DARFUR CEASEFIRE PLANS HAVE UNAMID FEELING THE HEAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001737

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR CEASEFIRE PLANS HAVE UNAMID FEELING THE HEAT

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1734

B. KHARTOUM 1697

C. KHARTOUM 1698

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 2, Acting UNAMID Political
Chief and head of the DDDC Abdul Mohammed and Sudan Scholar
Alex DeWaal told CDA Fernandez that UNAMID has been
frantically trying to throw together a proposal for a
ceasefire commission in the last week. Mohammed promised to
deliver UNAMID's proposal to the Embassy "within a few days"
and, spurred by an alternate US proposal (reftels),asked
that UNAMID be allowed to present its plan and identify areas
where U.S. assistance is required. DeWaal emphasized that
although Darfur urgently needs a ceasefire commission right
now, any mechanism will require updated mapping of rebel
positions, non-military logistical support for armed groups,
technical training on the ceasefire, and embedded monitors of
the ceasefire. The intent of the presentation appeared to be
to protect UNAMID's turf from the US proposal on monitoring
the Darfur ceasefire, and additional pressure from the US
side in pushing its own "bridging" plan may well FORCE a
recalcitrant UNAMID into action. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Following the December 1 DDDC briefing (reftel A,)
Abdul Mohammed and sidekick cum political prop Alex DeWaal
switched gears on December 2 visiting the Embassy to discuss
a ceasefire monitoring mechanism for Darfur. Mohammed said
that since President Bashir's announced ceasefire at the
Sudan People's Initiative and the more recent U.S. offer of
help to establish a monitoring mechanism for violence (reftel
B-C) UNAMID has been scrambling to draft a proposal for the
ceasefire commission. Mohammed said that UN DPKO has sent
strong orders to UNAMID to immediately come up with a plan
for a ceasefire monitoring mechanism, despite the fact that
"UN headquarters has very little trust in UNAMID." According
to Mohammed, DPKO has already sent some feedback to UNAMID's
initial outlines saying that they want a "lighter" proposal,
(to which Mohammed responded, "we aren't exactly sure what
that means") and CDA Fernandez quipped that if UNAMID were
any lighter it would be invisible.


3. (C) Mohammed and DeWaal both emphasized that the GOS has
appeared very receptive to UNAMID's establishment of such a
mechanism and that senior officials from NISS Chief Salah
Gosh to the Sudanese AT;vkgQQeX;Qarfur's rebels are already very skeptical about any such
proposal, and that unless the proposal is robust, they will
inevitably reject UNAMID's proposal.


4. (C) Having been involved in security arrangements
discussions in Darfur for the last four years, DeWaal said
that although a mechanism is needed in the short term, UNAMID
needs to establish a sustainable mechanism. "After the
failed mechanisms of the past, we know what we have to do to
make this work," said DeWaal, naming four specific
ingredients of a functional ceasefire mechanism. First, the
ceasefire commission will need to have reliable and
comprehensive maps of rebel positions and controlled areas.
"All agreements have fallen apart when it comes to mapping,"
said DeWaal, saying that JEM, SLA/Unity, and SLM/MM's fluid
positions complicate this exercise (SLM-AW positions in Jebel
Marra are more static). Second, armed groups will need to
receive non-military logistical support, as "a fighter cannot
respect a ceasefire if he doesn't respect himself." Third,
DeWaal said that all armed elements (including the GoS) will
need to receive technical training on the meaning of the
ceasefire, as this is a very technical, specific, and complex
agreement which needs to be fully understood by the field
commanders. Fourth, DeWaal said that any ceasefire
commission will need an embedded monitoring and reporting
element. This will most likely begin at Darfur's airports
where ceasefire monitors will log GOS aircraft and flight
plans. Monitors will eventually be embedded both in GOS and
rebel units.


5. (C) Both DeWaal and Mohammed acknowledged that UNAMID is
already mandated with carrying out some of these functions,
but that the mission has been too conservative and afraid of

KHARTOUM 00001737 002 OF 002


angering the GoS. Mohammed said that UNAMID's cautious
approach must change, while DeWaal said that UNAMID has been
worse than AMIS about reporting GoS violations. DeWaal said
that the "Chadian factor" and JEM will complicate the
creation of a ceasefire mechanism. "The GOS will not be
'boxed in' when it comes to Chad, and this obviously applies
to JEM as well," stated DeWaal. DeWaal said that even if this
ceasefire commission is not effective when it comes to Chad
and JEM that, "you can still make a difference in two-thirds
of the territory and improve security and the lives of
Darfuris there." Mohammed admitted that UNAMID fully realizes
that "over 70 percent" of the violent actions in Darfur are
government initiated and that this plus SAF AIR operations
gives wide scope for the regime to begin to tone down the
tempo of operations if it really wants such an effort to
succeed.


6. (C) CDA Fernandez discussed GOS officials' mixed
reactions to the U.S. offer to assist Sudan establish a
ceasefire commission. DeWaal noted that the U.S. offer had
pushed UN DPKO and UNAMID to start working on a ceasefire
commission. CDA Fernandez said that regardless as to what
plan UNAMID composes, there is value to including space for
U.S. involvement and that some GoS actors such as NISS Chief
Salah Gosh seem to have recognized the value of U.S.
involvement. Mohammed then ended the meeting stating that
UNAMID would complete its plan, identify areas for U.S.
assistance, and then deliver a copy of this plan to the
Embassy for feedback.

COMMENT
- - - -

7. (C) Abdul Mohammed noticeably failed to mention Chief
Mediator Bassole during the entire meeting. The DDDC Chief
is obviously trying to trying to inject himself into the
center of every solution for Darfur. DeWaal likely knows
that he is being played by Mohammed, but his expertise is
still valuable for UNAMID and for informing the frantic and
often incoherent Mohammed. During A/S Hook's upcoming
December 3-4 trip to El-Fasher we will discuss this further
with other UNAMID officials and urge other senior UNAMID
officials to become involved and not simply let Mohammed run
the show. The U.S. should continue to push our offer of
assistance for the establishment of a monitoring mechanism
for violence in Darfur, at least as a way of pressing both
the Khartoum regime and DPKO. This offer has certainly lit a
fire under UNAMID.
FERNANDEZ