Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08KHARTOUM1616
2008-11-04 16:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

CHADIAN REBELS: SELECTING A LEADER, MILITARY

Tags:  ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2234
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001616 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG AND AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: CHADIAN REBELS: SELECTING A LEADER, MILITARY
PLANS, AND CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

REF: A. KHARTOUM 01558

B. KHARTOUM 01593

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001616

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG AND AF/C
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO UN AU SU
SUBJECT: CHADIAN REBELS: SELECTING A LEADER, MILITARY
PLANS, AND CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

REF: A. KHARTOUM 01558

B. KHARTOUM 01593

Classified By: CDA Alberto M. Fernandez, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 2, UFDD-F leader Abdoulwahid
Aboud Makaye told poloffs that Chadian rebel leadership
meeting in Khartoum will soon choose a leader by consensus,
random selection, or a complicated multi-staged election.
According to Aboud, the Chadian opposition does not fear the
Government of Chad's new air assets, nor its increased
military deployment in Eastern Chad. Aboud boasted of his
own movement's force ("the second strongest after UFCD") and
the overall strength of the opposition, which is light,
mobile, and "able to hold areas of Eastern Chad for up to two
months." Like Tollimi (reftel),Aboud sought the
intervention of the international community (especially the
U.S.) but feared it might come too late and only when the
movements would have besieged N'Djamena. END SUMMARY.

DESPERATE MEASURES: A UNIQUE, REVOLVING ELECTORAL SYSTEM TO
CHOOSE A LEADER
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- - - - - - -

2. (C) Aboud confirmed Tollimi's reports of Chadian rebel
unification efforts (reftel) in Khartoum, and reported the
movements have agreed on a common political and military
platform that will culminate in a written manifesto. He
admitted the difficulty of choosing a leader, but said
Chadian opposition was focusing on forming the structure of
the political alliance consisting of a president, a first and
a second vice-president, the parliament and 32 ministers. He
was optimistic that this could be done in the next two weeks.
On the question of choosing a leader, Aboud foresaw three
options: 1) Choice by consensus, something that was
"unlikely" in his opinion; 2) Election by a complicated,
multi-staged, *secret* ballot; 3) Random drawing. (Aboud
admitted this final choice was unpopular with the movements,
but that it could be a last resort if the first two options
fail.)


3. (C) Aboud described the second option, the electoral
system, in much of its complexity and detail. Each of the
five Chadian rebel movements would provide three
representatives to participate in the election for a total of
fifteen representatives. However, the fifteen representatives
would only be allowed to vote for four out of five leaders at
a time to compel them to vote for someone other than their
own leader. The voting would occur for five consecutive

rounds with different candidates in each election. (Note:
Aboud did not specify exactly how candidates would be
nominated, what would occur in the chance of a tie, or the
exact specifications of this unique system. End Note.)
Aboud said that although all rebel leaders have not agreed to
this system, they are moving towards agreement on this
structure, should they need to use it.

ANOTHER VOICE OF SUPPORT FOR TOLLIMI
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

4. (C) When asked which individual he would support for the
leadership of the Chadian opposition, Aboud broke out into an
uncontrolled laugh. (Comment: It was not clear whether
Aboud was struck by poloffs directness, or whether he found
the question amusing, as he obviously considers himself the
best leader for the rebels. End Comment.) When the question
was rephrased ("What leader would you support other than
yourself,") Aboud recovered and said that many rebels look to
Nouri as their leader, as Nouri is the eldest in the group
"and in Africa it is natural for the oldest person to be
regarded as the natural leader." Despite Nouri's traditional
appeal, Aboud personally would support Abaker Tollimi because
he believes that: 1) Nouri is not appropriate given his ties
to Hissene Habre, (reftel.) 2) Nouri lacks the personal
leadership and charisma necessary to unite the rebels. 3)
Tollimi would be an acceptable leader to the other movements.
Aboud mused that since Tollimi serves Nouri, the only way
that Tollimi would be able to take leadership of the Chadian
rebels, is if Nouri removed himself as a candidate and
endorsed his subordinate Tollimi. With respect to other
candidates, Aboud repeated Tollimi,s analysis (reftel) on
why Erdimi and Adouma Hassaballah would be unsuitable
leaders. Although Hassaballah controls the largest military
force, he suffers from high blood pressure, diabetes, and is

KHARTOUM 00001616 002 OF 003


not a powerful leader, stated Aboud. Contrary to Tollimi,s
predictions, Aboud made no mention of Fidel Moungar or
Ngarlegy Yorongar (reftel),though he did stress the need to
include exiled opposition leaders in an inclusive dialogue.

UNITED OR NOT, NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE KEY TO A DEMOCRATIC CHAD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

5. (C) Aboud stated that even without unification,
negotiations with the GoC are possible if the international
community agrees to oversee the process. He asserted that
the lack of unification would not undermine such negotiations
as the process should include Chadian reconciliation efforts
to include political opposition leaders and civil society.
He called on, in particular, the African Union (AU),United
Nations (UN),European Union (EU),and the U.S. to lead the
mediation. He insisted on a multi-lateral effort so as to
avoid a repeat of the Sirte Agreement, where the AU, instead
of mediating, simply facilitated a meeting with Deby and left
them at the mercy of the Libyans. "We are not just after
money," he quipped. He claimed the AU alone would not get
involved as it has been reticent to engage seriously in
mediating this conflict. He said he personally had met the
AU,s representative in Khartoum to encourage AU mediation
and that the Chadian opposition is still waiting for a
response to a letter they sent to the AU urging its
involvement (Note: Aboud did not elaborate when asked when
the letter was sent. Poloffs have previously requested a
copy of this letter from Chadian opposition representatives
on multiple occasions, a request the latter were unable to
fulfill. End note.)


6. (C) As to the future of Chad, Aboud emphasized that the
Chadian opposition believes in the democratic transformation
of Chad. He explained that negotiations should clearly
outline the terms of a government of national unity during
the transition period and the movements should let Deby
finish his mandate. He believed an agreement must guarantee
the vice presidency to the military opposition (i.e. the
Chadian rebels). He elaborated the latter would have the
mandate to form a real Chadian National Army. He also
believed an agreement must include a clause forbidding Deby
from contesting the next presidential elections.

MILITARY OPTION STILL A POSSIBILITY
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

7. (C) Asked if the movements fear Deby's military build-up
in Eastern Chad, a confident Aboud replied they were not
worried and further asserted that "they could still take
N'Djamena." He claimed they are not scared of Deby,s new
military acquisitions, which included tanks and new air
assets (specifically noting 11 helicopters and 2 F-111
airplanes positioned.) Aboud confirmed that some rebel
movements would like to attack and hold Eastern Chad, rather
than drive all the way to N'Djamena. Aboud accepted that the
Chadian rebels cannot hold land indefinitely ("one or two
months at the most,") but thought that this would be enough
time to force the government to the negotiating table. Aboud
did acknowledge, however, that holding land any longer than
this would be difficult for the movements. He stated that
the rebels' strength lies in their speed, mobility, and
unpredictability. He stressed they preferred negotiations,
but are afraid it would take them staging an attack all the
way to the presidential palace in N'Djamena for the
international community to take them seriously.

FRANCE IS PART OF THE PROBLEM
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8. (C) Aboud lamented France's meddling in African internal
affairs, in particular the paternalistic relationship it
maintains with its former colonies. He said he understood it
to be the vestige of colonization, but deplores that France
seems to have a relationship not with the state, but with
just the head of state. He commented France was better placed
than any other nation to exert pressure on Deby, as it can
leverage its military cooperation with the GoC to encourage
Deby to engage with the opposition. Instead, Aboud said
France uses it to help Deby and provide the government with
intelligence on the whereabouts of the movements. He accused
France of adopting a self-serving stance as the current
status quo allows France to continue to extract resources for
its own benefit. He decried such a blatant abuse of power,
and asked how France would react if the oppositions movements
gain power and annul Franco-Chadian treaties. He encouraged
the U.S. to become more involved in Chad to counter France's

KHARTOUM 00001616 003 OF 003


undue influence.

COMMENT
- - - - -

9. (C) Overall, Aboud appeared to be an intelligent,
affable, and engaging character (especially when compared to
gruff and illogical characters such as UFCD's Hasaballah.)
Although we have only heard it from our last three contacts
with the Chadian opposition, it is remarkable that all three
named Abaker Tollimi as their choice for the Chadian
opposition's leadership (both the Dutch and French
Ambassadors have recently speculated to us that Aboud himself
could be the Khartoum regime's choice as he seems the "most
stable and trustworthy" choice for the ruling NCP). Whether
Tollimi will gain the support of his own leader, Nouri, or
whether the strange systems for selecting a leader will
actually result in his leadership remains to be seen. Our
conversation with Aboud led us to the conclusion that the
Chadian rebels are desperate for a leader (even considering
selecting a leader out of a hat,) deeply divided (to the
extent that they invented an elaborate and incomprehensible
voting system,) and very anxious for international
engagement. Given that the Sudanese government may be
pressing the Chadian rebels not to mount attacks into Chad
over the next few months, the Chadian rebels should have
plenty of time to resolve their leadership issues, if they
are able.
FERNANDEZ

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