TFCD01: DARFUR REBELS' FATE COULD BE TIED TO DEBY'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000166 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AND AF/C NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2013 TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KPKO SU CD SUBJECT: TFCD01: DARFUR REBELS' FATE COULD BE TIED TO DEBY'S Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) The Chadian Embassy in Khartoum and Senior Assistant to the President/Chairman of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) Minni Minawi asserted in February 3 conversations with Poloff that a Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) Antonov bombed areas around Adre, Chad at approximately 1500 hours Sudan local time. The head of security at the Chadian Embassy claimed that he had spoken to the governor of Adre 10 minutes earlier, who had reported that the Antonov was accompanied by &several8 SAF attack helicopters in an assault that was coordinated with Arab militias on the ground. According to the Chadian Embassy, the Antonov has now returned to El Geneina, West Darfur. Both the Chadian official and Minawi speculated that the Sudanese assault was intended to disrupt the influx of pro-Deby, Sudanese Darfur rebel movements into Chad, who are moving to combat Chadian opposition elements backed by Khartoum. ¶2. (C) A non-governmental source with extensive contacts among the Darfur rebel groups reported to Poloff on February 3 that two of the most militarily strong (and Zaghawa-dominated) Darfur factions--the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Khalil Ibrahim and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity led by Suleiman Jamous, Abdullah Yehia, and Sharif Harir--had dispatched fighters into Chad to support Deby,s counteroffensive. A prominent JEM commander told Field Poloff on February 2 that Khalil and his lieutenants were on route to Chad through North Darfur. Minawi confirmed this information, stating that JEM forces had crossed into Chad via Tine, North Darfur earlier on February ¶3. He also said that fighters affiliated with the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD),which is allied with a JEM break-away faction under an umbrella group--the United Revolutionary Front (URF)--were heading across the border. ¶3. (C) The fate of Deby,s government will have a profound effect on several of Darfur,s strongest rebel groups. JEM, SLA/Unity, and the URF depend on support from Deby, a fellow Zaghawa, and on access to Eastern Chad for safe haven and supply routes. Even Minawi, the sole signatory of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) who now holds a place in the Government of National Unity (GNU),is concerned that a new regime in N'djamena could lessen the leverage that he and his fellow Zaghawa have vis--vis Khartoum. &Even me, I am with Deby today,8 he told Poloff, predicting that the end of Deby would leave Minawi and the Zaghawa rebels squeezed between Khartoum and a proxy government in N'djamena. ¶4. (C) Only rival SLM leader Abdulwahid al Nur, a Fur that commands broad popular support among the IDPs in Darfur and maintains a significant military force, would remain unaffected by the collapse of Deby,s government. He receives little aid from Deby, and his fighters do not transit Chad as often as the Zaghawa-dominated movements. Abdulwahid could point to the removal of Deby at the hands of the Khartoum-backed opposition to bolster his public resistance to participating in the UN/African Union-led Darfur peace process, likely arguing that the Sudanese Government cannot be trusted to adhere to a political settlement until a credible UN peacekeeping force has deployed. Further disunity within the Zaghawa rebel movements in Darfur as a result of Deby,s fall would also strengthen Abdulwahid's claim that he is the pre-eminent leader among Darfur,s numerous rebel groups. ¶5. (U) Tripoli minimize considered. FERNANDEZ