UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001670 DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE REF: A) KHARTOUM 1622 B) KHARTOUM 1524 C) KHARTOUM 1507 D) KHARTOUM 1468 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Poloff spoke with Commander Victor Luis Hernandez, FPU Advisor/Coordinator for UNAMID, and Col. Nody Stafford, Chief of Military Plans for UNAMID, November 12-13 to discuss UNAMID deployment issues. UNAMID and contingent-owned equipment continues to flow into Darfur, but additional air lift into El Geniena would be helpful. Lack of donor support mean FPUs from Mali, Cameroon, Gambia and Rwanda cannot deploy in the foreseeable future. Alternate police contributing countries are being queried as to their ability to deploy FPUs. Issuance of visas by the GoS for non-Africans has lagged recently and disrupted the continuity of operations. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) Poloff spoke with Commander Victor Luis Hernandez, FPU Advisor/Coordinator for UNAMID, and Colonel Nody Stafford, Chief of Military Plans UNAMID, November 12-13 to discuss UNAMID deployment issues. Stafford told Poloff that UNAMID military force strength now stands at 9281 (up from last week's total of 9063) military boots-on-the-ground or 46.5 per cent of the end of December goal. Hernandez reported that Formed Police Unit (FPU) strength still stands at three units (420 staff); combined with unarmed police personnel the total number of police remains at 1995. FPU Donor and Placement Issues -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Lack of donor support has affected FPUs from Mali, Cameroon, Gambia and Rwanda as they reportedly do not have adequate resources to deploy. UNAMID is attempting to identify alternate Police Contributing Countries (PCCs) that possess the capabilities required to deploy expeditiously at UN standards. UNAMID is initiating informal capability assessments of two FPUs from Jordan and one FPU each from Malaysia and Congo-Brazzaville, while concurrently coordinating with DPKO and the African Union to receive permission to proceed. Lack of donor support and delays in the arrival of Contingency Owned Equipment Movement (COE) have also impacted the deployment of the Togolese and the first Senegalese FPUs, as both shifted from December 2008 to February and June 2009 respectively. ¶4. (SBU) Hernandez reported that site selection for the Egyptian FPU due in February is still pending. The choice of Shagil Tobaya 50 kilometers south of El Fasher was rejected by the UNAMID 'move-con' staff so alternate locations are being discussed. The Indonesian FPU is making progress on the construction of its own camp but still requires the expertise of construction managers from the U.S., Turkey, and the U.K who have not yet received visas. Local contractors are filling the gap. Equipment Movement - Ground -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Stafford reported that COE is moving into Darfur, and UNAMID is pleased with the results of the six trucking contractors. Sector West equipment remains the most critical, as it has been a challenge to get COE into El Geneina. Ninety four containers of Ethiopian Q~{(Q?fe placed on a train and are currently en-route to Nyala, where they will be transferred to trucks and hauled to El Geneina. Road conditions to El Geniena remain poor, but contractors are providing their own engineers in the body of each convoy who are helping with issues along the way. The Egyptian heavy transport company has moved 79 per cent of their own equipment to Nyala. The balance is still in El Obeid or en route. ¶5. (SBU) Currently 2,092 containers, 754 vehicles, and 388 break bulk (loose pieces of disassembled equipment) remain in El Obeid. (Note: Post is aware that these figures do not match those provided by DPKO and will attempt to verify the correct numbers during the course of a visit to El Fasher Next week. End note.) Contractors have been tasked with moving 1,830 containers, 577 vehicles, and 157 break bulk pieces. The remainder requires air transport. UNAMID's first priority for air movement is the Nigerian level two hospital equipment now expected to arrive by mid-December. The next highest priority is the Egyptian and Chinese engineering equipment, which is anticipated by the end of November. Of the 94 containers belonging to the Ethiopians, 49 are designated for the infantry battalion in Kulbus in Northern West Darfur state, and the balance will be moved to El Geneina for the multi-role logistics unit, transport company, and sector reconnaissance company. ¶6. (SBU) Stafford recently visited El Obeid and was encouraged as he personally saw a staff with a positive sense of urgency. He also KHARTOUM 00001670 002 OF 002 saw two large disassembled container lifts that belong to Bangladesh, and he is now considering commissioning them in place for use in El Obeid. He feels the addition of this equipment would "unlock lots of container movement." Air Operations -------------- ¶7. (SBU) IL-76 aircraft operations resumed this week, and a second IL-76 is expected to be added to the flight plan next week. As each flight will be able to courier three containers or vehicles, Stafford is optimistic the bulk of the COE currently in Obeid will be in place by the end of the year. The IL-76 provided by UNMIS "has been a disappointment." UNAMID is supposed to have the airlift capability one day each week, but UNAMID "hasn't had the pleasure in over a month." ¶8. (SBU) When asked about the possibility of a U.S.-provided air bridge Stafford responded, "Want it! Need it desperately! It would be a great means of flying equipment forward to Sector West." The two runways at El Geniena are 1,620 meters and 1890 meters and cannot support IL-76 operations. (As opposed to the runways at El Fasher and Nyala that are 2970 meters and 3,000 meters respectively and made of asphalt.) Stafford also spoke of the possibility of a C-17 augmentation being discussed in New York. As this aircraft can land on dirt strips and can carry up to three containers or vehicles at a time, Stafford would welcome the addition. Lack of Visas a Continuing Disruption -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Lack of visa issuance by the GoS for certain non-African countries remains a problem. Stafford reports he continues to receive assurances of the GoS cooperation on visa issues, but there has been little progress. Among those assigned to UNAMID who remain waiting are four UK engineers, several military staff officers, and approximately five contractors needed to supervise the Indonesian camp construction. The result of these hold-ups is the lack of continuity in deployment and mission effectiveness. As people with significant experience depart, they are not able to pass along lessons learned to the incoming member; valuable knowledge is lost and mission stability declines. Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) With equipment now moving into Darfur, UNAMID needs to expand its search for fresh donors to boost the prospect of meeting FPU deployment goals. FPUs directly impact the quality of life for those in the IDP camps, and this is perhaps the one area where UNAMID can now make the greatest difference in the shortest period of time. Further pressure must continue to be placed on the GoS to approve visas for non-Africans in order to allow UNAMID to maintain corporate knowledge and operational stability. In the larger picture of mission effectiveness, UNAMID and UN/AU Chief Mediator Bassole also must be pressed to develop and negotiate a cease-fire mechanism to give the Khartoum regime no space to hide since a monitoring mechanism is not yet in place. Deployment should not be a goal in itself, and the mission must test the GOS offer of a cease-fire in order to improve security in Darfur to the extent possible. FERNANDEZ