SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF CALLS IDEA OF A US-LED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001698 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU SUBJECT: SUDANESE INTELLIGENCE CHIEF CALLS IDEA OF A US-LED INDEPENDENT DARFUR CEASE-FIRE MONITORING TEAM A "GOOD AND VERY POSITIVE RESPONSE" REF: A. KHARTOUM 1691 ¶B. STATE 122270 ¶C. KHARTOUM 1651 Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alberto M. Fernandez, reasons 1.4(b) a nd (d) ¶1. (C) CDA Fernandez met with Sudanese National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) Chief Salah Ghosh on 23 November to discuss the idea of a US-led independent Darfur Cease-fire Monitoring Team in response to Ghosh's past request for assistance in instituting a cease-fire monitoring mechanism (ref B). CDA Fernandez explained to Ghosh that the temporary team could act as a "bridging mechanism" for monitoring GoS President Omar Al-Bashir's "unconditional and unilateral" cease-fire until UNAMID could effectively take on the task (ref A). "We know that UNAMID has to do this eventually, but its capability is limited now," said Fernandez. "We don't want to lose the effectiveness" of the cease-fire declaration by not implementing a monitoring mechanism within the next one to two months, he continued. Fernandez told Ghosh that the USG is offering such an initiative not to criticize the GoS, but to be helpful. He mentioned that UN and Darfur rebel group buy-in to such an idea would be necessary, but emphasized that the USG is sharing the proposal with the GoS first. Fernandez told Ghosh that in the event the US-led initiative is accepted by the GoS and other involved parties and undertaken, the US contracting company hired to logistically support this effort would not be one that the regime has outright rejections to such as Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) or Blackwater. ¶2. (C) Ghosh thanked the CDA for the USG proposal. He suggested that the US-led team should have enough personnel to properly carry out its work beyond verification or assessing blame. "We don't seek to find out who is responsible for the killing; rather we seek to stop the killing," said Ghosh. The team "has to be a deployment of more than 100" and should be assigned to specific locations and organizations, said Ghosh. "They should deploy with the GoS troops and the rebel movements and act as more than just a verification team," he continued. "This way Washington will know the truth" that it is not just the GoS carrying out violence against the rebels, but the rebels also attacking GoS forces, civilians and food convoys, Ghosh implied. It will be practical to integrate the monitoring team into UNAMID's forces in order to make it more effective, he said. Fernandez again emphasized that in the end, UNAMID would have to act as the permanent cease-fire monitoring force and that the US-led team would only act as a transitional body. "This (proposal) is a good and very positive response," said Ghosh. While he was enthusiastic about the idea, he made it clear that the GoS decision of whether to accept the proposal is a political one. Ghosh promised to discuss it with his GoS colleagues and get back in touch with the Embassy. "We will work on it, but the political environment makes the discussion harder; but I will do my best," said Ghosh. ¶3. (C) CDA also raised continuing complaints that SLM leader Minni Minawi had made about the lack of implementation of the September 19 El Fasher agreement seeking to strengthen the moribund DPA. He noted that Darfur negotiator Ata al-Manaan had recently said that promised limited funding for compensation and reconstruction had been handed over to Minawi, but that does not seem to be the case. Ghosh reiterated past concerns that any funds handed over to SLM-MM, without strings, will be wasted or stolen. ¶4. (C) Comment: Initial GoS reactions by MFA Under Secretary Mutriff Siddiq (septel) and NISS Chief Salah Ghosh to the idea of a US-led effort to put in place an independent Darfur Cease-fire Monitoring Team have been positive. While the USG tries in earnest to support the sweeping if unrealistic ceasefire announcement made by GoS President Bashir on 12 November, the GoS must make up its mind whether it is ready to practice what it has preached (ref C). While the GoS will have to carefully weigh whether it is ready to swallow its pride and welcome a US-led initiative to stop the fighting in KHARTOUM 00001698 002 OF 002 Darfur, for now the USG-proposed monitoring mechanism is the only one on the table, given UNAMID's lethargy. Rejecting the plan would make the GoS appear not to be serious in reaching a comprehensive solution to the Darfur crisis, but fully supporting it would not be the modus operandi of this cagey and paranoid regime. One possible scenario is that the GoS will take its time deciding upon the type of monitoring mechanism that would benefit it the most, accept it, then half-heartedly implement the plan. The impending ICC indictment of President Bashir keeps pressure on the regime to do the right thing, but this pressure will only last so long. In an alternate (but perhaps less likely) scenario, the regime may calculate that it wants to keep the USG engaged in Darfur with contracted personnel on the ground, in hopes that this will help avoid a more aggressive approach by the incoming US administration. End Comment. FERNANDEZ