Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM1633
2008-11-09 14:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

CHADIAN REBELS: RFC'S ERDIMI SAYS IT IS HIS TURN

Tags:  PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC KPKO UN AU SU CD 
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OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1633/01 3141412
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FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2264
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001633 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: CHADIAN REBELS: RFC'S ERDIMI SAYS IT IS HIS TURN
TO LEAD

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1616

B. KHARTOUM 1593

C. KHARTOUM 1574

D. NDJAMENA 396

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001633

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS ASEC KPKO UN AU SU CD
SUBJECT: CHADIAN REBELS: RFC'S ERDIMI SAYS IT IS HIS TURN
TO LEAD

REF: A. KHARTOUM 1616

B. KHARTOUM 1593

C. KHARTOUM 1574

D. NDJAMENA 396

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In two separate meetings on November 6 and
7, Timan Erdimi and his Secretary General of the Rally for
the Forces of Change (RFC),Mahamat Hanno, both forcefully
argued that Erdimi is the best leader for the Chadian rebels.
Erdimi bashed rival UFDD leader Mahamat Nouri, and said that
his own Zaghawa tribal identity could actually be an asset in
a transitional Chadian government. Both RFC leaders claimed
that they are not intimidated by the Government of Chad's new
military assets, claiming that they will attack and hold
large areas of eastern Chad. END SUMMARY.

BASHING NOURI
- - - - - - - -

2. (C) Erdimi reviewed rebel efforts to select a single
leader of a unified movement (refs a-c),then quickly turned
to criticize UFDD's Mahamat Nouri. Erdimi acknowledged that
Nouri is the most senior leader, but cautioned that age
should not be the sole criterion for selecting a leader,
joking "if age is the most important thing, you would have
ended up with McCain, not Obama." Hanno acknowledged that
Erdimi and Nouri have the most experience, wisdom and
knowledge among the movement leaders. However, he too
accused Nouri of wanting to usurp a position that naturally
should go to Erdimi, as the most experienced rebel leader.
Hanno noted the problem of leadership would be resolved were
Nouri and Erdimi to agree, as the other leaders would accept
their decision. He said RFC was ready to make concessions
and propose a third leader other than Nouri and Erdimi.
(Note: Erdimi did not repeat this proposal in his separate
meeting. End Note.)


3. (C) According to Erdimi, the Government of Sudan
previously pushed Mahamat Nouri's leadership because of his
Gorane ethnicity. "The GoS did not want a new Chadian leader
from tribes (like the Zaghawa and Arabs) that have a presence
in both Chad and Sudan," said Erdimi. UFDD's Nouri twice
failed to unite the Chadian rebels and topple Deby, and he
should be replaced, Erdimi continued. According to Erdimi,
there are very strong feelings among many different rebel
leaders that Nouri is not an appropriate leader for this
united rebel front.

ZAGHAWA IDENTITY AN ASSET, NOT A LIABILITY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4. (C) Asked whether a Chadian rebel leader from the

Zaghawa tribe would be acceptable to the Government of Sudan,
Erdimi responded, "in the short term the GoS does fear the
Zaghawa, but they view Chad's and Darfur's Arabs as more of a
long-term threat." According to Erdimi, during this latest
search for a leader, the GoS has not proposed Nouri (or any
other leader,) and will accept whomever the rebels choose.
Although some rebel leaders fear replacing one Zaghawa for
another (i.e. Deby for Erdimi,) Erdimi stated that he
believes that this ethnic continuity could ease the
transition period from one government to the next. According
to Erdimi, the Zaghawa dominate the upper echelon of the GoC,
and while many of them would reject a president of a
different ethnicity, they would accept Deby's removal by
another Zaghawa. "If the other rebels are telling you that
we cannot have more Zaghawa leadership, they do not recognize
the overall importance of this tribe and they will fail,"
claimed Erdimi.


5. (C) Hanno was more direct, accusing Nouri of fostering
tribalism within the rebels, and saying that Nouri firmly
believes that Chad should not be governed by another Zaghawa.
Hanno added that the GoS recognizes that Chad will not be
stable without a significant role for the Zaghawas. Although
proudly asserting his Zaghawa identity, Erdimi claimed that
RFC is an ethnically-diverse movement, and only 40 percent of
its fighters are from the Zaghawa tribe.

PLAN TO TAKE THE EAST
- - - - - - - - - - -

6. (C) Although Hanno declined to comment on the schedule of
the next offensive, he did assert that RFC has strongly

KHARTOUM 00001633 002 OF 002


considered the military plan of taking and holding Eastern
Chad (as opposed to storming N'Djamena). Hanno asserted that
this is only natural, as every Chadian president came to
power by taking eastern Chad, and said that the most crucial
area is around Abeche. While admitting that it is difficult
to hold on to cities for an extended period of time, Hanno
speculated that it would be possible to hold rural areas,
attack cities to take GoC military equipment, and avoid
international forces by steering clear of IDP and refugee
camps. Separately, Erdimi agreed, saying that the GoS has
not put any pressure on the rebels to halt their military
activities, only encouraging them to select a single leader.
Erdimi said that if there is no progress in negotiations
(with Deby,) 2009 will be a very busy year for the rebels.
Hanno was even more blunt, saying, "we are in Africa, and
regime change is done by military force!"

NO FEAR FOR DEBY'S EQUIPMENT
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

7. (C) Military equipment alone has little value in Chad's
rugged environment, and the RFC understands Deby's inherent
weaknesses (especially as RFC is composed primarily of
dissidents from Deby's army and guards,) Hanno said. For
example, Hanno stated, Libya brought thousands of tanks and
hundreds of helicopters to eastern Chad in the Chad-Libya war
in the 1980's, but the more mobile and better motivated
Chadian forces easily destroyed and captured all of these.
Compared to this massive Libyan deployment, Deby's two or
three planes and helicopters "are nothing," Hanno asserted.
Separately Erdimi agreed, saying that equipment without the
men is worthless. "Wars are fought by people, not
equipment," summarized Hanno.

"MY MEN HAVE RETURNED"
- - - - - - - - - - - -

8. (C) Erdimi said that over 80 percent of RFC's men who
joined the government (in deals such as that brokered by
GoC's Abderahman Moussa with former RFC commander Becher
Issack Togoi in August 2008, ref d) have returned to the
RFC's camps in Eastern Chad and Darfur. Erdimi said that the
number of men who defected was greatly exaggerated by
President Deby, and that only 135 documented RFC fighters
ever joined the government, the majority of whom now have
returned. Hanno asserted the RFC is the real backbone of the
rebellion, and that if the RFC pulled out, Deby would no
longer be threatened and the rebellion would collapse. Hanno
claimed that the RFC has approximately 2000 fighters. (Note:
ICG's September 24 report on Chad cites a number of 3,000
for the RFC, while other Chadian rebels have estimated that
the RFC has less than 1,000 troops, refs a-c.) Erdimi
claimed that the RFC is committed to a united rebel front,
and that it will not stage an attack alone, although it could
succeed.

COMMENT:
- - - - -

9. (C) The meetings with Erdimi and Hanno proved that the
Chadian rebels continue to struggle with competing ethnic
identities, big egos, and an overall leadership struggle.
Erdimi clearly sees himself as the most appropriate choice.
He somewhat awkwardly and unconvincingly attempted to frame
his ethnicity as acceptable to the rebels, the ruling elite
in N'Djamena and to the GoS. Although all of the Chadian
rebels with whom we have spoken agree that Deby must go and
the international community must oversee negotiations, their
similarities seem to stop at that. Certainly, the Khartoum
clique has developed quite a allergy for the clannish and
aggressive Zaghawa and fears that another Zaghawa ruling in
Chad will repeat the pattern of Deby himself, who came to
power in 1990 with the same Khartoum regime's help. Post will
continue to follow Chadian rebel activities in Khartoum in
the coming weeks, as contacts continue to predict that a
single leader will be selected sometime in November.
FERNANDEZ

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