ABYEI ADMINISTRATION AFTER TWO WEEKS: SO FAR, SO GOOD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001714 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF EAID ECON ASEC KPKO UNSC SU SUBJECT: ABYEI ADMINISTRATION AFTER TWO WEEKS: SO FAR, SO GOOD REF: KHARTOUM 1585 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: According to the UN Head of Office for Abyei, the new Abyei Administration has made a good start since its arrival in the area two weeks ago. The Administration has drafted a budget, but is still not receiving the oil revenues promised in the Roadmap Agreement. It also is preparing for the annual Misseriya cattle migration, which is starting early this year. Relations between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya remain tense after the May fighting. The Joint Integrated Police Unit (JIPU) is seeking to establish its presence throughout the Abyei Roadmap area, but also is seriously under-resourced. IDPs displaced in May are returning, but only very cautiously. END SUMMARY. Good Start After Two Weeks - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶2. (SBU) In a conversation with econoff on November 23 and during a briefing to the AEC Three Areas Working Group November 24, UN Head of Office for Abyei Christine Johnson provided an update on Abyei Roadmap agreement implementation and the initial progress of the Abyei Administration. Johnson credits the Abyei Interim Administration with making good progress, given it has been there on the ground only two weeks. She reported that SPLM-appointed Administrator Arop Mayok and his NCP-appointed Deputy, Rahama al Nour, appear to cooperate well, at least in public. (According to another source, Mayok and al Nour are old acquaintances who get along well together.) The two have traveled through the Roadmap area, making direct contact with traditional leaders, who had begun to lose confidence in the Administration during the lengthy delay between their appointment and arrival on the scene (reftel). The Administration also began to focus immediately on what Johnson called its "core areas" of responsibility: budget, security, and the provision of social services. A Budget, But Still No Revenues - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶3. (SBU) An early Administration priority was drafting a budget; in fact two - an immediate emergency budget and a 2009 budget. According to Johnson, the drafting process focused on key areas such as health, education, and social welfare. With technical support from the UN and from Bearing Point advisors, working groups for each of these areas drafted the corresponding budget section. The exercise brought the Abyei Administration into working contact with the international NGOs on the scene, and the SPLM together with the NCP. The finished drafts now must be approved by the Abyei Council. ¶4. (SBU) Although the Administration has drafted a budget, it still is living hand-to-mouth, according to Johnson, begging supplies from traders in the town market place. Oil revenues allotted to the Administration and the local population by the Abyei Protocol and the Roadmap still are not being disbursed. The reason for the delay remains unclear. (Note: Separately, NCP negotiator Dirdeiry Ahmed Mohammed, claimed to polchief November 26 that the money has indeed been disbursed, but that the Administration does not have the capacity to spend it yet. We tend to believe Johnson, and will continue to press the GOS on the status of the funds. End note.) An Early Challenge - the Misseriya Cattle Migration - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶5. (SBU) One of Mayom's first acts was to appoint Deputy Administrator al Nour to deal with the annual winter (dry season) migration of al Nour's fellow Misseriya cattle herders through Abyei to the grasslands in Bahr al Ghazal further south. Johnson reports that the migration has begun early this year, and has already reached Abyei's northern boundaries. The Abyei Joint Integrated Unit (JIU) is deploying to provide security. She said that while the cattle ("hundreds of thousands") are moving, the Misseriya herdsmen are waiting, on the instructions of their traditional leaders. (According to Johnson, the cattle move spontaneously in search of fresh grass and the herders travel along with them.) A major issue for the SPLM will be if and how the Misseriya are armed for the migration. Anything other than small arms is likely to cause problems. ¶6. (SBU) Negotiations also are underway between the Misseriya and the SPLA on the conditions for the herders' movement south of the 1956 border. The Misseriya seek to bring their weapons along or receive guarantees of security from the SPLA, while the SPLA demands the herdsman come south unarmed. Johnson believes that a compromise will be reached along the lines of prior years, with herdsmen allowed to bring a limited number of weapons with them (on the order of two automatic rifles per cattle camp) for self-defense. Dirdeiry, who is Misseriya, told polchief he would travel to Southern Kordofan next week to meet with community leaders to attempt to prevent conflict this year and discuss the terms of that KHARTOUM 00001714 002 OF 003 migration, along the lines of what Johnson described (the migration through South Kordofan parallels the one through Abyei). Dirdeiry and SPLM SG Pagan Amun traveled together to the Abyei region last year to mediate several conflicts. A Longer-Term Challenge - Dinka-Misseriya Reconciliation - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶7. (SBU) Johnson said that a longer term issue will be reconciliation between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya in the aftermath of the May fighting. The Dinka remain bitter about looting by Misseriya during and after the outbreak of fighting in Abyei in May. Johnson said that for their part, the Misseriya are very unhappy and insecure. Both Misseriya herdsman and younger Misseriya are unhappy with their tribal leaders. She described the situation as volatile. Establishing Security - - - - - - - - - - - ¶8. (SBU) UNMIS now is able to patrol throughout the Roadmap area, but so far the SAF continues to refuse it permission to move north (outside) of the provisional boundary established in the Roadmap. Such access is important because that is where contact between Dinka and Misseriya is most common and, therefore, violent clashes are most likely to erupt. Johnson said she is more concerned about events outside the Roadmap boundary spilling over, than about problems within the area itself. While UNMIS Sector IV can maintain security in Southern Kordofan to the east, she described Meriam to the west as a "blind spot," and especially worrying because it borders Darfur. ¶9. (SBU) Johnson reported that the Joint Integrated Police Unit (JIPU) is working to establish a three-level security system in the Roadmap area. First, it has identified six villages outside of Abyei town where it plans to establish stations. The second level will be to institute mobile patrolling in the countryside, especially to the north, where trouble is most likely to breakout between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya. The third level will be to establish a reaction team to respond quickly to incidents. This will include an information element to dispel rumors and misinformation. Johnson said that minor incidents frequently are blown out of proportion as word spreads, leading to potentially dangerous confrontations. ¶10. (SBU) Johnson praised both the JIU and JIPU the leadership, but said that serious problems, especially lack of resources, continue. Both units lack communications equipment and vehicles (the JIPU, shockingly, has only one vehicle.) Johnson said the JIU appears on its way to slowly making up its shortfalls through bilateral donations. The JIPU, however, remains seriously under resourced and constrained in its ability to carry out its mission. Both the JIU and JIPU continue to be seriously under-funded by the GoS in Khartoum. Pushing for a Final Troop Withdrawal - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶11. (SBU) An additional issue is the continued presence of SPLA military police in Agok to the south and a SAF unit reputedly providing security in the Difra oil field to the north. Each uses the presence of the other as an excuse to remain. Administrator Mayok is trying to persuade the SPLA unit to make the first move and withdraw. IDPs Returning, But Slowly - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ¶12. (SBU) Johnson said that the tens of thousands displaced by the May fighting are returning to Abyei, but very gradually. The IDPs are very conscious of the tenuous security situation and have been cautious about going home. She said that many families appear to be keeping multiple options open. While one family member remains in Agok with school-age children, another may return to Abyei to reclaim land, while a third may travel to Juba or elsewhere in search of work. In sum, Johnson concluded, we are not at a stage where IDPs can be returned to Abyei en masse. A better approach is to create an environment - security, infrastructure, social services - conducive to voluntary IDP returns, and let people decide for themselves when to do so. Comment - - - - ¶13. (SBU) Johnson's report that the Abyei Administration is up and running is welcome news. Abyei has been without an administration for three years and, therefore, without government services, development assistance, and security. Arop Mayok and company appear to be seeking to address these issues quickly. However, their work and that of the UN continues to be hampered by their own limited capacity, and by GoS resistance and foot-dragging, notably in terms KHARTOUM 00001714 003 OF 003 of disbursal of the agreed oil revenues and refusal to allow UNMIS to patrol the potential trouble area north of the roadmap boundary. Although the danger has lessened, Abyei remains a potential flashpoint between the NCP and the SPLM. The risk of confrontation will increase as the migration season progresses and other political factors such as the ICC, elections planning, and border demarcation - not to mention the announcement of the result of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on Abyei's borders, anticipated in June 2009, come into play. This volatile combination of sensitive issues promises to make 2009 a potentially especially destabilizing year for Abyei and Sudan, which will need to be managed carefully by the Sudanese and the international community. ERNANDEZ