DENG ALOR ON NCP INTRIGUE, EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001657 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG NSC FOR HUDSON AND PITTMAN DEPT PASS TO USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN ASSIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2013 TAGS: KISL PGOV PREL UN AU SU SUBJECT: DENG ALOR ON NCP INTRIGUE, EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S VISIT REF: A. KHARTOUM 1640 ¶B. KHARTOUM 1597 Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Deng Alor said Egyptian President Mubarak, worried about Sudanese instability, delivered a grim message to President Bashir on November 10 counseling full and rapid compliance with ICC and Darfur issues. Both the Egyptians and Alor see increasing signs of an incipient power shift in Sudan which could force Bashir out of power, replace him with VP Taha and a group of civilian Islamists or lead to preventive action by a cornered Sudanese President against his internal foes. End summary. A SURPRISE VISITOR -------------- ¶2. (C) FM Deng Alor outlined to CDA Fernandez on November 12 the background of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak,s lightning November 10 visit to Khartoum and Juba. Alor visited Cairo last week and huddled with Egyptian spy chief Omar Suleiman, FM Aboul Ghaith, and President Mubarak to bring about the trip, which seems to have caught the leadership of President Bashir's NCP by bemused surprise. The trip, which also built on frequent pleas for a visit by Sudanese Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail, happened very suddenly with less than 24 hours warning by the Egyptians. ¶3. (C) While Aboul Ghaith stuck to platitudes, both Suleiman and Mubarak in separate meetings expressed deep concern about the situation in Sudan. They noted that they are very worried about the unity and stability of Sudan. They said that implementation of the CPA has not been smooth, "progress comes about as a result of quarrels which leave greater bitterness behind." The Khartoum regime has not made unity attractive, it hasn't invested in the South even though it has oil money. Consequently, no Southern leader is willing to lobby for unity, "why would anyone want to stay in such a country?" TAHA TRIUMPHANT? -------------- ¶4. (C) Suleiman added that the ICC issue and Darfur are also major concerns. "The NCP is jittery about the future," they have no clear road map and no real solution for Darfur but are throwing out ideas hoping one will stick. He admitted to Alor Egypt,s concern about the naivet of the upcoming Qatari Initiative and asked "why would the Darfuri rebels participate in a Doha conference, aside from Qatari money?" If the key issues in Darfur are compensation for the victims, one Darfur region, a VP slot, and increased development, the regime should just move forward on them without delay regardless of what the rebels want. ¶5. (C) Suleiman said that the Egyptians are "worried of the possibility of a palace coup" in the next few months in Khartoum. Hassan al-Turabi, the former godfather of Sudan's Islamists purged by Bashir in 1999, schemes of getting back into power "but his chances are slim." Bashir is steadily and quietly losing control to a clique led by VP Taha, supported by NISS chief Salah Ghosh (both Ghosh and Taha are members of the same Shaygiyya riverine Arab tribe). The two of them, in conjunction with Finance Minister Awad al-Jaz and party chief Nafie Ali Nafie, are consolidating power. Taha is using Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ali Karti as his liaison with SAF. Karti, who used to be a PDF (Popular Defense Force) leader during the North-South War has maintained his ties to much of the Army, "he is buying them off." Suleiman said that Nafie and Ghosh are not security rivals but allies. Finance Minister Al-Jaz oversees the party security apparatus. "Even the police doesn't really report to the Interior Minister" but through a private firm called the Nasr Company to Taha. The Egyptians prefer Bashir or another army officer and fear that the "real Islamists" will take over soon in Sudan "we didn,t allow them in Egypt, we throw them in jail here, and we don,t want them next door. Taha is acceptable, for now, but he will change once he takes power." BASHIR CORNERED -------------- KHARTOUM 00001657 002 OF 003 ¶6. (C) The Egyptians told Deng that Bashir is increasingly isolated with only some of the senior professional officers in SAF loyal to the President, but they are not really in charge of most of the military. Alor and Murbarak commiserated about the recent Fateh Arwa incident when Bashir attempted to replace the powerful Ghosh with retired Army General Arwa, issuing a decree reinstating Arwa as a Lieutenant General in preparation for placing him as head of State Security. Bashir was confronted by Taha, Nafie, Al-Jaz, MOD Abdurahim Hussein and Presidential Affairs Minister Bakri Salih (the last two frequently seen as Bashir loyalists) and told that appointing Arwa was a party "red line" for them. Bashir was forced to humiliatingly reverse his order after 24 hours. Mubarak told Alor that "when a President makes a mistake, he corrects it but waits a while to show that he is in charge, Bashir couldn't do that". (Note: Arwa is a secularist former head of security in the Nimeiri regime, who worked closely with the USG in moving thousands of Falasha Jews from Mengistu's Ethiopia to Israel in the 1980s. Perceived as an "old army buddy" of Bashir, he also has clashed in the past with the civilian Islamists. End note). ¶7. (C) A "tired and sleepy" Mubarak perked up once his foreign minister departed, joking about the 1995 Sudanese-engineered assassination attempt against him in Ethiopia. He noted that several times when he met Presidential Advisor Mustafa Othman Ismail (later Foreign Minister) he called him "Oh, killer of killers" not realizing that the Sudanese involved was actually VP Ali Osman Taha, not Ismail (adding spice to the confusion was the loathing between Ismail and Taha). Mubarak said that Bashir is approaching the ICC issue politically rather than legally. "You need both horses, or you won,t win the race." Mubarak,s legal advisors told him that there is no way that Bashir can avoid an arrest warrant being issued. He had dispatched a legal expert, Muhieddin Surur, who participated in the writing of the Rome Statute, to try to talk sense to Khartoum, noting "the NCP will pay dearly by refusing to deal with the ICC. They have less that two months left to get out of this." Mubarak added that no one will come to Sudan,s help on the Security Council to get an Article 16 deferral if the Sudanese don,t recognize the process. Alor said that Mubarak had delivered the same grim prognosis privately to Bashir on November 10 in Khartoum. Bashir is a sore sight ("Al-Bashir miskeen"),observed the Egyptian ruler. THE ENEMY WITHIN -------------- ¶8. (C) In his meeting with Mubarak in Khartoum, Bashir avoided talking about the ICC, and concentrated on the CPA and Darfur. He invited Mubarak to attend a session of the Sudan People,s Initiative (SPI) but it was nixed by Egyptian Security which claimed that they needed to hurry up and get to Juba. The NCP are reportedly jealous and surprised that Alor was able to convince Mubarak to visit Juba "the first Egyptian President ever to visit South Sudan" and an unexpected plum for the SPLM. ¶9. (C) Alor had been asked to attend private meetings with VP Taha (on November 11) and NISS Chief Ghosh (on November 12) which seemed to reveal to him how far along the intrigue to replace Bashir actually is. Both Ghosh and Taha were mystified as to why Mubarak had actually come to Sudan. Taha noted that the Egyptians seem to have greater confidence in the SPLM than in their fellow Arabs, greeting the Foreign Minister by saying "how are your people the Egyptians (Ahlak al-Misriyeen, keif?")? Alor explained to Taha that "the Egyptians are genuinely worried about Sudan and think we are approaching the ICC issue in a wrong way." Taha supposedly agreed that the SPLM and the Egyptians are probably right about the ICC "but the President won,t listen to reason." He was surprised that they expressed so much candor with the SPLM and not the NCP. If the Egyptians believe this, so do the Arabs "and they will probably throw us overboard rather than stand by us." "ANYTHING CAN HAPPEN" -------------- ¶10. (C) Ghosh,s two hour meeting with Alor on November 12 was even more stunning. Ghosh mused that the Egyptians may be KHARTOUM 00001657 003 OF 003 conspiring within the Sudanese Army to find a military replacement for Bashir. "We both know that the warrant is coming, anything could happen here at any time." Alor quoted Ghosh as saying "can we allow the whole country to be destroyed because of one person?" Alor asked whom Ghosh was referring to and the spy chief admitted it was the President with Alor responding "you better take off your jacket because you must be wearing a wire." Ghosh urged the SPLM to engage more closely with Taha, "Ali Osman is a good person, he is a statesman." He suggested that Alor spend more time with the VP, "Ali likes you. He is not as comfortable around Salva Kiir who doesn,t talk when he is angry." Ghosh suggested to Alor that "both the SPLM and NISS don,t like the military," a suggestion that the wary FM rejected, adding "we are neutral in the SPLM, we made a deal with a party not an individual." Ghosh cryptically remarked that "some of our people are cowards, they don,t want to take bold action." He noted that, "if something happens, Nafie and Al-Jaz will not be factors, they will follow," the implication being that they will follow Taha. ¶11. (C) Alor noted to CDA Fernandez that one of his cousins, who is a NISS Brigadier (Koul Deng),is sure that Bashir,s guards are being infiltrated or suborned to prepare the ground for a bloodless coup sometime after the next year. "An ICC indictment could be a trigger to action, rather than uniting the regime, it could tear it apart although there is always a chance the President would move first." Deng believes Bashir is in a weaker position than ever before but cannot be counted out yet, "he knows they are plotting". He suggested that there is a faint if ironic possibility of a Bashir-Sadiq al-Mahdi alliance against the Islamists (ironic because Bashir overthrow Al-Mahdi in the 1989 coup) although the President is hampered by the fact that "whatever he does, he is the one with the ICC arrest warrant looming, not Taha or anyone else right now." ¶12. (C) Comment: We defer to Embassy Cairo on the Egyptians, but much of Alor's analysis rings true. Conspiracy and plotting is like breathing in Sudan and both the NCP and SPLM are inveterate plotters and schemers so much of this needs to be put in the context of "business a usual in Sudan," but certainly since the July 14 ICC announcement on President Bashir, the NCP has been under tremendous pressure and doesn,t seem to be trying very hard to hide the growing internal fissures within the regime. If Taha has indeed grown so strong, it will have been quite a political resurrection for the former regime strongman. We agree with Alor that the situation is very dynamic and turbulent (while it is obvious that Taha,s influence is definitely increasing),that Bashir is not finished yet and that it is not at all clear how it will turn out in the next few months. Both Bashir and the civilian Islamists also fear that precipitous action could drag the entire regime down, not just their rivals. All parties and factions in Sudan will continue to maneuver and shift to take advantage of an increasingly volatile political situation, not just in Darfur, but increasingly in Khartoum. End comment. FERNANDEZ