UNAMID DEPLOYMENT IN GREATER DETAIL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001726 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT IN GREATER DETAIL REF: A) KHARTOUM 1694 B) KHARTOUM 1670 C) KHARTOUM 1622 D) KHARTOUM 1524 E) KHARTOUM 1507 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: UNAMID climbed to 50.3 percent of its authorized total force strength last week and expects to reach its goal of 60 percent by end of the year, as reported in Ref A. Most troop-contributing countries (TCCs) anticipated to arrive in the coming months have not provided load lists to DPKO, so their equipment and hence their deployment will be delayed. UNAMID asked that the US put pressure on TCCs to finalize purchases and prepare their load lists. There are only three out of nineteen anticipated Formed Police Units (FPUs) currently deployed, as the additional proposed units are experiencing equipment and capability shortfalls. UNAMID hopes that the "Friends of UNAMID" group of donor countries including the US might help fill these gaps. End summary. ¶2. (SBU) As reported in Ref A, CDA Fernandez, PolCouns, and Poloff spoke with Colonel Noddy Stafford, Chief of Military Plans UNAMID, Lt Col Tim House, DPKO liaison, Commander Victor Luis Hernandez, FPU Advisor/Coordinator for UNAMID, and Adeyemi Ogunjemilusi, Deputy Police Commissioner November 18-19 to discuss UNAMID deployment issues. This cable provides additional detail on deployment figures. Stafford said that UNAMID military force strength now stands at 9,815 (up from last week's total of 9,281) military boots-on-the-ground or 50.3 percent of the mission's total authorized force strength. Stafford believes they will have 9,837 personnel deployed by the end of the month. In order to reach 60 percent deployment by the end of the year, UNAMID expects to complete the deployment of the Egyptian and Ethiopian battalions and bring the former AMIS battalions up to full battalion strength when they rotate in December. Hernandez reported that Formed Police Unit (FPU) strength still stands at three units (420 staff); combined with unarmed civilian police officers ("civpols") the total number of police stands at 1995. ¶3. (SBU) Stafford expects the following increase in personnel by the end of the year: Country: No. Unit Pakistan: 106 Hospital Pakistan 335 Engineering Co. Ethiopia 443 Infantry Battalion Ethiopia 300 Multi-role Logistics Co. Ethiopia 125 Transportation Sector Reconnaissance Co. Egypt 120 Remainder of Battalion Rwanda 120 Remainder of Battalion Rwanda 262 Remainder of Battalion FPU (Formed Police Unit) Status, Goals, and Challenges -------------- -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi reported to the CDA that UNAMID is satisfied with the current FPUs (1 in El Fasher and 2 in Nyala) and that they are running well. UNAMID struck water at two wells in Nyala which will provide each unit their own integral water supply. While the Indonesian FPU officers in El Fasher are still on light duties as they construct their camp and await equipment, they are escorting women gathering firewood outside Zam Zam IDP camps and regularly patrolling inside the camp. The Nepalese currently located in the Nyala Super camp are still undergoing camp preparation. ¶5. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi said a goal of the FPUs is to build 83 community police cenvers ,CPCs) in|he mos4 ieevily(poru|ateeQJImtarngl`y0Fcpleced PgRsnq@$ID\)(cAmS"to!uwQgQ$vlm~c}s j2omQgkclptn0dNnevS`q!;o.\m1m,\~e :w$rbr*1&"Cfe"4yQF#exist, but do not yet fully meet UN standards. Ogunjemilusi also wants to put 50 gender-based crime desks in camps, but lacks the resources for this initiative as well. He reported anecdotal evidence that installing lighting and patrolling is already mitigating some crime in the camps and hoped to find the funds for more lighting. FPUs continue to recruit local volunteers to learn police basics and these volunteers are extending the reach of the FPUs. However, volunteers must continually be monitored to ensure civil rights and humane practices are respected. Ogunjemilusi also reported that IDPs are fickle in their attitude toward FPUs. Some days it seems that IDPS are pleased with the presence of the FPUs; other days the IDPs are not as receptive. Relations between IDPs and local, Sudanese police are often tense. ¶6. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi requested that the Friends-of-UNAMID increase their support to the FPUs, and that UNAMID better manage FPU expectations. Because of miscommunication, troops arrive expecting KHARTOUM 00001726 002 OF 003 to be fully equipped, uniformed, and provided a salary. While FPUs cost approximately US$8 million each, there are additional needs for more vehicles (including maintenance packages),communication equipment, tents, investigation kits, and capacity building training. There are other smaller but critical needs as well - needed to equip the community police - which would greatly enhance the FPU programs and which the Friends of UNAMID or other donors might be willing to provide: vests, reflective jackets, flashlights, and identification cards. ¶7. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi said he can only support police units within 100 km of the major cities of Nyala, El Fasher, and El Geneina as equipment delivery outside this radius is impossible. A further challenge is how to synchronize deployment of the additional 16 FPUs scheduled to arrive. With the current slippage of arrival dates and equipment, Ogunjemilusi does not believe he will see more than ten FPUs on the ground next year and is concerned that the failure of each country to communicate deployment dates and equipment lists will hinder the smooth deployment of arriving units. ¶8. (SBU) Ogunjemilusi also briefed the CDA on the UNAMID goal of providing training to GoS police. He finds that like the IDPs, their attitude towards the FPUs fluctuates. While they state their desire for training is serious, they will not start without the full construction of new training facilities. Local police also state they intend to conduct joint patrols, but will not do so unless they receive reflective jackets. Ogunjemilusi characterizes GoS expectations as, "Give us weapons, train us on weapons, provide a salary, and don't allow the community police volunteers to become pro-rebel militia". ¶9. (SBU) While Ogunjemilusi would like to sponsor Human Rights training for all GoS police up to the senior management level, UNAMID lacks the capacity to do so. He opines outsourcing in a separate country may be the most effective mechanism, but many Sudanese are suspicious, viewing training outside the country as a method of "brainwashing police to perform intelligence functions". Equipment Movement -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Movement of equipment is progressing, with 91 containers being transported last week. Equipment moves from Port Sudan on new trucks to El Obeid, where it is transferred to older vehicles that will be "less of a financial burden if lost or hijacked." Ethiopian contingent-owned equipment (COE) is just beginning to move. The 1,000 Ethiopians are ready to deploy, but must await the arrival of their equipment. The same is true for the Rwandans and Senegalese who are scheduled to deploy 1,318 troops by the end of the year, but their COE is not scheduled to arrive until January. Stafford is concerned that demand may soon outpace the contractors' capabilities. ¶11. (SBU) An emerging problem is that of units not able to deploy as previously agreed due to lack of capacity to acquire and prepare their equipment for shipment. Senegal, Tanzania and Burkina Faso all pledged troops, received advanced training, and UNAMID tentatively scheduled their equipment movement. However, these countries have not provided their load lists and cargo readiness dates, primarily because they have not yet purchased their own required equipment. A better flow of information is required to avoid shipment delays, conflict of movement, and duplication of plans. To circumvent this problem, Stafford and House plan to meet soon with Thai officials to discuss plans and details of their deployment schedule and brief them on particulars of their site. Stafford said the current goal of deployment by March 30 will slip if countries are not pressured to uphold their commitments. When countries miss their target dates for shipping COE, the entire logistics chain is affected. APCs -------------- ¶12. (SBU) Currently Canada is providing 104 Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs) divided between the Nigerian, Senegalese, and Rwandan Battalions. However this support could end soon and the battalions are expected to provide their own APCs. There have been significant obstacles in making this happen. The Nigerian battalion has some APCs but no maintenance package, so as equipment breaks down, it remains inoperable. Rwanda has a contract for 20 APCs to be manufactured in China that were due last October. The Chinese have yet to produce the vehicles and the manufacture date has pushed back to January 2009. Given a four month lag time between acceptance and delivery, the Rwandans will not receive their equipment until April at the earliest. Senegal reported a "fiscal problem" with their APC supplier, suggesting they do not have the funds to procure their APCs. Canada has been approached to extend KHARTOUM 00001726 003 OF 003 the usage of their equipment and provide maintenance through the end of June, 2009. While they have been sympathetic and appear supportive, according to their Charge in Khartoum, final resolution has not been reached. Future Plans -------------- ¶13. (SBU) UNAMID plans to close two redundant camps, Malha in Sector North and Saortony in Sector South, before June, 2009 as they do not fit into current IDP needs. Both camps are old AMIS camps in areas dominated by hills, so they are indefensible from a security perspective. They are also located far from IDP concentrations. ¶14. (SBU) While UNAMID hopes the security situation will improve, they are prepared for future Phase V contingencies. Stafford explained the three parts of UNAMID's contingency evacuation plan to CDA Fernandez. First, UNAMID would re-deploy 25 per cent of its personnel outside Sudan including unarmed police, military observers, staff officers and non-essential civilians. Second, UNAMID would consolidate personnel to 12-13 battalion locations abandoning 19 camps. FPUs would remain in place. Third, complete evacuation would take place to Entebbe, Uganda. Stafford noted that Entebbe is also the evacuation point for UNMIS, so if both units must evacuate simultaneously, a strong measure of coordination and synchronicity will be required (and it would be a major challenge for Entebbe to support the massive influx of UN and humanitarian personnel). UNAMID hopes to have advanced warning of any deteriorating security situation and be allowed two months to redeploy, however Stafford said the plan is to be able to move out in as little as ten days. Comment -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Equipment and training gaps remain which need to be addressed, especially for the FPUs. The proposals for equipment donation to the FPUs and community police programs by the Friends of UNAMID or other donors deserve our attention and support. The UN, the USG, and others need to pressure the TCCs to procure equipment in a timely fashion and establish a liaison mechanism for relaying deployment data to UNAMID. UNAMID specifically requested that Senegal, Tanzania, and Burkina Faso provide their load lists to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) within the next two to four weeks to allow UNAMID to plan these shipments accordingly. FERNANDEZ