UNAMID SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ADADA MILDLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001724 SIPDIS FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2013 TAGS: POL PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: UNAMID SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ADADA MILDLY RECEPTIVE TO U.S.-LED DARFUR MONITORING MISSION REF: A. STATE 122270 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1697 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1698 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 ( b) & (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CDA Fernandez briefed UNAMID Joint Special Representative Adada on the proposed U.S.-led Darfur-ceasefire monitoring mission on November 26 (reftel a). While Adada appeared mildly receptive to the idea initially, he urged that the U.S. work to get rebel movements to the negotiating table and later that day he and NISS Director Salah Gosh jointly told the press that UNAMID itself is ready and able to immediately monitor the Darfur ceasefire. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On November 26, CDA Fernandez met with UNAMID Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada to brief him on ref. (A) proposal for a U.S.-led international mission to monitor a Darfur ceasefire. Charge Fernandez began by saying that while the U.S. understands that ceasefire monitoring is properly and eventually the role of UNAMID, it is proposing that the U.S. lead a &bridging mechanism8 until UNAMID is ready to take up the mission. The CDA remarked that the unilateral ceasefire declared by President Bashir on November 12 already is falling apart, but might still be salvaged if action is taken quickly. Drawing on talking points in reftel a, he explained that he already had presented the U.S. idea to GoS officials Mutriff Saddiq and Salah Gosh on November 23 (refs. B and C),and both had been initially, if vaguely, receptive. ¶3. (C) CDA Fernandez explained that the U.S. is proposing that it lead an international team to initially monitor the Darfur ceasefire. This mission would be similar to the one that the U.S. had successfully led earlier in support of the CPA in the Nuba Mountains and in South Sudan. Monitoring would be carried out by a private, probably U.S., company contracted and paid for by the USG. The monitors themselves would probably be retired military personnel with significant experience. The monitors could be multi-national, not exclusively American. ¶4. (C) Adada asked about the desirability of employing a private company vis-a-vis UNAMID to monitor the ceasefire. 
The Charge repeated that the U.S. mission would be only an interim measure until UNAMID is ready to take on the mission itself. He noted that the primary constraint in deploying such a force will be logistical, the same challenges that are hampering the deployment of UNAMID. Adada added that the challenges were more political than logistical, the rebels would balk. Logistically, such a team would be hard-pressed to match the resources that UNAMID already has on the ground. ¶5. (C) Adada opined that, before any monitors can be deployed, it will be necessary to convince the rebel movements to support the ceasefire. CDA Fernandez agreed this was a good point, but argued that the U.S. monitoring proposal could serve as a means to get the rebels to commit to the ceasefire. The rebels do not trust the GoS and are unfortunately if unfairly suspicious of UNAMID as well. A U.S.-led mission might help overcome these suspicions. An effective Darfur ceasefire, he said, could require three stages. First the rebels will need to be brought in, then a comprehensive ceasefire declared. Finally the monitors would quickly deploy. Adada recalled the collapse of the last Ceasefire Commission, and especially the controversy about per diems for rebel commanders, as an object lesson in failure. CDA reminded Adada that the CFC finally collapsed when the GOS arrested the JEM reps to the Ceasefire Commission. ¶6. (C) Adada noted that UNAMID will require approval from New York to work with a private firm. The Charge replied that the U.S. understands this. It is floating the idea first with the GoS to see whether it would be acceptable, as an initials step, then with UNAMID. If the GoS agrees, New York, Washington, and Khartoum will need to work together on the implementation. Adada remarked that if Khartoum firmly commits to the idea, he saw no reason why it should be a problem for New York. The Charge promised to provide Adada with a copy of the U.S. diplomatic note delivered to the GNU containing outlining the proposal. (Note: A copy of the dipnote was emailed to Adada later the same day. End note.) KHARTOUM 00001724 002 OF 002 Adada promised to communicate the information to New York. ¶7. (C) Adada continued that Joint Chief Mediator Bassole is now working with the rebel movements to convince them to join in the ceasefire. He said that the movements have been arguing &We don,t need a ceasefire, we need a framework for a political settlement.8 CDA Fernandez agreed that it is critical to get the movements to commit. He added that JEM is both the most important group bring on board and the most skeptical. ¶8. (C) Adada said that NISS Director Salah Gosh had called him, urgently seeking a meeting. He and Gosh would be meeting immediately after Adada,s meeting with the Charge. CDA Fernandez commented that Gosh may want to discuss with Adada the U.S. monitoring proposal. (Note: Following Adada,s meeting with Gosh, the two held a joint press conference, at which they declared that UNAMID is now ready and able to monitor the still illusory ceasefire. End note.) ¶9. (C) Comment: Adada was noncommittal, but appeared mildly receptive to the idea of an interim U.S.-led monitoring mission at his meeting with the Charge. However, his joint statement with Gosh later in the day on UNAMID,s ability to perform the monitoring mission unassisted does not bode well for a final acceptance of the U.S.-led initiative, either by Khartoum or by UNAMID. The reality is that such an initiative is more of a challenge to UNAMID, to its monopoly on monitoring and supervision, than to either the Khartoum regime or to the rebels. An independent, US-led, Darfur Monitoring Team would reveal violence by both Khartoum and the rebels, but also passivity and inaction by UNAMID. FERNANDEZ