SUDAN'S OIL - DEBT, DYSFUNCTION, AND DISTRUST

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000163 SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/SPG, AF/EPS, EB/IFD, AND EB/ESC DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR, AND ALSO PASS USAID SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ECON EAID SU SUBJECT: SUDAN'S OIL - DEBT, DYSFUNCTION, AND DISTRUST REF: KHARTOUM 1719 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In separate meetings with econoffs from January 24-31, leading oil experts expressed concern about significant northern oil revenue arrears to the south estimated to be between $150-250 million USD. Contacts were also critical of the dysfunctional institutions managing petroleum in both the North and in the South. The meetings also reveal a startling lack of attention by the GoSS to oil industry revenues, which are available for them to review. These leading oil experts, including the Norwegian Petroleum Envoy and the Director General of the GoSS Petroleum Unit, urged greater transparency, institutional development, and planning for the oil industry, warning that disagreements over petroleum could lead to war if the South secedes in 2011. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) Meetings: On January 24, EconOff met Catriona Laing and Andrew Hall, the Country Director and lead Economist for the U.K's Department for International Development (DFID). On January 29, EconOffs met Yousif Ramadan, the Director General of the Petroleum Unit, and one of the few southerners working on oil issues in Khartoum. On January 31, econoffs met Anders Hannevik, the Norwegian Petroleum Envoy to Sudan. Hannevik has been in Sudan for approximately 5 months of his two year tour. NORTHERN OIL ARREARS -------------- ¶3. (SBU) According to figures compiled by Yousif Ramadan, the Director General of the Petroleum Unit of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS),northern arrears to the South by the end of November 2007 amount to approximately 177 million U.S. dollars. (Note: With estimates as high as one-quarter of a billion dollars, neither Ramadan nor Hannevik were able to verify the exact amount of arrears, as debts from 2005 are disputed. End note.) Ramadan stated that he has voiced concern to senior GoSS leaders such as President Salva Kiir about the size of the arrears, but that senior leaders have not raised the issue with GNU politicians. The Norwegian Petroleum Envoy, Anders Hannevik, said that Ramadan's figures for the arrears are accurate and that it is "absolutely worth pushing this issue with senior politicians, as this is a significant amount of money." (Note: Ramadan's report is available at www.petrolgoss.net and the November figures for the GoSS share from oil revenues published by the Ministry of Finance have been sent to AF/SPG. End Note.) DYSFUNCTIONAL INSTITUTIONS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Ramadan stated that the National Petroleum Commission (formed by a Presidential decree in 2005) still does not have an office, representatives, or any functioning bodies except for the joint technical committee which distributes revenues. Working out of a decrepit office rented from the Sudanese Council of Churches, Ramadan said he remains physically isolated from other colleagues at the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM),and that there is still no indication that the NPC will build a physical office any time soon. The Norwegian Petroleum Envoy confirmed that the NPC is dysfunctional, meeting only once in the summer of 2007 to decide the fate of Block B. (Note: The Assessment and Evaluation Commission's factual report on the Status of the CPA Implementation, from October 2007, notes that "The NPC has been established. Internal regulations were adopted April 19, ¶2007. The Joint Technical Committee on Oil Revenue has been formed and is functioning. The Secretariat is partially functioning, but is awaiting GOSS nominees." End Note.) ¶5. (SBU) Ramadan also stated that "the amount of information that we receive from the Ministry of Energy and Mining is in decline." He complained that key government ministries are not anywhere close to the CPA's goal of having 20-30% of all civil service positions designated to southern Sudanese (as stipulated in the power sharing protocols of the CPA, 2.6). Ramadan was equally critical of his own southern government, saying "We need our GoSS ministers to do something to put our house in order. Our representatives at the Ministry of Energy and Mining say the same thing over and over and there is a lot of indifference about oil issues." Ramadan said that despite his position as one of the lead interpreters of oil revenue, senior southern leaders have only called on him "once or twice" to ask questions or seek more information about the figures. ¶6. (SBU) The Norwegian Petroleum envoy also emphasized that the institutions responsible for managing Sudanese oil need to be improved. Hannevik stated that there is an unnecessary delay in calculating and transferring the revenue owed to the south. According to Hannevik, the Ministry of Energy and Mining receives daily production reports and this information should be immediately available to the GoSS. Hannevik stated that there is no system or schedule for distributing revenue, for analyzing the data, or for withdrawing money from the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account (ORSA). Hannevik stated that given the amount of money and the dependence on this revenue, it is ridiculous that there are not firm procedures KHARTOUM 00000163 002 OF 002 in place. According to Hannevik, the Government of Southern Sudan still has not received any funds since January 1, 2008 and that this may start to affect their ability to function. SECESSION AND OIL -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Returning to themes from his November 2007 presentation to S/E Natsios (reftel),Hannevik stated that the latest oil figures show even more dramatically that the North will lose almost all of its oil revenue if the South secedes in 2011. He said that his current modeling of the net value of projected total production shows that this revenue drop to the North may be unacceptable for the NCP and could potentially lead to disastrous results including a return to war. According to Hannevik, production in the North is declining dramatically, while it is gradually increasing in the South. Hannevik added that production in block 6 located in the North is declining and all of it is going to Sudanese refineries for local consumption, leaving essentially no oil for export produced in the North. Hannevik said that Abyei's declining oil reserves "make it less of an issue than the larger question about the 2011 referendum." Hannevik said that he has shared his oil prediction estimates with many senior GoSS leaders including Salva Kiir, and is scheduled to give his first presentation to senior NCP leaders the week of February 3. Yousif Ramadan agreed that oil could be a destabilizing factor following secession, saying "I am afraid of 2011," adding "all of the oil in the South will belong to us in 2011, but the North will not accept a sudden decline in revenues." INCENTIVES FOR 2011 PLANNING -------------- -- ¶8. (SBU) Hannevik emphasized that it may be possible to offer incentives to the North and the South for planning for the oil industry after 2011. Hannevik emphasized that this would require close cooperation with China, noting that the Norwegian Foreign Minister is currently in China and that the Norwegian MFA had even considered sending Hannevik on this trip to discuss Sudanese oil issues. Hannevik stated, "The oil contracts were written when the price of oil was $18 a barrel. It is now around $100 a barrel and it is my personal opinion that too much oil revenue is going out of the country." Hannevik stated that he believes that if pressured, the Chinese might be willing to renegotiate oil contracts, as they are more concerned about energy security and access to oil than to its price. "They could spare to lose a few dollars and still be happy with their arrangement in Sudan," stated Hannevik. ¶9. (SBU) DFID's Catriona Laing and Andrew Hall also told econoff that the U.K. is interested in long-term planning for the oil industry. Laing stated that the British have modeled different options for post-2011 revenue sharing and are interested in offering incentives such as debt relief for the North and the South should they agree to a deal. Laing said that one scenario would establish milestones for cooperation (the first being the 2009 mid-term elections) that would be tied to oil revenue post-2011. Laing emphasized that the British are interested in debt relief as one option, and that the U.S. might be able to give other incentives in a larger package. Laing stated that linking secession and petroleum in one discussion is a sensitive issue that will require support from the U.S., UK, Norway, the Netherlands, and China. ¶10. (SBU) COMMENT: Contacts painted a bleak picture of the Sudanese oil industry, hampered by non-existent institutions, disorganization, shocking lack of oversight by the South, and great distrust. The GoSS appears paralyzed by these challenges, satisfied with its current revenues, distracted by constant crises, and disadvantaged by its lack of experience in the industry. The elite in the GNU appear to benefit from this, making key decisions by themselves, building up arrears to the South to make them even more dependent, and doing little to make the industry more transparent, comprehensible, and inclusive. Much can be done to improve the industry including: training key GoSS personnel; facilitating information-sharing between the North and the South; supporting southern representation in key government ministries; and standardizing procedures and timelines associated with revenue transfers. The meetings also reveal a startling lack of attention by the GoSS to oil industry revenues, which are available for them to review. Absolutely essential for long-term peace and stability, the discussion on post-secession oil revenue sharing should commence as soon as possible and should be linked to discussions on Abyei. FERNANDEZ