
UMMA PARTY LEADER TRYING TO STEER SUDAN AWAY FROM
VZCZCXRO7038 OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO DE RUEHKH #1744/01 3381043 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 031043Z DEC 08 ZDK CTG NUMEROUS REQUESTS FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2460 INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001744
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG
NSC FOR HUDSON AD PITTMAN
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID SOCI KDEM AU UN SU
SUBJECT: UMMA PARTY LEADER TRYING TO STEER SUDAN AWAY FROM
CRASH LANDING
REF: KHARTOUM 1704
KHARTOUM 00001744 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Albeto M. Fenandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001744
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG
NSC FOR HUDSON AD PITTMAN
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID SOCI KDEM AU UN SU
SUBJECT: UMMA PARTY LEADER TRYING TO STEER SUDAN AWAY FROM
CRASH LANDING
REF: KHARTOUM 1704
KHARTOUM 00001744 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Albeto M. Fenandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: National Umma Party Leader Sadiq al-Mahdi
believes Sudan confronts a choice between "hard and soft
landings" as pressure grows on the ruling NCP from various
quarters. Al-Mahdi said that Umma is attempting to engage
moderates within both the NCP and the opposition to steer
Sudan away from confrontation, but that hardliners in the NCP
resist any real change, while those in the opposition insist
on regime change. Al-Mahdi said that the SPLM sees Umma as a
threat rather than a partner, but hopes this will change in
time to form a strategic partnership before national
elections. He argued that if the West, the opposition, and
Sudan,s neighbors deliver a firm, consistent message for
peaceful change, the regime will eventually listen. END
SUMMARY.
PRESSING A BROAD AGENDA FOR CHANGE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) On December 1, Charge Fernandez called on National
Umma Party leader and former PM Sadiq al-Mahdi to hear his
views on Umma,s current relationship with the ruling
National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People,s
Initiative (SPI) on Darfur. Many in the Umma rank and file
have complained about al-Mahdi's perceived rapprochement with
the regime that overthrew him in 1989. According to al-Mahdi,
Umma is pursuing a strategy of simultaneously trying to
engage moderates within the NCP and with other opposition
parties on an agenda for change; including Darfur, human
rights, and elections. Al-Mahdi believes that a national
accord is the best hope for Sudan to avoid a crash landing as
pressure on the regime mounts.
3. (C) Al-Mahdi described Umma,s difficult dialogue with
the NCP. He said that Umma will not form a special
relationship with the NCP and will only join the government
as the result of elections. Instead, Umma has pressed the
NCP for engagement on a comprehensive list of issues,
including expanding the Darfur agenda and adding other
governance issues beyond Darfur. Umma thought it had
achieved agreement, only to see the NCP walk it back.
Al-Mahdi said there is an intransigent element within the NCP
(which he said includes Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie)
who fear compromise and have sought to whittle down this list
to exclude things they find threatening. Although Umma is
participating in SPI, al-Mahdi described it as in fact a
&subtraction8 from the comprehensive agenda Umma is trying
to pursue unilaterally with the NCP.
SUDAN,S COMPLEX POLITICAL DYNAMIC
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) At the same time, al-Mahdi said that Umma is pressing
the same agenda with the other opposition parties to try to
reach a consensus on what they want from the regime. He said
there is an element among the opposition (including Popular
Congress Party leader Hassan Turabi) who demand nothing less
than regime change. He described Turabi (a one-time regime
insider who also is al-Mahdi,s brother-in-law) as waging a
personal vendetta against the NCP who purged him in 1999.
Al-Mahdi described a complex dynamic, in which Umma is
simultaneously reaching out to both NCP and opposition
moderates who want to avoid confrontation, in opposition to
hawks in both the NCP and the opposition who oppose any
dialogue.
INTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE NCP
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) Al-Mahdi agreed with CDA Fernandez that there is an
incipient internal struggle within the NCP between
hard-liners and (relative) moderates. He said a rivalry
between Nafie and VP Taha is part, but not all, of this.
Al-Mahdi believes the regime is feeling pressure on multiple
fronts. The various intra-Sudan peace agreements it
negotiated (CPA, DPA, Eastern) are not working, and its
partnership with the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM)
is in a shambles. Then this summer came ICC Prosecutor
Ocampo,s request for an indictment of President Bashir.
Finally, Sudan,s economic problems are only just beginning.
The regime banked on oil prices remaining high indefinitely,
and failed to invest its revenues during the boom years
wisely (for example, by improving agricultural productivity
and diversifying exports). Now it is facing straightened
KHARTOUM 00001744 002 OF 002
circumstances, with little to show from its earlier windfall.
6. (C) Meanwhile, al-Mahdi said, the Darfur rebel movements
have raised the threshold for a settlement. The CDA agreed,
noting that on a recent visit to Darfur, one rebel told him
that their objectives now are either regime-change in
Khartoum or a CPA-like settlement that would grant Darfur
autonomy and possible independence. Some rebels claim that
they no longer believe that Khartoum can deliver on any
commitment it makes.
7. (C) The CDA wondered whether an ICC indictment would
unify the NCP or tear it apart? Al-Mahdi opined that an
indictment would force a showdown between NCP moderates and
hardliners. He said that the SPLM has the same position on
the ICC as does Umma: urging the NCP to be cautious in
responding to an indictment, to avoid provoking a
confrontation. He noted that the governments of Sudan,s
Arab neighbors are delivering the same message as Sudanese
reformers and this needs to continue - the regime cares about
what the Saudis, Libyans and Egyptians think.
SPLM: RIVAL OR PARTNER?
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. (C) Asked about Umma,s relationship with the SPLM,
al-Mahdi said that the SPLM believes that it must eliminate
the Umma party as a rival if it wants to rule all of Sudan,
rather than engage it as a partner. He said this position is
being pushed by Northern SPLM leaders, such as Yasser Arman
and Mansur Khalid, who have their own personal agenda
different from that of the SPLM as a whole. Al-Mahdi said
that for its part, Umma is keen to develop a strategic
relationship with the SPLM and asked for American help in
drawing the two together. He is hopeful that SPLM will come
to realize the advantages of this.
TRAGEDY OR DIVINE PROVIDENCE?
- - - - - - - - -c@aQVZODr~ freedom in the North,
but does not practice it in the South. The SPLM has
recreated Khartoum in Juba. Neither is President Bashir
fully in control of the NCP or of the GoS, al-Mahdi said. In
neither North nor South is the status quo stable. He
described both the NCP and the SPLM as &decapitated.8 This
leadership vacuum is a tragedy, he said, but then added that
perhaps it is God,s plan for bringing change to Sudan.
10. (C) Al-Mahdi concluded by saying that the U.S. and the
West can help by sending a clear, consistent, and firm
message pressing for change while also engaging them. This
would complement what it is hearing from the opposition and
beginning to hear from some of Sudan,s Arab neighbors. The
regime has never changed without outside pressure, he said.
COMMENT
- - - -
11. (C) Umma,s ambitious strategy of mediating a national
political accord between the NCP and the opposition is
laudable, but self-serving and probably unrealistic in
Sudan,s fractious political environment. Already we have
seen that Al-Mahdi himself felt obliged to disassociate
himself from the results of the Sudan People's Initiative
because he felt that the NCP did not take into account the
Umma party's views and confronted an internal revolt to a
cozier relationship with the NCP. The NCP are past masters
of delay and deception, and of buying off and dividing the
opposition, while the SPLM remains conflicted about whether
to pursue John Garang's vision of a &New Sudan8 (and if so,
whether to partner with other parties in the North) or to opt
for an independent South. We expect the NCP to stretch out
negotiations with Umma for as long as it is in their interest
to do so, while Umma will bend with the wind, looking to see
who will come out on top.
FERNANDEZ
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG
NSC FOR HUDSON AD PITTMAN
DEPT PLEASE PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2013
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON EAID SOCI KDEM AU UN SU
SUBJECT: UMMA PARTY LEADER TRYING TO STEER SUDAN AWAY FROM
CRASH LANDING
REF: KHARTOUM 1704
KHARTOUM 00001744 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Albeto M. Fenandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: National Umma Party Leader Sadiq al-Mahdi
believes Sudan confronts a choice between "hard and soft
landings" as pressure grows on the ruling NCP from various
quarters. Al-Mahdi said that Umma is attempting to engage
moderates within both the NCP and the opposition to steer
Sudan away from confrontation, but that hardliners in the NCP
resist any real change, while those in the opposition insist
on regime change. Al-Mahdi said that the SPLM sees Umma as a
threat rather than a partner, but hopes this will change in
time to form a strategic partnership before national
elections. He argued that if the West, the opposition, and
Sudan,s neighbors deliver a firm, consistent message for
peaceful change, the regime will eventually listen. END
SUMMARY.
PRESSING A BROAD AGENDA FOR CHANGE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. (C) On December 1, Charge Fernandez called on National
Umma Party leader and former PM Sadiq al-Mahdi to hear his
views on Umma,s current relationship with the ruling
National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People,s
Initiative (SPI) on Darfur. Many in the Umma rank and file
have complained about al-Mahdi's perceived rapprochement with
the regime that overthrew him in 1989. According to al-Mahdi,
Umma is pursuing a strategy of simultaneously trying to
engage moderates within the NCP and with other opposition
parties on an agenda for change; including Darfur, human
rights, and elections. Al-Mahdi believes that a national
accord is the best hope for Sudan to avoid a crash landing as
pressure on the regime mounts.
3. (C) Al-Mahdi described Umma,s difficult dialogue with
the NCP. He said that Umma will not form a special
relationship with the NCP and will only join the government
as the result of elections. Instead, Umma has pressed the
NCP for engagement on a comprehensive list of issues,
including expanding the Darfur agenda and adding other
governance issues beyond Darfur. Umma thought it had
achieved agreement, only to see the NCP walk it back.
Al-Mahdi said there is an intransigent element within the NCP
(which he said includes Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie)
who fear compromise and have sought to whittle down this list
to exclude things they find threatening. Although Umma is
participating in SPI, al-Mahdi described it as in fact a
&subtraction8 from the comprehensive agenda Umma is trying
to pursue unilaterally with the NCP.
SUDAN,S COMPLEX POLITICAL DYNAMIC
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
4. (C) At the same time, al-Mahdi said that Umma is pressing
the same agenda with the other opposition parties to try to
reach a consensus on what they want from the regime. He said
there is an element among the opposition (including Popular
Congress Party leader Hassan Turabi) who demand nothing less
than regime change. He described Turabi (a one-time regime
insider who also is al-Mahdi,s brother-in-law) as waging a
personal vendetta against the NCP who purged him in 1999.
Al-Mahdi described a complex dynamic, in which Umma is
simultaneously reaching out to both NCP and opposition
moderates who want to avoid confrontation, in opposition to
hawks in both the NCP and the opposition who oppose any
dialogue.
INTERNAL CONFLICT IN THE NCP
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5. (C) Al-Mahdi agreed with CDA Fernandez that there is an
incipient internal struggle within the NCP between
hard-liners and (relative) moderates. He said a rivalry
between Nafie and VP Taha is part, but not all, of this.
Al-Mahdi believes the regime is feeling pressure on multiple
fronts. The various intra-Sudan peace agreements it
negotiated (CPA, DPA, Eastern) are not working, and its
partnership with the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM)
is in a shambles. Then this summer came ICC Prosecutor
Ocampo,s request for an indictment of President Bashir.
Finally, Sudan,s economic problems are only just beginning.
The regime banked on oil prices remaining high indefinitely,
and failed to invest its revenues during the boom years
wisely (for example, by improving agricultural productivity
and diversifying exports). Now it is facing straightened
KHARTOUM 00001744 002 OF 002
circumstances, with little to show from its earlier windfall.
6. (C) Meanwhile, al-Mahdi said, the Darfur rebel movements
have raised the threshold for a settlement. The CDA agreed,
noting that on a recent visit to Darfur, one rebel told him
that their objectives now are either regime-change in
Khartoum or a CPA-like settlement that would grant Darfur
autonomy and possible independence. Some rebels claim that
they no longer believe that Khartoum can deliver on any
commitment it makes.
7. (C) The CDA wondered whether an ICC indictment would
unify the NCP or tear it apart? Al-Mahdi opined that an
indictment would force a showdown between NCP moderates and
hardliners. He said that the SPLM has the same position on
the ICC as does Umma: urging the NCP to be cautious in
responding to an indictment, to avoid provoking a
confrontation. He noted that the governments of Sudan,s
Arab neighbors are delivering the same message as Sudanese
reformers and this needs to continue - the regime cares about
what the Saudis, Libyans and Egyptians think.
SPLM: RIVAL OR PARTNER?
- - - - - - - - - - - - -
8. (C) Asked about Umma,s relationship with the SPLM,
al-Mahdi said that the SPLM believes that it must eliminate
the Umma party as a rival if it wants to rule all of Sudan,
rather than engage it as a partner. He said this position is
being pushed by Northern SPLM leaders, such as Yasser Arman
and Mansur Khalid, who have their own personal agenda
different from that of the SPLM as a whole. Al-Mahdi said
that for its part, Umma is keen to develop a strategic
relationship with the SPLM and asked for American help in
drawing the two together. He is hopeful that SPLM will come
to realize the advantages of this.
TRAGEDY OR DIVINE PROVIDENCE?
- - - - - - - - -c@aQVZODr~ freedom in the North,
but does not practice it in the South. The SPLM has
recreated Khartoum in Juba. Neither is President Bashir
fully in control of the NCP or of the GoS, al-Mahdi said. In
neither North nor South is the status quo stable. He
described both the NCP and the SPLM as &decapitated.8 This
leadership vacuum is a tragedy, he said, but then added that
perhaps it is God,s plan for bringing change to Sudan.
10. (C) Al-Mahdi concluded by saying that the U.S. and the
West can help by sending a clear, consistent, and firm
message pressing for change while also engaging them. This
would complement what it is hearing from the opposition and
beginning to hear from some of Sudan,s Arab neighbors. The
regime has never changed without outside pressure, he said.
COMMENT
- - - -
11. (C) Umma,s ambitious strategy of mediating a national
political accord between the NCP and the opposition is
laudable, but self-serving and probably unrealistic in
Sudan,s fractious political environment. Already we have
seen that Al-Mahdi himself felt obliged to disassociate
himself from the results of the Sudan People's Initiative
because he felt that the NCP did not take into account the
Umma party's views and confronted an internal revolt to a
cozier relationship with the NCP. The NCP are past masters
of delay and deception, and of buying off and dividing the
opposition, while the SPLM remains conflicted about whether
to pursue John Garang's vision of a &New Sudan8 (and if so,
whether to partner with other parties in the North) or to opt
for an independent South. We expect the NCP to stretch out
negotiations with Umma for as long as it is in their interest
to do so, while Umma will bend with the wind, looking to see
who will come out on top.
FERNANDEZ